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Judicialization is the process through which adjudi­
catory institutions attain attributes of recognized courts. 
In the American national government judicialization occurs 
in the evolution of a tribunal from an administrative advi­
sory panel into a constitutional court fully Incorporated 
Into the Federal judiciary. In theory, adjudicatory insti­
tutions can be placed along a continuum ranging from execu­
tive to Judicial adjudication. Criteria for placement are 
based on the extent of presence of acknowledged characteris­
tics of judicial justice. The continuum framework reveals 
relationships among tribunals at a given time or the move­
ment of a specific tribunal over time.
The evolutionary process is vivid in the trans­
formation of intermediate appellate bodies in the American 
military judicial system. Courts of Military Review are 
the contemporary institutional result of Judicialization of 
appellate review in the larger of the two criminal justice 
systems created by the national government. A Court of 
Military Review In each armed service— Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Coast Guard— examines automatically trial court 
convictions resulting In severe sentences. These cases may
iv
receive a discretionary review by the Court of Military 
Appeals, a tribunal of three Presldentially appointed 
civilian Judges. Appellate examination of convictions is 
an anomaly in the history of Anglo-American military law. 
Only since World War II in the United States has Justice 
replaced discipline as the objective of the military legal 
system.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the 
Courts of Military Review are evolving toward a status of 
genuine judicial institutions recognized in law and fact 
as legislative courts. The hypothesis is substantiated 
through (1) a critical survey of military legal history to 
document the appellate transformation, (2) an analysis of 
judicial and legislative decisions affecting the intermedi­
ate appellate tribunals, (3) a comparison of judicial 
behavior in military courts with that in courts of state 
and other national jurisdictions, and (4) a normative 
critique of proposals for future reform of appellate insti­
tutions and procedures, A descriptive methodology is used 
to identify and analyze characteristics of the military 
appellate tribunals for placement on the continuum of 
adjudicatory institutions. Limited use is made of tech­
niques from the traditional and behavioral approaches to 
judicial research. The principal source materials are 
legislative and Judicial documents, Interviews with
v
participants in the military appellate process, and pub­
lished evaluations of the legal system by competent com­
mentators. A comparable analytical format is usable for 
examining other adjudicatory institutions undergoing 
j udicialization.
Evidence supports the conclusion that the Courts 
of Military Review in the 1969-1971 period attained a 
position on the judicialization continuum comparable to 
that of recognized legislative courts, tribunals formally 
declared by Congress to have been created under Article I 
of the Constitution. The Courts of Military Review have 
not received that Congressional declarations in contrast, 
the Court of Military Appeals and the United States Tax 
Court have been declared by Congress to be Article I 
courts. Nevertheless, United States Supreme Court dicta 
suggest the classification of the military intermediate 
appellate tribunals as legislative courts, the absence of 
a Congressional declaration notwithstanding. Predictably, 
the Courts of Military Review will continue to gain the 
attributes of genuine courts. Some of these features can 




FROM EXECUTIVE TO JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION
In 1972 the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 
reversed the murder conviction of Jennie B. Griffin 
because the trial judge improperly prohibited jury con­
sideration of self-defense e v i d e n c e , I n  1972 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
murder conviction of J. D. Collier because the trial judge 
gave insufficient weight to evidence of the defendant's 
insanity at the time of the offense.2 In 1970 the United 
States Air Force Court of Military Review reversed the 
murder conviction of Albert V. Parmes because the trial 
judge erroneously admitted certain psychiatric examination 
reports which should have been classified as hearsay 
evidence.3
The overriding significance of these cases from 
the three criminal jurisdictions in the United States is 
not simply the prevention of Injustice to these defendants;
1Griffin v. State, 273 So. 2d 478 (Ala. Crim. App.
1971).
2Unlted States v. Collier, 453 F. 2d 1173 (5th Cir.
1972).
^United States v. Parmes, 42 CMR 1010 (AFCMR 1970).
1
2
instead, it is the reality that within the American military 
legal system intermediate appellate courts now exist which 
are capable of Impartially reviewing courts-martial action. 
This study analyzes the continuing evolution of military 
appellate tribunals into counterparts of national and state 
courts. Specialized criminal appellate methods in civilian 
Jurisdictions were developed in the late nineteenth cen­
tury. In contrast, military appellate tribunals were estab­
lished more than fifty years later, in 195.1, In the first 
effective Congressional action to reduce centuries-old exe­
cutive control of the armed forces legal processes. Trans­
formation from executive into judicial adjudication has 
resulted from the impact of public opinion, political lead- 
ership, and the acknowledgment by military officials of the 
necessity of equal justice for all Americans.
Military judicial organization
Since enactment in 1950 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, adjudication of criminal offenses in the 
four armed services has been accomplished in a three-tiered 
court system.^ The structure corresponds to that of the 
courts of general jurisdiction of the national government 
and to that of twenty-three states.5 Trials are conducted
**10 U.S.C. secs. 801-940 (1970). The Uniform Code 
was enacted May 5» 1950, 64 Stat. 108, and amended subse­
quently, most significantly October 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1335*
^The Council of State Governments, The Book of the 
States, 1972-1973 (Lexington, Ky.: The Council of State
Governments, 1972), p. 125-
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in a court of first instance; in the military this tribunal 
is called a court-martial, while in the national and in 
many state systems the typical term is district court. An 
appeal by a convicted defendant is heard, potentially, in 
two appellate courts within each Jurisdiction. Trial court 
judgments in the military are examined first by the Court 
of Military Review established in each service— Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Coast Guard. Approximately 10 per cent of 
these cases are reviewed additionally by the United States 
Court of Military Appeals, the court of last resort in the 
military judicial system.? Equivalent courts in the regular 
national judiciary are the eleven Courts of Appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court. Similar titles are common in 
the states with intermediate and supreme courts. A military 
or a state case may be further examined in an infrequently 
granted appeal to the United States Supreme Court.® The 
Courts of Military Review resemble most directly in Juris­
diction and purpose the Court of Criminal Appeals of
610 U.S.C. sec. 866 (1970).
710 U.S.C. sec. 867 (1970).
^Appeals to the United States Supreme Court from 
the state supreme courts and from the United States Courts 
of Appeals can be initiated immediately after adverse deci­
sions of those courts. In contrast, a military appeal must 
be reframed and Introduced in the lowest Federal court. 
Consequently, the number of military cases successfully 
appealed to the Supreme Court is very small. See, below, 
pp. 164-65*
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Tennessee and of Alabama.9 in these states separate inter­
mediate courts exist for criminal and civil litigation; in 
other states with a three-tiered structure intermediate 
appellate courts hear both categories of cases.^
The Courts of Military Review receive cases within 
their Jurisdiction automatically from trial courts; in con­
trast, state and federal Courts of Appeals examine cases 
initiated by the convicted defendant. The military tri­
bunals review convictions from two of the three classifi­
cations of trial courts, the general and special courts- 
martial.11 All cases must be reviewed in which the sentence
^Tennessee, Tennessee Code Annotated (1956 with 
1972 cumulative supplement), secs. 16-441, 16-448, and 
16-452; and, Alabama, The Code of Alabama, Recompiled,
(1959 with 1971 cumulative supplement, title 13, sec.
111(1). The Tennessee court was established in 1967 and 
that of Alabama in 1969.
^Texas and Oklahoma have a Court of Criminal 
Appeals which reviews cases directly from trial courts; 
however, this court's decisions are not reviewable by the 
supreme court in either of the two states. The court 
structure is three-tiered for civil litigation only.
Texas, Constitution, art. 5, sec. 4; and, Oklahoma, Con­
stitution, art. 7, sec. 4.
11The third, and lowest, classification of court- 
martial is the summary court, which corresponds to a jus­
tice of the peace or magistrate court in many state systems. 
Jurisdiction of this layman court is limited to trial of 
enlisted men for certain minor offenses with a maximum pos­
sible punishment of one-month confinement. Decisions of 
these courts are reviewed administratively by the military 
commander who convened the court-martial. Normally his 
decision to approve the trial verdict and sentence is based 
on advice from a military attorney. The commander's only 
options are to accept the court judgment or to reduce the 
sentence. 10 U.S.C. sec. 820 (1970)*
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(1) includes confinement for one year or more, a dishonor­
able or bad-conduct discharge, dismissal, or the death 
penalty, or (2) affects a general or flag o f f i c e r . A d d i ­
tionally, a general court-martial not meeting a criterion 
for automatic review may be referred to the Court of Mili­
tary Review at the discretion of the senior legal officer 
of each armed service, the Judge Advocate General.**-3 in 
about 90 per cent of the cases the decision of the Court 
of Military Review is final. Controversial matters of law 
in the remaining cases are resolved by the Court of Mili­
tary Appeals upon the granting of a petition for review 
initiated by the appellant.1^
The Courts of Military Review perform essential 
functions of appellate tribunals of any jurisdiction. The
1210 U.S.C. pec. 866(b) (1970). A flag officer 
holds one of the five highest grades in the Navy or Coast 
Guard, the grades of commodore through fleet admiral. The 
equivalent grades in the Army and Air Force are brigadier 
general through general of the Army (Air Force).
■^10 U.S.C. sec. 869 (1970). For clarification, the 
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation performs 
for the Coast Guard those functions assigned to the Judge 
Advocate General in the other three services.
m A comparatively small number of cases are heard 
by the Court of Military Appeals under two other provisions 
of the Uniform Code. A Judge Advocate General may order a 
case forwarded to the highest court following a decision of 
a Court of Military Review which contains new or contro­
versial interpretations of military law. The purpose of 
this procedure, called certification, is to obtain an 
authoritative declaration on the issue by the Court of 
Military Appeals. The remaining category consists of those 
cases involving the death penalty or affecting a general 
or flag officer. 10 U.S.C. sec. 867(b) (1970).
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Courts conduct an "independent and objective assessment" 
of the procedure in and Judgment of trial courts to ensure 
that Justice prevails.-*-5 Through a centralized examination 
of trial records3 each Court determines and maintains con-• 
sistent standards in courts-martial within its military 
department. In these tasks the Courts develop the military 
common law through their authoritative interpretation of
■I /Tstatutes. In accomplishing these functions, the military 
courts have a distinct advantage over other criminal appel­
late courts. The military tribunals consider both law and 
fact; other courts cannot evaluate questions of fact.1?
The military legal system is the larger of the two 
criminal law Jurisdictions established by the national 
government.1  ̂ In Fiscal 1971 the United States District 
Courts tried 39,582 cases involving violation of general
15Coppedge v. United States. 369 U.S. 438, 455-56 
(1962) (Justice Stewart concurring).
■^Lester B. Orfleld, Criminal Appeals in America 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1939), pp. 32-34.
•^The Courts of Military Review evaluate facts con­
tained in the transcript of the original trial based on 
the appellate Judges1 own inquiry and on points emphasized 
by appellate counsel. New testimony is not presented to 
the appellate court, although certain post-trial facts can 
on occasion be submitted to the appellate Jurists.
1 8Of course, under the American federal system, 
most crimes are violations of state, rather than national, 
law and are tried In state courts. As an indication of the 
number of state trials, 2,251,647 persons were charged In 
1971 with violation of state criminal law, according to 
data from 2,990 cities. U.S., Department of Justice, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 
for the United States, 1971, P* 110.
criminal law.1  ̂ This total was only about 52 per cent of
the number of courts-martial— 77,31^— in which military
personnel were prosecuted for violation of specialized
criminal law contained in the Uniform Code.2^ Appeals
from these trials established the Courts of Military
Review as the more active of the intermediate appellate
courts with criminal jurisdiction. In Fiscal 1971 the
eleven United States Courts of Appeals disposed of 3,0^7
cases filed by individuals convicted in district courts.21
The four Courts of Military Review completed action on
pp7,123 cases automatically entered on their dockets. The 
percentage of appeals from trials in each jurisdiction was 
approximately the same in 1971.
Judicialization in theory 
and practice
The Courts of Military Review as just described 
represent the contemporary stage in the continuing trans­
formation of military appellate tribunals and procedures.
19U.S., Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, 1971, p. 317-
POU.S., United States Court of Military Appeals and 
the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the 
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, Annual 
Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals and 
the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the 
General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, 1971, 
p. 5. [Hereinafter cited USCMA-JAG"'Annual Report. J
21Annual Report of U.S. Courts, 1971, p. 2^1.
22USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, p. 5.
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The fundamental characteristic of the evolution is the 
increasing replacement of potentially arbitrary executive 
adjudication with independent Judicial adjudication. Evi­
dence suggests that this trend will affect many elements in 
the military legal system. The predictable next event in 
the reform of intermediate appellate courts is uncontested 
recognition of their status as legislative courts estab­
lished by act of Congress.^3 present, the four Courts 
of Military Review disagree on the nature of their creation. 
The statute authorizing establishment of these Courts is 
not as precise as are statutes pertaining to other legis­
lative courts. The issue is significant because further 
enhancement of their judicial status depends upon favorable 
resolution of this controversy.2 **
The process through which tribunals attain addi­
tional attributes of genuine courts is termed judicializa­
tion. Implicit in the concept is the replacement of pro­
cedures of executive, or administrative, adjudication with 
those of judicial adjudication. Two methods of adjudication
^Legislative courts are those tribunals established 
by Congress to participate in the accomplishment of one of 
the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Consti­
tution. These courts are not elements of the judiciary, as 
are courts established under Article III. The United States 
Court of Military Appeals and the United States Tax Court 
are unequivocally recognized as legislative courts created 
under Article I.
pllfcnThe issue of legislative court status for the 
Courts of Military Review Is analyzed in Chapter VI* below.
9
are very evident in the evolution of military appellate 
review. According to Roscoe Pound, a leading American 
legal theorist,
What differentiates administrative adjudication 
from judicial justice is the lack of checks upon arbi­
trary, biased, or extra-legal if not unlawful (in the 
sense of lack of accord with the legal rights of indi­
viduals) action in the one case as compared with the 
numerous and effective checks in the other.25
Criteria for evaluating judicialization of the military 
appellate system are based on Pound's comparison. The 
transition can be described in terms of movement along a 
continuum from administrative toward judicial adjudication. 
The former is characterized by the absence or inadequacy of 
controls on arbitrary acts committed in the name of justice. 
The latter is identified by the presence of effective checks 
on extra-legal activity which impedes justice. At any given 
time the system can be described by determining the extent 
of presence of the acknowledged attributes of judicial jus­
tice. A principal check against biased action is appellate 
review performed by courts possessing essential independ­
ence, i.e., freedom from any external coercion.
Beginning primarily in 1916, American reformers 
have endeavored to eliminate "arbitrary, biased, or extra- 
legal" procedures historically prevailing in military law.2^
25Justice According to Law (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1951), P- 79.
p/T°A detailed examination of the beginning of the 
reform movement is presented in Chapter III, below.
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The difficulty in replacing administrative adjudication 
with Judicial Justice arises from divergent opinions on 
the purpose of military law. Should the system promote 
and ensure Justice as in a civilian criminal Jurisdiction? 
Or* should it be an instrument of discipline for the mili­
tary command hierarchy? Adherents of the former objective 
seek the maximum development of Judicial adjudication with 
all its guarantees of impartial determination of an indi­
vidual's guilt.27 Conversely, advocates of the latter 
urge retention of the commander's traditional discretion 
in using military law to compel obedience, although in 
doing so the rights of the individual might be violated.2® 
Not until the post-World War II period did Congress declare 
the objective of American military law to be the promotion 
of justice.2^
The distinction between administrative and Judicial
^The earliest complete expression of this debate 
occurred in efforts to amend the Articles of War after 
World War I. Both viewpoints are contained in U.S., Con­
gress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Establishment 
of Military Justice, Hearings, before a subcommittee of the 
Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, on S. 64, 66th Cong., 
1st sess., 1919. Additionally, see, Samuel T. Ansell, 
"Military Justice," Cornell Law Quarterly, 5 (November, 
1919)* 1-17; and, Edmund M. Morgan, "The Existing Court- 
Martial System and the Ansell Articles," Yale Law Journal,
29 (November, 1919), 52-74.
? ftIn addition to Hearings on S. 64 (1919), see,
Enoch H. Crowder, Military Justice During the War (Washing­
ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1919)*
29The commitment to a goal of Justice occurred in 
Congress' passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
64 Stat. 108 (1950). [10 U.S.C. secs. 801-940 (1970)].
11
adjudication, as expressed by Pound, can be applied to any 
tribunal regardless of its placement in the United States 
government. Thus, a tribunal located outside the statu­
torily defined Judiciary can conceivably possess attributes 
of Judicial adjudication. This circumstance in fact exists 
in the military legal system. Although the Courts of Mili­
tary Review are presently organized within the military 
departments of the executive branch, they are gaining 
through judicialization characteristics of Article III 
courts.
This analysis is supported by an 1887 United States 
Supreme Court decision which emphasized the judicial nature 
of military trials, although the Court acknowledged that 
courts-martial have historically been separate from the 
American judiciary.30
The whole proceeding from its inception is judi­
cial. The trial, findings, and sentence are the solemn 
acts of a court organized and conducted under the 
authority of and according to the prescribed forms of 
law. It sits to pass upon the most sacred questions 
of human rights that are ever placed on trial in a 
court of justice; rights, which In the very nature of 
things, can neither be exposed to danger nor subjected 
to the uncontrolled will of any man, but which must be 
adjudged according to law.31
The Court pointed out, further, that "a court-martial
3°Runkle v. United States. 122 U.S. 5*13 (1887).
31lbid., p. 558. Emphasis In the original. The 
excerpt is from an 1864 Opinion of the Attorney General / 





organized under the laws of the United States is a court of 
special and limited jurisdiction.11
Nevertheless, the Eunkle opinion did not diminish 
traditional emphasis on administrative adjudication in 
military law. Separation of military and civilian criminal 
legal systems had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
1857s a decision not specifically affected by Runkle 
although the two opinions represented opposite positions 
on the purpose of military law.^2 Supporters of the dis­
ciplinary purpose relied on Dynes v. Hoover as authority 
for minimizing judicial safeguards and procedures in adjudi­
cation. Since the Supreme Court had ruled that military 
courts were "entirely independent" of the Article III judi­
ciary, military law traditionalists concluded that trials 
should be conducted administratively. The most influential 
proponent of this view was William Wlnthrop, an Army legal 
officer in the late nineteenth century. His commentary on 
military law was the basis for many objections to reforms, 
even those proposed in the Uniform Code in 19^9* Winthrop 
wrote:
Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Govern­
ment, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to 
the executive department; and they are in fact simply 
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by 
Congress for the President as Commander-in-chief, to 
aid him In properly commanding the army and navy and 
enforcing the discipline therein. . . .
32Pynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857)*
13
Thus, Indeed, strictly, a court-martial is not a 
court in the full sense of the term, or as the same is understood in the civil p h r a s e o l o g y . 3 3
Administrative adjudication endorsed by Winthrop institu­
tionalized many of the disadvantages described by Pound. 
Specifically, the military legal system before 1951 pro­
vided only a few checks on arbitrary action. Contributing 
to the possibility of biased decisions was the absence of 
an Independent Judiciary. Because a court-martial was 
commonly viewed as an instrumentality for enforcing dis­
cipline, commanders considered appropriate virtually any 
means to accomplish the desired end. Moreover, their acts 
were rarely examined by any other authority, certainly not 
by a formal appellate Judicial tribunal.
Thus, the twentieth century development of a mili­
tary Judiciary approaching Independence from executive con­
trol corresponds with the growth of independent courts in 
England in the seventeenth century. A brief survey of 
Anglo-American military and civilian Judicial history 
illustrates common difficulties existing in administrative 
adjudication.
Since the eleventh century English military laws 
and tribunals have been separate from civilian courts and 
laws. The antecedent of the modern military trial court, 
the Court of the High Constable and Marshal of England, was
^ Military Law and Precedents (2d ed.; Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1896, 1920 reissue),
p. 49. Emphasis in the original.
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administered by two royal appointees as a tribunal apart 
from the regular common law courts. In the sixteenth cen­
tury the court evolved into the Marshal’s Court, the origin 
of the present term "court-martial.” Over time the Marshal 
was replaced by military officers, normally unit commanders, 
empowered to judge and punish soldiers in the name of the 
K i n g .3^ The transition was officially, implemented in a 
royal order issued by James II in 1687.^“* These arrange­
ments were formalized in the Mutiny Act of 1689, the first 
military criminal statute.
The first American military law was adopted by the 
Continental Congress In 1775 in an almost verbatim enact­
ment of the. existing British Articles of War. Consequently, 
the historical separation of military and civilian laws and 
courts was established In America. The early statutes for 
governing the land and naval forces contained many elements 
of administrative adjudication injurious to the rights of 
the Individual. For example, the accused received a form 
of jury trial; however, the verdict and sentence were merely 
advisory to the unit commander. His disposition of the case
3**winthrop, Military Law, pp. 46-47; and, William B. 
Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel, Military haw under the Uni­
form Code of Military Justice (Chapel Hill: University of
NortH—CarolinirTresspT955TT-PP • 4-5.
ocWilliam Holdsworth, A History of English Law, ed. 
by A. L. Goodhart and H. G. Hanbury (7th ed. rev.; London: 
Metheum & Co., 1956, I, 577- See, also, D. P. O'Connell, 
"The Nature of British Military Law," Military Law Review,
19 (January, 1963), 143-44.
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was unreviewable, except In infrequent instances.36
Judicial subservience to royal authority existed 
in the early history of civilian criminal procedure in 
England. Serving at the King's pleasure, judges were 
dismissed from office for political reasons periodically 
in the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries. The con­
flict between the judiciary and the monarchy Intensified 
during the reign of the Stuarts in the seventeenth cen­
tury. 37 The theoretical justification for an independent 
judiciary had been recognized at least since the fifteenth 
c e n t u r y . The Revolution of 1688 and the constitutional 
adjustment thereafter resulted in statutory recognition of 
judicial independence. The Act of Settlement of 1701 gave 
substance to the theory of judicial independence through 
provision for appointment of judges for life during good 
behavior.^9 "The judges exercised the royal power of
3^a detailed examination of the development of 
appellate review in American military law is presented in 
Chapters III through V, below.
37Theodore P. T. Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead1s 
English Constitutional History (11th ed. ; London": Sweet &
Maxwell Limited, 196'OJ, pp. 464-66.
38W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of 
Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine^ from Its Origin to
the Adoption of the United States Constitution, Tulane 
Studies in Political Science, Vol.-9 (New Orleans: Tulane
University, 1965)s P. 5.
■^Geoffrey Cross and G. D. G. Hall. Radcliffe and 
Cross, The English Legal System (4th ed.; London: Butter-
worths, 1964)7 p. 39oT
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keeping the King's peace and vindicating the King's 
authority and it became settled that the King could not 
administer justice in person nor sit in the courts.,,ii0
The increasing independence of English Judges 
before the Revolution of 1688 was not reflected directly 
in the plan of governmental organization espoused by the 
leading political theorist of the period, John Locke. In 
his "Second Treatise of Civil Government," written in 1681, 
Locke omitted a separate judiciary in his three-function 
structure.2*1 Instead, judicial matters were included among 
domestic executive functions. The legislative function was 
the predominant element in Locke's system, which included a 
third function, the federative, related to foreign affairs. 
Approximately fifty years later the French political 
theorist Montesquieu reinterpreted Locke. In examining 
the contemporary English polity Montesquieu identified 
three broad governmental functions accomplished by separate 
entities— the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.2*2 
Although critics now consider Montesquieu to have over­
emphasized the degree of separation among the functions, 
his approach was adopted by succeeding generations as a
2*°Pounda Justice According to Law, p. 84.
illTwo Treatises of Government, ed. by Thomas I.
Cook (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), PP. 194-96.
^ The Spirit of Laws, trans. by Frederic R. Coudert 
(rev. ed.; London: Colonial Press, 1900), I, 151-56.
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prescription for restriction of governmental d e s p o t i s m .
The doctrine of separation of powers was incorporated in 
American national and state constitutions as a reaction to 
many of the excesses of executive authority occurring during 
colonial rule.
An assessment
Thus, the United States inherited from England the 
concept of dividing the principal functions of government 
among separate entities and an associated preference for 
judicial rather than executive adjudication of civilian
^ A n  example of the criticism of Montesquieu's 
accuracy in analyzing the existing English constitution 
is that by. an American political scientist of the early 
twentieth century, Prank J. Goodnow.
"If, however, Montesquieu had carried his researches 
further, he would have seen that the existence of his 
third function of government, i.e., the judicial func­
tion, could not be predicated from the mere fact of the 
independence of the judges. A study of the powers of 
the judges of the higher courts, and particularly of 
the powers of the justices of the peace, would have 
shown conclusively that English political ideas were 
irreconcilable with the existence of three powers of 
government."
Although Goodnow recognized only two functions, which he 
called the expression of the will of the state [politics] 
and the execution of the will of the state [administration], 
he noted the existence in "any concrete government" of three 
authorities engaging in administration. The Judiciary is 
the first of these to become differentiated. He pointed out 
that "the most progressive political communities" have estab­
lished independent judiciaries. Politics and Administration: 
A Study in Government (New York: Russell & Russell, 1900,
1967 reissue], pp. 12, 17-18, and 39. See, also, Gwyn, The 
Meaning of Separation of Powers, 100-107; and, Carl J. 
Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory
and Practice in Europe and America (4th ed.; Waltham, Mass.: 
Blaisdell Publishing Co., I960), pp. 176-77-
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crimes. The preference, however, was not applied to mili­
tary law because of the prevailing opinion that such law 
was chiefly for the disciplining of armed forces. Although 
the military legal system has remained a component of the 
executive branch, judiclalizatlon has occurred in the insti­
tutions and procedures. Progress in judiclalizatlon is 
identified by the presence of those acknowledged attributes 
of a true judiciary. Among these are: independence,
absence of authoritative review by a nonjudicial agency or 
official, shielding of judges from improper political influ­
ence, plus a number of specific powers, including the power 
to summon witnesses and to compel their attendance in court, 
to punish contempt, to issue extraordinary writs, to make 
rules for the administration, of judicial affairs, to con­
trol the admission of attorneys to practice in the court, 
and to exercise other inherent authority necessary to the 
accomplishment of the court's mission.
The four Courts of Military Review are presently 
deficient in many of these characteristics. Succeeding 
chapters analyze the advancement of the military appellate 
tribunals along the Judiclallzation continuum as various 
characteristics have been added by statute or practice. A 
comprehensive assessment of the judicial nature of the four 
Courts is impossible because disagreement exists among the 
four tribunals on their actual powers. For example, two 
of the four have declared their authority to issue writs; 
one has denied the existence of such authority; one has
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not ruled. More certainty ex±3ts in evaluating other
characteristics. For example, a nonjudicial official,
the President, is granted the right by statute to affect
the Judgment of the military appellate courts in specified
circumstances.
Despite these deficiencies, the Courts of Military
Review are the result of Judicialization, a process which *
now enables the military defendant to receive equivalent 
opportunity for impartial examination of his trial as is 
available to his fellow citizen prosecuted in either of 
the other criminal jurisdictions in the United States.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY: ANALYSIS THROUGH DESCRIPTION
The larger of the two criminal law Jurisdictions 
under the national government Is the American military. 
Within this legal system the court of last resort for the 
vast majority of defendants convicted of serious crimes Is 
the Court of Military Review In each of the four armed 
services. Further, these Courts are undergoing a distinc­
tive process of Judicialization which is continually 
enhancing their stature as tribunals of judicial adjudi­
cation. These key facts, justify study of the Courts of 
Military Review by political scientists. Public law 
scholars have conducted relatively little detailed analysis 
of specialized courts, a category in which the military 
intermediate tribunals are the most active.’*’ The lack of 
previous examination of the history, Image, jurisdiction, 
and judicial processes of the military courts necessitates 
a departure in this work from the prevailing patterns of
1In addition to the military courts, examples of 
specialized courts In the national government are the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims, 




The product of description
This study adheres to the general style of politi­
cal science research suggested by Charles S. Hyneman, who 
defined the purpose of Inquiry in the discipline as the 
"full understanding of legal governments."2 Of the four 
broad methods or approaches identified by Hyneman, the one 
most relevant here is "description of legal governments." 
Thus, the objective of this research is a comprehensive 
description of one specific element of American government—  
the Courts of Military Review. A descriptive methodology is 
appropriate because the significant point for analysis is 
the Courts1 evolution from advisory administrative staffs to 
the equivalent of genuine appeals tribunals in the national 
and state judiciaries. This transition is a notable demon­
stration of Judicialization. This work is an exploratory 
inquiry into the development of four courts through judicial 
and legislative processes.
In varying degrees, inferior courts undergo changes 
in statutory characteristics and in procedures which 
enhance their judicial status. The transitions are greater 
in specialized courts, many of which were originally estab­
lished as Institutions with only limited judicial features.
^The Study of Politics: The Present State of Ameri­
can Political Science (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1959)3 P* 2b.
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Among the specialized courts, the Courts of Military Review 
are perhaps the tribunals exhibiting the most changes, 
because the extensive evolution has occurred in a frequently 
hostile atmosphere. Within the military legal system, judi­
cial review has historically been minimized. Accusation, 
trial, and punishment have until quite recently been the 
prerogative of the individual unit commander in his task 
of maintaining discipline among subordinates. ■ Courts-martial 
were among the devices for ensuring compliance with orders. 
Formal judicial evaluation of the legal sufficiency of con­
victions was nonexistent before 1951* Even in the 19^9- 
1950 period establishment of effective appellate tribunals 
was opposed by traditionalist military elements. Review 
procedures were created principally through Congressional 
responses to public demand for reform. Only since 1969 
have the intermediate appellate courts initiated improve­
ment in their judicial status. The significant landmarks 
in this judicialization movement can best be identified 
and analyzed through a descriptive rather than a behavioral 
approach.
The hypothesis of this study is that the Courts of 
Military Review are evolving toward a status of genuine 
judicial institutions recognized in fact and law as legis­
lative courts. The hypothesis is to be tested through 
Cl) a critical survey of military legal history to document 
the transition from confirmation of military trial court
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verdicts by a potentially biased commander to Judicial 
determination of the legal sufficiency of convictions and 
appropriateness of sentences by independent appellate 
courts; (2) an analysis of Judicial decisions and legis­
lative declarations affecting the status of the inter­
mediate tribunals; (3) a comparison of characteristics of 
these Courts with attributes of established appellate 
bodies in the national and state Judiciaries; and (*0 a 
normatively oriented critique of proposals for revision of 
existing military legal systems.
Hyneman's statement of the objectives of descrip­
tion forms the framework under which this broad analytical 
approach will be used in this study.3 The organizational 
structure of the military legal system must be described 
at various times to determine the scope of its evolution.
The processes of decision-making within the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government are rele­
vant to an appraisal of the progress of Judicialization. 
Description of the politics of control of legal government 
is necessary for an evaluation of the policy conflicts 
affecting the structure and procedures of the military 
legal system. An examination of policies and acts of 
governments and the resultant Impact on affected publics 
Is essential to determine the interactions producing change.
3Ibid., pp. 36-39.
24
The hypothesis will be tested in the format of 
descriptive analysis; however, data for the inquiry will 
be obtained in part from methods frequently identified 
with the traditional and behavioral approaches to judicial 
study. Excessive reliance on either approach is insuffi­
cient because of the necessity for data on the Courts' 
evolvement in the context of existing statutes. This 
analysis cannot be developed from traditional methods 
emphasizing study of legal doctrines enunciated by courts. 
Nor can it be produced through behavioral methods concerned 
with characteristics and activities of judges. Beginning 
in the late 1950's, the behavioral movement brought concen­
tration
on public and institutional responses to judicial 
decisions; interest group litigation activities; the 
backgrounds, attitudes, and role perception of judges; 
intracourt bargaining and strategic behavior; and the 
development of mathematical models of decision-making 
and of nonmathematleal models relating courts to the 
political process.4
These behavioral inquiries have been directed almost exclu­
sively toward the United States Supreme Court. Many of the 
studies provide no usable models for examination of other 
courts. Quantitative methods developed in Supreme Court 
research are inapplicable to analysis of lower appellate
^Joel B. Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy 
Analysis: The Supreme Court in the Sit-In Cases," in
Frontiers of Judicial Research, ed. by Joel B. Grossman 
and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York: Joseph Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1969), PP. 405-406.
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tribunals, principally because of the comparatively few 
dissents on such courts and the variable panel procedure 
by which cases are heard.^ Unlike the Supreme Court which 
always sits en. banc, lower appellate courts most commonly 
divide into three-judge panels to hear all but the most 
important cases. The combination of judges on lower courts 
is not fixed; therefore, relationships among the total 
court membership on given policy issues cannot be as 
thoroughly demonstrated by statistical techniques as is 
possible on the United States Supreme Court.
During the 1960's research was extended to the lower 
Federal and state supreme courts; however, very few in-depth 
analyses of the specialized courts were published. These 
judicial Institutions typically have been excluded from the 
development of models for examination of inferior courts. 
This situation is evident in comments by writers of two 
recent works employing systems analysis in evaluating inter­
dependent processes of the Federal courts of general juris­
diction. For example, Richard J. Richardson and Kenneth N. 
Vines recognize "considerable justification for focusing 
upon the district and appeals courts," but they exclude 
other courts of the national government as subjects for
^Kenneth N. Vines, "Judicial Behavior Research," 
in Approaches to the Study of Political Science, ed. by 
Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler
Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 136-38.
their research.® "Lower courts other than the district 
and appeals courts are 'special' courts and they deal only 
with cases in certain restricted a r e a s . S i m i l a r l y ,  in 
a work designed to demonstrate the applicability of systems 
analysis to the Federal judiciary, Sheldon Goldman and 
Thomas P. Jahnige reject consideration of specialized tri­
bunals.® Military courts are disposed of with a footnote 
remark that "in this book the subject of military justice 
is not t r e a t e d . Several explanations are possible for 
the lack of scholarly interest in specialized courts. As 
noted, traditional concentration on the United States 
Supreme Court has been modified recently with attention to 
the next logical subjects, the lower Federal and state 
supreme courts. Consequently, the specialized courts have 
been considered only tangentially. Further, the military 
legal system has been disregarded as a subject for judicial 
research because of its nonjudicial image. Military law 
has been envisioned by the layman and the scholar as the 
tool of an arbitrary, vindictive, and capricious commander
g
The Politics of Federal Courts: Lower Courts in
the United States (Boston: Little* Brown and Company,
19-70), p. 4.
7Ibid. Interestingly, in the essay cited above, 
n. 4, Vines urged examination of "different aspects of the 
judicial system." p. 140. Both works were published in 
1970.
g
The Federal Courts as a Political System (New York 
Harper & Row, 1971)•
9Ibld., pp. 1-2, n. 4.
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rather than as a statutory system of courts designed to 
preserve individual rights. Ambiguity has existed in the 
classification of military courts as judicial or adminis­
trative tribunals. This uncertainty and the persistence 
of obsolete stereotypes have reduced political scientists' 
interest in studying the military legal system. The mili­
tary courts are now evolving into a clear status as judi­
cial institutions. Consequently, the lack of research by 
the mainstream of the political science discipline should 
not now deter inquiry into the Courts of Military Review.
The Richardson and Vines work is a precedent for
use of a mixture of methodologies to attain the desired
1 0scope of analysis. Although emphasizing systems analy­
sis , the two writers point out their use of a variety of 
conceptual tools, methods, and materials to achieve "a 
fuller picture of the lower judiciary." Similarly, in 
this work the descriptive approach will be developed by 
using data developed from traditional and behavioral 
methods. The Richardson and Vines publication on the 
Federal trial and intermediate appeals courts is somewhat 
similar to this study of the Courts of Military Review; 
examinations of legislative activity and of appellate 
decision-making are comparable. However, this work cannot 
be structured parallel to their study because of differences 
in the jurisdiction of the two sets of appellate courts and
10The Politics of Federal Courts, pp. 164 and 170.
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lack of data on military Judges. These are among the major 
limitations on employment of the systems analysis model, 
the most frequently used framework In judicial studies pub­
lished since the mid-1960's. ̂
The product of systems analysis
Because of the common use of the systems model in 
contemporary scholarship it is appropriate to outline 
reasons for the limited applicability of systems analysis 
in this study. Systems analysis as a methodology in politi­
cal science was developed by David E a s t o n . T h e  previously 
cited works employing the model view the Federal judiciary
For examples of use of systems analysis in judi­
cial research, see, Glendon Schubert, Judicial Policy- 
Making; The Political Role of the Courts tChicago: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1965), especially,PP. 104-30;Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), especially, pp. 31-36; 
Joel B. Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy Analysis"; 
Kenneth N. Vines and Herbert Jacob, "State Courts," in 
Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis,
ed. by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (2d ed.; Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971)> PP. 272-311; Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, State Court Systems (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973); and, Sheldon
Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Judicial System: 
Readings in Process and Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Inc., 19bb). Manyof these references are 
cited in Goldman and Jahnige, The Federal Courts as a Politi­
cal System, pp. 1-2, n. 4. For a critique of the methodology 
see, Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, "Systems Analysis 
and Judicial Systems: Potential and Limitations," Polity,
3 (Spring, 1971), 334-59.
l2His principal works on the subject are The Politi­
cal System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), and A Systems
Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1965).
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as a complete system or cycle. Additionally, the judiciary 
is a component of the all-encompassing American political 
system. The four elements of a functioning system are 
input, a conversion process, outputs, and feedback. Inputs 
are normally viewed as consisting of two segments, demands 
(principally litigation in the judiciary) and supports 
(favorable attitudes from the public and the legal profes­
sion enabling courts to operate). The conversion process 
is the method by which conflicting claims in the litigation 
are resolved by judges. Numerous variables affect the 
methods of decision-making occurring in each of the courts 
In the Federal judiciary. Outputs from courts are deci­
sions, the means by which demands are met and policies are 
made. Feedback is the reaction in the Judicial system 
environment which affects future Inputs through, for example, 
increased litigation or reduced support for the courts as 
institutions of government.
The full systems framework is unnecessary for the 
study of a single kind of court, as Is the objective here. 
Accordingly, this work concentrates on the conversion pro­
cess of the judicial system. Other systems analysis elements 
are examined only in the context of the decision-making 
procedures of the courts under study. Research in the con­
version process of the Supreme Court has occupied the atten­
tion of behavioral political scientists. Because compara­
tively complete data are available on the Justices' personal
30
backgrounds, attitudes, court behavior, and voting records, 
many detailed analyses have been performed with quantita­
tive techniques. However, these models are inappropriate 
for study of lower courts on which data are fragmentary 
and most decisions are made by three-judge panels. An 
even great problem exists in applying these techniques to 
the Courts of Military Review. Here virtually no data are 
obtainable on the judges as individuals. Additionally, 
the study of judicial selection and recruitment, a common 
topic in behavioral research, cannot be developed with the 
same effectiveness in this examination of the military 
courts. This limitation is caused by the method of assign­
ment of military attorneys to the courts under criteria 
frequently extending beyond an individual's qualifications.
Systems analysis is an inadequate methodology in 
this study because of the limited policy-making role of 
the Courts of Military Review. This is part of a larger 
issue of the degree of judicial policy-making resulting 
from criminal litigation. None of the previously cited 
writers has approached the question in describing policy 
as the output element of the judicial system. Undoubtedly, 
major social, economic, and political policies are enunciated 
in criminal decisions. The judicial response to a civil 
liberties claim occurs in the prosecution of a person for 
violating, for example, a trespassing law. However, policy 
declarations are an improbable output of courts dealing
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exclusively with the typical felonies and misdemeanors 
punishable under the Uniform Code. As long as justice is 
administered within the range established by legislative 
policy, little opportunity exists for policy outputs 
affecting society. Deviations from the acceptable range 
are the instances of significant judicial policy-making.
The Courts of Military Review and their predecessor 
tribunals have engaged in very little policy-making in the 
sense of deviating from prevailing statutes defining crim­
inal acts and from executive orders establishing procedural 
requirements, such as rules of evidence and elements of 
proof for each crime. Since 1969 the Army Court of Military 
has Initiated policy by declaring its authority to issue 
writs for extraordinary relief. As the Intermediate courts 
continue evolving, as hypothesized, toward legislative 
court status, they logically will exert greater policy 
influence on military law. The Impact of these policy 
outputs on the military public is a subject for future 
research. Perhaps at that time the complete systems analy­
sis model will be an appropriate framework for Investigating 
the military legal environment
13a major topic for future research is an investi­
gation of the cultural influences on judicial decision­
making created by the unique military environment. The 
Impact of political culture, generally, has been considered 
by Richardson and Vines in The Politics of Federal Courts.
A modification of their concept is suggested in Joel B. 
Grossman and Austin Sarat, "Political Culture and Judicial 
Research," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1971 (Sum­
mer, 1971), 177-207.
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For this study, a descriptive analysis method, 
supplemented with other research techniques, will yield 
maximum data for the objective— a complete examination of 
the judicialization of the military intermediate appellate 
courts. This approach will be applied first to a critical 
survey of the history of appellate procedures to establish 
the rationale and justification for the judicial system.
CHAPTER III
ORIGINS OP APPELLATE REVIEW
The present Courts of Military Review are the 
institutional result of judicialization' of the American 
military legal system, in which appellate review of 
court-martial convictions has been an anomaly. Only since 
1951 have military tribunals with even a semblance of 
independent judicial power existed. Examination of the 
history of military law reveals the extent of change 
toward meaningful appeals for the convicted defendant.
Traditionally military law has been justified as 
an essential means of maintaining discipline. As such, 
law could be used by a commander to gain compliance with 
frequently undesirable orders. Consequently, the nature 
of the legal system was predominately executive rather 
than judicial. Since World War I reformers have sought to 
reduce executive control through creation of genuine judi­
cial independence at both trial and appellate levels. Pro­
ponents of executive control and of command discretion 
urged retention of the status quo. A 1956 statement by 
the Navy Judge Advocate General is a typical expression 
of the traditionalist military viewpoint.
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[T]he armed services have got to accomplish more with 
their criminal code, that is, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, than do civilian jurisdictions with 
their criminal codes. The criminal code of a civilian 
jurisdiction is designed to maintain good social order 
amongst the people. With our code, we must not only 
maintain good social order but we must foster and pro­
duce a dedicated fighting spirit.1
The policy of military law as a tool of command existed in
British statutes, precedents for the first American laws
governing the Army and Navy. The usage was perpetuated in
the Constitution of 1787 by the omission of military courts
from the Federal judiciary in Article III. Since military
law was an executive disciplinary device, post-trial review
expectedly became the prerogative of the unit commander and,
on occasion, his superiors. Even in 1973 the commander who
convened the court-martial must exercise his statutory
options on the verdict and sentence before adversary pro-
pceedings begin in an appellate court.
Executive, or command, control characterized the 
separate statutes establishing criminal codes for the Army, 
Navy, and Coast Guard. Judicialization is more evident in
^Statement of Rear Admiral Ira H. Nunn in U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, To Amend the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings% before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 6583* 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956 
[Committee Paper No. 110], p. 8446.
2 10 U.S.C. secs. 871 and 860-865 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  The com­
mander, upon the recommendation of a staff attorney, must 
approve the trial court verdict or impose a verdict supported 
by the evidence in the record. Similarly, he must approve 
the sentence adjudged or impose a lesser sentence. He cannot 
increase the severity of either the sentence or verdict.
Sec. 864.
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the Articles of War, which were amended more frequently and 
substantively than were the laws of the Navy or Coast Guard.
A form of administrative appellate review was established 
statutorily in the Army in 1920, but comparable development 
did not occur in the other services until thirty years 
later with the implementation of the Uniform Code.
Two principal kinds of appellate review have existed 
in military law: review by the commander who appointed the
court-martial and, depending upon sentence severity, an 
additional review by the President, Congress, or a Cabi­
net secretary; and more recently review by appellate tri­
bunals. 3 This review is a prerequisite to execution of a 
sentence. A court-martial decision is without effect until 
confirmed by some superior military authority. In contrast, 
the verdict of a criminal trial court in a civilian juris­
diction is self-executing. No authority apart from the 
court must approve decisions of the judge or jury. Because 
the verdict and sentence of a military court must be approved
^Surveys of the history of military appellate review 
are contained In several sources, including: William P.
Fratcher, "Appellate Review in American Military Law," Mis­
souri Law Review, 14 (January, 1949), 15-75; Luther C. West, 
"A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial 
System," UCLA Law Review, 18 (November, 1970), 1-156; Frank 
Fedele, "Appellate Review In the Military Justice System," 
Federal Bar Journal, 15 (October-December, 1955), 399-435; 
and, Robert 0. Rollman, "Of Crimes, Courts-Martial, and 
Punishment— A Short History of Military Justice," United 
States Air Force Judge Advocate General Law Review, 11 
(Spring, 1969), 212-22. For complete citations of military 
law statutes, see, John T. Willis, "The United States Court 
of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation, and Future,"
Military Law Review. 55 (Winter, 1972), 42-43.
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externally, this procedure led to a form of* automatic 
appeal in the confirmation action. Historically, manda­
tory examination of the court decision did not always 
benefit the accused because a commander dissatisfied with 
the outcome could return the case to the court-martial 
with a demand for a more severe punishment or reversal of
iian acquittal.
Military appeals— 1775-1918
The original American Articles of War and Articles 
for the Government of the Navy were patterned after British 
statutes. In the Army law, sentences imposed by the two 
courts-martial of restricted Jurisdiction required con­
firmation by the convicted defendant's commander; but the 
need for confirmation of general court-martial verdicts was 
somehow omitted despite such a requirement in British law. 
The deficiency was corrected in 1776 in amendments drafted 
by a committee which included Thomas Jefferson and John 
Adams. These new provisions specified confirmation of 
general court-martial convictions by Congress or by the 
commander-in-ehief. A 1786 amendment required Congres­
sional confirmation of sentences of a general court-martial 
involving death, peacetime dismissal of an officer or 
affecting a general officer.
^Thls right was eliminated in the 1920 Articles of 
War but was continued, although administratively proscribed, 
in the Articles for the Government of the Navy until 1951*
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Acting under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu­
tion , the First Congress transferred confirmation respon­
sibility to the President. With reactivation of the Navy 
in 1797 Congress adopted the naval laws prevailing during 
the Revolutionary War. Except for minor modifications 
during the Civil War affecting specific sentences requiring 
Presidential confirmation, the Articles of War were not 
changed from the founding of the Republic through World 
War I. From 1775 to 1951 the Articles for the Government 
of the Navy were revised extensively only once, in 1862, 
with no change in confirmation procedures by the commander 
and, as necessary, the President.5
The present system of appellate review resulted from 
events over a ninety-year period. Controversy over inter­
pretation of a statute, an intense personal rivalry between 
two Army judge advocates general, and increased public 
awareness of the abuses of the legal system during wartime 
all led to creation in the Army of the predecessor of the 
Courts of Military Review.
In 1862 Congress defined duties of the Army Judge 
Advocate General as Including "revision" of court-martial 
records.^ In 1866 this section was reworded to read, "[t]he 
Judge-Advocate-General shall receive, revise, and cause to
5Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 20H, 12 Stat. 605.
6Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, 12 Stat. 598.
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be recorded the proceedings of courts-martial, . . .”7 The 
language was retained in the Revised Statutes of I874 as 
Section 1199, the provision cited frequently in military 
law controversy during and immediately after World War I.® 
Before 1917 proponents of judicialization Insisted that 
Congress intended Section 1199 to be authorization for the 
Army Judge Advocate General to revise unsupported convic­
tions already approved for execution by the field commander. 
However, such positive judicial power was officially rejected. 
The War Department position on Section 1199 was upheld by a 
United States circuit court in 1882.̂  The court determined 
that in context the word "revise" meant the "discharge of 
clerical duties." Counsel for the petitioner, a military 
prisoner seeking release by habeas corpus, "strenuously 
contended" that Congress authorized the Judge Advocate 
General to reverse court-martial verdicts.10 Thus, until
7Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, 14 Stat. 334.
^R.S., sec. 1199 (1874). This provision was not a 
part of the Articles of War; rather, it was included in a 
statutory description of the organization of the Army.
^Ex parte Mason, 256 P. 384, 387 (C.C., N.D., N.Y. ,1882).
"It is urged that, because the statute makes it the duty 
of that officer [the Judge Advocate General] to 'receive, 
revise and cause to be recorded the proceedings of all 
courts-martial,' the power to reverse is to be implied.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the exercise of 
such an important power would be conferred in vague and 
doubtful terms, or that it lurks behind the word ’revise.1"
10A similar conclusion was argued at Senate hearings 
in 1919. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 64 (1919). The prin­
cipal drafter of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and a
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1920 the task of the few lawyers In the Army was merely to 
advise the confirming authority, most commonly the field 
commander, on legal sufficiency of convictions. The com­
mander was not obligated to follow the recommendations.
The role of the Judge Advocate General was even more 
restricted in that his opinions were recorded only in 
those few cases requiring Presidential confirmation. 
Typically the field commander would have ordered the sen­
tence to be carried out before the trial transcript reached 
the Judge Advocate General in Washington. Thus, his only 
action in "revising" the record under Section 1199 was to 
recommend clemency in instances of irregularities or 
injustices. Once a case had been closed by the field com­
mander and the sentence officially announced, the only 
recourse in correcting errors was for the same commander 
to grant clemency. A strong-willed officer was probably
long-time authority on military law, Harvard University 
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, contended that "the legislative 
history of the act [section 1199] tends to show that the 
Bureau of Military Justice . . . was intended to be a court 
of military appeals. . . . "  "The Existing Court-Martial 
System," p. 65. The same interpretation appears in Morgan, 
"The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice," 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 6 (February, 1953), 171. Congres­
sional Globe accounts of floor consideration of the section 
are inconclusive in revealing legislative Intent. The sec­
tion was read but not debated prior to Senate passage and 
was passed by title on a motion for the previous question 
in the House. [32] Cong. Globe 3320 and 3397-98, 37th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1862. The idea of reversal of convictions 
by the Bureau of Military Justice was raised by Senators 
four years later in debate over reenactment of the pro­
vision. [38] Cong. Globe 3672-76, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866.
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reluctant to admit his own error in approving the unfair­
ness. Clemency was of little benefit to the person already 
subjected to physical punishment.
Appellate review before 1920 was characterized by 
the absence of authoritative participation by any person 
competent in law. Irreparable harm could easily occur 
during trial and in the commander's review, in neither, of 
which a lawyer had a formal voice. Provisions governing 
post-trial review in the Army during World War I became 
sources of controversy from which emerged reform legisla­
tion in 1920. Article 46 of the 1916 Articles of War 
required the commander appointing a court-martial to approve 
the sentence before imposing punishment. Article 48 spec­
ified certain severe punishments requiring Presidential 
approval before Imposition. However, the same Article 
defined wartime exceptions to Presidential confirmation.
For present purposes, only the exception In cases of death 
for the crime of mutiny is relevant. During wartime the 
commanding general of an army in the field had statutory 
authority to order execution of a person convicted of 
mutiny and sentenced to death.13- Early In 1918 the War 
Department directed field commanders to submit all records 
of courts-martial In which the death sentence was imposed 
to the Judge Advocate General for review before the sen­
tence was carried out. Still, field commanders retained
1:l39 Stat. 600.
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authority to confirm 95 per cent of sentences.12
The 1918 order was the Army's reaction to heightened 
criticism of military Justice following the legal but seem­
ingly summary execution of several soldiers convicted of 
mutiny. Shortly after American entry into World War I in 
1917* Negro soldiers assigned to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 
demonstrated riotously against alleged racial injustices 
by the Army and the local community. Some offenders were 
tried for mutiny. Although not required to do so by law, 
the commanding general in seeking to ensure fairness and 
legal sufficiency assigned his staff attorney to review 
daily the transcript of the just-concluded proceedings.
The court-martial returned death sentences against several 
defendants. Because a state of war existed, the commander
was authorized under Article of War 48 to carry out death
sentences for mutiny without submitting the case for Presi­
dential confirmation. Since he had received the attorney's
daily assurance of the legality of the conviction, the com­
mander ordered the executions to be conducted the morning
^2William M. Connor, "Legal Aspects of the Deter­
minative Review of General Court-Martial Cases under Article 
of War 50 1/2," Virginia Law Review, 31 (December, 1944), 
121. The author was an Army lawyer and former member of 
an Army board of review. Connor and Major General Enoch H. 
Crowder, the Army Judge Advocate General from 1911 to 1923» 
each estimated that commanders refused to follow the advice 
of the Judge Advocate General in more than 3 per cent of 
the cases in which modification was suggested and that the 
President declined to follow such advice in 2 per cent of 
the cases. Crowder, Military Justice During the War, pp. 9 
and 49.
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after completion of the trial.
A few months later at Port Bliss, Texas, several 
sergeants were convicted for mutiny in disobeying an offi­
cer's order which was admittedly contrary to regulations.
For complying with printed orders rather than the verbal 
command, the men were sentenced by court-martial to dis­
honorable discharge and imprisonment for terms ranging from 
ten to twenty-five years. Under his authority, the field 
commander approved the convictions and ordered the sentences 
carried out. J
When records of the Port Bliss trial reached Wash­
ington, the Acting Judge Advocate General, Brigadier Gen­
eral Samuel T. Ansell, endeavored to correct the injustices 
by invoking Section 1199, Revised Statutes. The case became 
another phase in the long-standing conflict between Ansell 
and Major General Enoch H, Crowder, the Judge Advocate Gen­
eral under whom Ansell had served since 1912. With the 
declaration of war Crowder was assigned temporarily as Pro­
vost Marshal General and administrator of the Selective Ser­
vice System. Ansell read "revise” in the disputed Section 
1199 as enabling the Judge Advocate General to perform a 
genuine appellate function. In the Fort Bliss case Ansell
-^Accounts of these two trials are included in 
several sources: Terry W. Brown, "The Crowder-Ansell Dis­
pute: The Emergence of General Samuel T, Ansell," Military
Law Review, 35 (January, 1966), 7-8; Edward P. Sherman,
"The Civilianization of Military Law," Maine Law Review,
22 (1970), 15; and Connor, "Article 50 l/2," pp. 124-25*
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attempted to have the entire charge overturned. Despite his 
absence, Crowder still succeeded in having his restrictive 
views of the Judge Advocate General's power endorsed by the 
Secretary of War.
Although the Port Bliss sergeants lost their free­
dom and the Port Sam Houston soldiers their lives, Ansell 
gained the opportunity thereby to implement a form of appel­
late review. War Department General Order 7 > effective 
February 1, 1918, directed field commanders to submit cases 
involving a death sentence, dismissal, or dishonorable dis­
charge to the Judge Advocate General before implementation.
To perform the review for legal sufficiency, Ansell organized 
boards with duties "in the nature of those of appellate 
tribunals"; however, opinions prepared by the boards were 
merely advisory to the Judge Advocate General, who in turn 
recommended disposition to the field commander. Contro­
versy existed over whether that officer was obligated to 
accept the opinion from Washington. As noted above, com­
manders frequently declined to follow the Judge Advocate 
General's opinion.1  ̂ Ansell supported a much more formal 
judicial examination of convictions. He asserted that 
General Order 7 was issued by the Secretary of War at
•^Opposite views on the legal effect of the Judge 
Advocate General's opinion are given in: William P.
Pratcher, "Notes on the History of the Judge Advocate 
General Department,." Judge Advocate General Journal, 1 
(June, 1944), 5 and 11, cited in Bollman, "History of Mili­
tary Justice," p. 219; and, testimony by Crowder, Subcom­
mittee Hearings on S. 64 (1919)» P* 1206. See, also,
Connor, "Article 50 1/2," pp. 140-41.
Crowder's insistence to preclude Congressional investiga­
tion of the Army legal system. ^
Articles of War of 1920
Despite their lack of Judicial power, the Ansell- 
appointed boards of review emphasized the need for protec­
tion of the accused's right for effective conviction review. 
World War I caused increased public attention to military 
law and brought demands for reforms. Most criticized was 
command Influence, Including alleged abuse of post-trial 
confirmation. However, little agreement existed on the 
precise revisions to accomplish desired ends. The leading 
Senate reformer, George Chamberlain of Oregon, introduced 
amendments to the Articles of War late in 1918. During 
hearings on his proposals the Ansell-Crowder dispute was 
raised, particularly their differing interpretations of 
Section 1199* Senator Chamberlain's amendments were not 
reported to the full Committee. At the Senator's urging 
the Committee asked Ansell to draft completely revised 
Articles of War. Ansell's effort was introduced by Cham­
berlain as Senate Bill 6H on which subcommittee hearings 
were conducted.1  ̂ Simultaneously, the War Department Joined
1*5̂Brown, "Crowder-Ansell Dispute," p. 8, cites 
correspondence from Crowder to support the view that Gen­
eral Order 7 was not issued completely to enhance Justice.
The bill was introduced in the House of Repre­
sentatives by Royal Johnson of South Dakota as H.R. 367.
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with the American Bar Association in a study of the legal 
system, appointed an Internal staff to do likewise, and 
in addition the Secretary of War assigned Ansell to prepare 
a bill.1^ Because of divergent views before the subcom­
mittee, Senate Bill 64 did not advance. Nevertheless, the 
appellate review system planned by Ansell was significant 
as the first attempt to remove post-trial review functions 
from the field commander who Initiated the trial.
Ansell*s draft provided a common law procedure 
with finality attaching upon announcement of the verdict 
and sentence by the court-martial. The commander's role 
as a reviewer was eliminated. All sentences of six months 
or more confinement would be examined by a court of military 
appeals, unless the convicted person waived the appellate 
hearing. The new court was to consist of three judges, 
probably civilians, appointed by the President with con­
firmation by the Senate. They were to have the attributes 
of other Federal judges, including the same salary and a 
lifetime appointment. Interestingly, the Ansell draft did 
not specify that the judges would be civilians. That con­
clusion is reached because the bill provided that military 
attorneys could be assigned temporarily to the court.
17According to Edmund M, Morgan, the Secretary's 
assignment to Ansell was "an attempt to render Ansell harm­
less." "Background of the UCMJ," p. 172. The Intensity of 
Ansell's criticisms of the existing Articles of War and of 
procedures used in the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
is evident in his article published at the time of hearings 
on S. 64. "Military Justice," pp. 1-17.
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Despite the court's judicial features, its statutory stand­
ing among Federal courts was compromised by its location in 
the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General. Although 
the bill pointed out that such a location was "for admin­
istrative convenience only," the direct relationship with 
the War Department created the possibility of infringement 
on the court's independence. Under Ansell's plan the 
single appellate court would have performed all review 
functions. No .intermediate courts were to be established;
the boards of review which Ansell created were to be dis- 
1 Rcontinued. Significantly, this court would have exer­
cised appellate review of Army cases only; no considera­
tion was given to creation of a unified judiciary for the 
entire military.
The War Department's study committee proposed no 
comparable appellate tribunal in its draft legislation. 
Instead, the field commander as confirming authority 
would grant a new trial if he disapproved the findings or 
sentence of a court-martial. Further, the President, upon 
recommendation of the Judge Advocate General, could vacate 
guilty verdicts and all or part of sentences. The Presi­
dent could order a new trial or restore rights to the con­
victed person. The Departmental proposal can be interpreted 
as an attempt by military traditionalists to retain control 
of the legal system. Provisions for numerous Presidential
■^S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st sess., art. 62, 1919.
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decisions gave senior military officers opportunity for 
their views to gain implementation because probably only 
infrequently would the President not accept War Department 
recommendations.
Opposition to the abrupt change in military legal 
procedures;— particularly in the commander’s role— caused 
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to abandon Senate 
Bill 6*1, the Ansell p l a n . -*-9 Consequently, the Committee 
endeavored to compromise diverse proposals to accomplish 
at least the most essential reforms of the Articles of War. 
The revised bill was brought'directly to the floor and 
approved as an amendment to a House-passed Army reorganiza­
tion bill. The section on appellate review, Article 50 1/2, 
was the only portion discussed extensively during floor con­
sideration. Senator Chamberlain described Article 50 1/2 as
the gist of the whole proposed amended Articles of War, 
because it gives to the proposed board of review and to 
the Judge Advocate General powers which the Judge Advo­
cate General claims he has not heretofore had and which, 
it seemed to me and to the committee, are absolutely 
essential to do full Justice to men convicted by court- 
martial. 20
The principal feature of Article 50 1/2 was creation 
of a board of review, the first statutorily established
^ For quotations of statements in opposition to 
the Ansell draft, see, Sherman, "Civillanization of Mili­
tary Law," pp. 25-26. For example, the legal scholar. John 
Henry Wigmore, asserted: "The prime object of military
organization is Victory, not Justice."
2059 Cong. Rec. 5844 (1920).
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panel to determine legal sufficiency of court-martial con­
victions.21 The Army Judge Advocate General was directed 
to organize in his office a board of three or more mili­
tary lawyers. The board was to examine mandatorily two 
categories of general courts-martial: those requiring 
Presidential confirmation (sentences involving a general 
officer, dismissal of an officer, or the death penalty, 
the latter with certain wartime exceptions) and those 
with sentences of penitentiary confinement or dishonor­
able discharges. In cases requiring Presidential confirma­
tion, questions of both law and fact were considered. In 
all other reviews the board examined only questions of 
law. For cases requiring Presidential approval, the board 
submitted its written opinion to the Judge Advocate Gen­
eral who, in turn, attached his own recommendations for 
forwarding directly to the President. Since final deter­
mination rested with the President, opinions of the board 
and of the Judge Advocate General were advisory. Despite 
this lack of finality, the Judge Advocate General ruled 
that when both the board of review and he found a convic­
tion unsupported the case would not be transmitted to the
21The Senate amendment attaching the revised 
Articles of War to other legislation was passed without 
debate In the House. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 4l 
Stat. 797- The title "board of review" was not capitalized 
in the statute. Perhaps this implied that the board was 
not considered a judicial Institution meriting designation 
with a proper noun.
President. Instead, the entire record would be returned to
ppthe field commander for rehearing. The effect was to 
accord to the opinion of the board of review and of the 
Judge Advocate General a distinct judicial character. In 
reality, the action barred execution of a sentence, a cir­
cumstance heretofore nonexistent in military l a w . 2 ^
Cases in the second category (involving confine­
ment and dishonorable discharges) were examined by the 
board for the purpose of recommending disposition to the 
Judge Advocate General, who also reviewed the same cases.
If the board and the Judge Advocate General agreed the 
record was legally sufficient, then the sentence was exe­
cuted. If both found that a conviction was unsupported, 
then the verdict and sentence were vacated, and the record 
was returned to the field commander for his decision on 
feasibility of conducting a new trial. If the Judge Advo­
cate General did not concur with the board’s decision, 
then the case was submitted to the President for disposi­
tion. Thus, the board of review could never by its own 
authority cause its opinion to prevail over that of the 
Judge Advocate General, yet the board opinion was not 
subject to veto by the senior legal officer.
One other method existed whereby cases were heard
2?Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928, Article of War 
50 1/2, cited in Pratcher, "Appellate Review," p. 7-
^^Pratcher, ibid.
by the board of review. The transcript of all remaining 
general court-martial convictions, with sentences involving 
fines or confinement for less than one year, were examined 
by a lawyer in the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
If this officer found the conviction unsupported, the case 
was sent to the board. If the panel agreed that an Injus­
tice had occurred, the procedure followed was that for 
cases requiring Presidential confirmation. Prior to its
revocation In 1949, Article 50 1/2 was amended twice with-
?  l iout substantive effect. n Thus, the compromise statute 
enacted in reaction to World War I injustices governed 
during World War II. Inadequate power in the Army boards 
of review, combined with no comparable statutory tribunal 
in the Navy, led to criticism of the entire legal system 
during and after World War II.
As described above, the Presidential confirmation 
cases enabled the board of review to exercise broad powers 
to examine questions of fact and law. But in all other 
cases— numerically the great majority— the board inter­
preted Its power very narrowly. The board and the Judge 
Advocate General did not weigh evidence, judge the credi­
bility of witnesses, determine controverted questions of 
fact, or make inferences from testimony.2** The boards did
oil
^ 1 0  U.S.C. sec. 1522 (1946).
2^Court-Martial No. 145791 (1921) and Court-Martial 
No. 192609 (1930) cited In Maurice F. Biddle, "A Brief Look 
at the Air Force Boards of Review," United States Air Force 
Judge Advocate General Law Review, 8 (May-June, 1966), 13,
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adopt procedures patterned after Federal appellate court 
rules. Counsel for appellant and for the Government appeared 
before the board. Formal written opinions, with dissents if 
any, were prepared in all Presidential confirmation cases 
and in others involving major questions of law. The accumu­
lation of opinions created a body of precedent which was 
observed according to stare decisis. However, opinions 
were not published or made accessible outside the Army 
headquarters. Thus, the actual precedent value was 
diminished because appellate defense counsel encountered 
difficulty in researching previous board decisions.
Navy appellate procedure
Criticism of World War I Naval legal procedures 
was insufficient to cause major efforts to reform the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy. Several explana­
tions are possible for this lack of public attention to 
the nature of legal affairs in the Navy. Presumably a 
proportionate number of injustices occurred in the Navy 
as in the Army. These instances probably did not attract 
public notice because the Navy drafted fewer civilians than 
did the Army. The Navy’s regular personnel were accustomed 
to summary and frequently harsh methods of discipline. The 
draftee did not adjust readily to the abrupt change from 
civilian to military criminal procedure; consequently, he 
was more likely to call attention to his plight than was 
the full-time member of the Navy. Additionally, the Navy
had no high-placed agitator for military law reform com­
parable to the Army's General Ansell. Articles 53 and 54 
of the Navy statute provided post-trial review. Sentences 
of general courts-martial were carried out on confirmation 
by the fleet commander or by the officer who convened the 
trial. As in the Articles of War, confirmation by the 
President was required in sentences involving the death 
penalty or dismissal of an officer. The Secretary of the 
Navy was empowered to vacate the verdict and sentence
PImposed by any of the three levels of Navy courts-martial. 
The Secretary received recommendations on granting relief 
from the Judge Advocate General after review for legal suf­
ficiency and from the Bureau of Naval Personnel or the 
Marine Corps Commandant after consideration of the dis­
ciplinary effect of the punishment and any mitigating 
circumstances.
Appellate procedures similar to those of the Navy 
existed in the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard.
Because of the comparatively small size of the Coast Guard, 
any problems in the administration of its criminal code 
attracted little public interest. Further, during wartime 
the Coast Guard operated as an element of the Navy and was 
thus governed by Naval laws. No landmark decisions in 
military law through World War II were derived from Coast 
Guard precedent.
2634 U.S.C. sec. 1200 (1946).
An assessment
Appellate review by authentic judicial institutions 
did not exist during the first 175 years of the organiza­
tion of the American military. This survey of the legal 
history through World War II has revealed only one statutory 
advance along the continuum of judiclalization. Boards of 
review created by the Articles of War of 1920 were not judi­
cial tribunals; nevertheless, the boards did represent a 
recognition by Congress of the need for formal appellate 
review In the military criminal law system. In terms of 
the Roscoe Pound framework, the boards performed a kind of 
executive adjudication. Their most significant deficiency 
was the absence of power to rule with finality. The court 
of military appeals proposed in Senate Bill 64 by General 
Ansell Is further evidence of an awareness of the need for 
judiclalization and of a commitment by reformers to develop 
remedies. If enacted as written, Senate Bill 64 would have 
moved the military legal system toward judicial adjudica­
tion. But as was to occur in future reform efforts, com­
promise reduced the degree of advancement. Another war in 
which millions of nonprofessional military members were 
subjected to administrative adjudication was required to 
rouse Congress sufficiently to enact reforms. The appel­
late system proposed and, in part, Instituted by General 
Ansell served as a model for what became the United States 
Court of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review.
I
CHAPTER IV 
JUDICIALIZATION IN THE UNIFORM CODE
During World War II approximately 16 million Ameri­
cans In the armed forces were governed by military legal 
systems only slightly different from those prevailing in 
every prior war. The more than 1.7 million courts-martial 
resulted In a conviction rate of almost 90 per cent and 
imposition of punishments, including 141 executions, com­
monly more severe than those for comparable crimes in a 
civilian jurisdiction. In the Army approximately 90,000 
persons were convicted by general court-martial. The 
harshness of punishments is indicated by two statistics:
Army boards of review recommended sentence reduction In 
75 per cent of the cases examined; and a special War Depart­
ment clemency board, headed by retired Justice Owen J. 
Roberts of the United States Supreme Court, reduced sen­
tences in more than 85 per cent of the 25*000 cases con­
sidered.1 The informal administrative examination of trial
Robert J. White, "The Uniform Code of Military 
Justice: The Background and The Problem," St.. John's Law
Review, 35 (May, 1961), 20.0; and, testimony by Under Secre­
tary of War Kenneth C. Royall in U.S., Congress, House, 
Committee on Armed Services, To Amend the Articles of War 
to Improve the Administration of Military Justice, To
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records in the Department of the Navy did not yield as 
great a rate of reduction of trial court sentences. The 
review procedure in the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen­
eral resulted in full reversal of convictions in only 
0.21 per cent of the cases considered in Fiscal 1945.2
Even before the end of the war both the Navy and 
War Departments reacted to growing criticism of military 
legal affairs. Internal opposition came not only from 
persons directly affected by the unfamiliar systems but 
also from attorneys and jurists whose wartime service was 
in administering the two criminal law statutes. With the 
increasingly widespread effect of trials as the war con­
tinued, Congressional and public complaints heightened. 
The Navy In 1943 and the Army In 1944 began the first of
Provide for More Effective Appellate Review, To Insure the 
Equalization of Sentences , and for Other Purposes, Hearings, 
before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives, on H.R. 3575, 80th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1947, [Committee Paper No. 125], P* 1916. A summary 
of statistics was cited by Representative Carl Vinson of 
Georgia In House floor debate on the Uniform Code. 95 Cong. 
Rec. 5724 (1949). For additional data on World War II 
courts-martial, see, Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper,
"The Scope of Military Justice," Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, 43 (September-October, 
1952), 285-98; and, Austin H. MacCormick and Victor H.
Evjen, "Statistical Study of 24,000 Military Prisoners," 
Federal Probation, 10 (April-June, 1946), 6-11.
2Statlstlcs cited, without contradiction, by John J. 
Finn representing the American Legion in U.S., Congress, 
House, Committee on Armed Services, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, Hearings, before a subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2498, 8lst 
Cong., 1st sess., 1949, [Committee Paper No. 37], P. 681.
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many investigations of the criminal Justice problem. Prom 
this research, the Administration in 1947 proposed amend­
ments to the Army and Navy statutes. Only the Army reforms 
were enacted; the Navy proposals fell victim to Congres­
sional demands for a unified legal code. The related 
objectives in the proposed amendments were creation of 
effective appellate review procedures and elimination of 
command influence in adjudication. Wartime experience 
demonstrated that the Army’s statutory boards of review 
and the Navy's administrative examination of trial records 
were insufficient methods of ensuring justice to the con­
victed serviceman. The chief deficiencies were lack of 
finality in board decisions and absence of authority to 
consider errors of fact in both services' review systems. 
These shortcomings, in turn, created the opportunity for 
improper actions by individual commanders.
The period 1946 through 1950 brought the greatest 
concentration of executive and legislative action on mili­
tary law in the nation's history. The major events were 
a Congressional inquiry into adequacy of the legal systems, 
Administration amendments to the Navy and Army statutes, 
enactment of the Articles of War of 1948, and preparation 
and enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 
1950. The product of these actions was the first military 
appellate tribunals with any degree of judicial independence. 
Because of the significance of this five-year period in the
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history of American military law, the actions will be 
analyzed in detail under the following topics: background
of reforms, the Navy amendments, the Army amendments and 
the Articles of War of 19*18, and the enactment of the Uni­
form Code. Provisions of the 1950 act relating to appel­
late institutions and procedures will be evaluated in depth 
because they continue to exist.
Background of reforms
In the atmosphere of widespread dissatisfaction with 
the wartime administration of the military criminal systems, 
numerous governmental and private study groups recommended 
revision of the statutes. Particularly significant was the 
report of a special subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Military Affairs.3 Because separate committees still existed 
for cognizance of the Army and the Navy, the panel examined 
Army problems only, Its first two proposals centered on 
increasing the effectiveness of appellate procedures. The 
Representatives did not urge the judicial enhancement of 
the boards of review; rather, they recommended that "the 
Judge Advocate General's Department be vested with judicial 
power It does not now possess." Such phrasing implied com­
mittee concurrence in the essentially executive, instead of
oJU.S., Congress, House, Judicial System, United 
States Army, H. Rept. 2722,. pursuant to H. Res. 20, 79th 
Cong., 2d sess., 19*16.
^Ibld., p . 1.
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judicial, review of court-martial convictions. An important 
change suggested by the panel was the elimination of the 
field commander from any post-trial review. Confirmation 
of the verdict and sentence was to be the responsibility 
of the Judge Advocate General's Department exclusively.
The legislators did not specify if confirming power would 
exist in the board of review. In all likelihood existing 
arrangements under Article 50 1/2 would be retained with 
the Judge Advocate General and the boards sharing power 
in final confirmations. Under the proposals the boards 
possessed authority to examine facts as well as law in all 
convictions resulting In confinement for more than six 
months.Legislation based on the report was introduced 
in the House in 19^6, but no hearings were conducted.
The House report added impact to growing demands 
for military law reform expressed by privately sponsored 
groups. Positions on the merits of amendments were taken 
by the American Bar Association, many state and local bars, 
the principal veterans organizations, and ad hoc public 
interest groups. Very few of these recommendations were 
significant advances toward judiclalization of the military 
legal systems. Similarly, only a few advocated unification 
of the criminal statutes into a single code to apply to all 
services, although In 19^6-19^7 emphasis was developing for 
a form of consolidation under the forerunner of the
5Ibid., pp. 1-3-
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Department of Defense. The military leadership also per­
sisted in retaining separate legal systems by preparing 
amendments to existing statutes rather than attempting to 
merge the laws. No effort was made even to standardize 
common procedures or descriptive titles. This failure of 
the services to work toward a uniform statute almost pre­
vented enactment of any reform in 19^8.
The Navy amendments
The Administration endorsed the separate legisla­
tive programs of the Navy and Army for updating their indi­
vidual criminal statutes. The Army's proposals were 
received earlier than those of the Navy by the newly 
reorganized House Armed Services Committee, a product of 
the movement toward military unification. Despite the 
continuing Administration support for separate statutes, 
the chairman of the House subcommittee, Charles H. Elston 
of Ohio, expressed hope that "we will be able to write 
some legislation applicable to both the Army and Navy, so 
that the entire system within those branches may be 
revised." However, two months later during consideration 
by the full Armed Services Committee of the Army legisla­
tion Representative Elston acknowledged the complexity of 
merging the two quite diverse statutes.? The task was
^Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (19^7), p. 1903.
^"We thought for a time we might consider both the 
Navy and the Army bills together, but after finishing 
the Army bill and receiving the Navy bill from the Navy
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indeed formidable and was accomplished only after six months 
of intensive work by a Department of Defense task force and 
after lengthy hearings in both the House and Senate. .
Although the amendments to the Articles for the 
Government of the Navy were never enacted, the proposals 
merit examination here because of the progressive reforms 
advanced. As described above, appellate review in the Navy 
before 1951 was organized and conducted entirely adminis­
tratively. All general court-martial cases were submitted 
to the Office of the Judge Advocate General for examination 
initially by a legal specialist officer. Cases involving 
controversial issues of law or fact and one in which the 
reviewing officer doubted the legal sufficiency were 
referred to a board of review. The board was a randomly 
selected panel of lawyers from the Department headquarters. 
The assumption was that their collective experience and 
Judgment would ensure a higher degree of justice than if 
the questionable case were evaluated solely by one officer. 
The board's recommendations were not binding upon the Judge 
Advocate General, whose opinion was in turn merely advisory 
to the Secretary of the Navy. The Cabinet official ruled
Department, we came to the conclusion that the situa­
tion was so' entirely different in the two Departments 
that we better proceed with the Army bill and take up 
the Navy bill at a later date,"
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, 
gull Committee Hearings on H.R. 77** and H.R. 2575, Hearings, 
before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Represen­
tatives, on H.R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 19^7 [Com­
mittee Paper No. 177]a p. *J160.
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finally on legal sufficiency and appropriateness of punish­
ment . ®
Under the Navy’s plan, po3t-trial authority of the
field commander was to be reduced significantly in general
courts-martial. In contrast, authoritative judicial tasks
of the Office of the Judge Advocate General were to be 
9increased. The field commander was to review the trial 
records for the single purpose of granting clemency. All 
legal evaluation was to be performed by qualified lawyers 
in Washington. Two boards appointed by the Secretary of 
the Navy were to have full power to set aside all or part 
of the verdict and sentence of any court-martial. A board 
of appeals was to examine trials upon petition by the con­
victed person. The board was to function as an element of 
the Secretary’s office. Number and qualification of board 
members were not specified In the bill; however, a member 
of the drafting panel wrote that the board was intended to 
"have as members civilians, or officers, or both" and that 
"three [members] are contemplated."10 The second board
^Robert S. Pasley, Jr., and Felix E. Larkin, "The 
Navy Court-Martial: Proposals for Its Reform," Cornell
Law Quarterly, 33 (November, 1947), 223.
9u.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill To Amend the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy To Improve the 
Administration of Naval Justice, S. Y 33F, 8Qth Cong..1st 
sess., 1947. The same bill was introduced in the House as 
H.R. 3687. Appellate matters were in Article 39* sections 
(e) through (h).
■^James Snedeker, "Developments in the Law of Naval 
Justice," Notre Dame Lawyer, 23 (November, 1947), 27.
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was to hear petitions for clemency; it was to possess inde­
pendent power to remitj mitigate, or commute the sentence 
imposed by any Navy court-martial. Appointed by the Secre­
tary, its members were not designated in the bill by number 
or qualifications.
The significant feature of the Navy appellate system 
was independence of the board of appeals from the adminis­
trative military organization. The bill specifically pro­
vided that the appellate tribunal would "serve in his [the 
Secretary’s] office." In contrast, the existing board of 
review in the War Department was appointed by and subordinate 
to the Judge Advocate General. Unfortunately for the cause 
of Independence of appellate tribunals, the Navy bill was 
not enacted to serve as a statutory precedent for future 
legislation. The present Courts of Military Review are 
components of the command structure of the Office of the 
Judge Advocate General in each service, thereby providing 
an opportunity for compromise of their judicial character.
Timing rather than merits caused the failure of 
the Navy amendments in 19*17. The House-passed Army legis­
lation encountered considerable opposition from Senators 
insistent upon development of a uniform code. In reaction 
to this demand the Department of Defense agreed to begin 
drafting such legislation. Consequently, the House Armed 
Services Committee did not conduct hearings on the proposed 
amendments to the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
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The Army amendments
The Army's proposed amendments to the Articles of
War contained few of the guarantees of independence for
1 1appellate panels present in the Navy bill.  ̂ The Admin­
istration plan was a deliberate compromise between the 
advocates of continued military control of the legal system 
and the reformers, principally outside the Department, 
urging infusion of civilian procedures. Consequently, the 
revisions were only a slight advance toward Judicializa- 
tion. The Department's position in endeavoring to counter 
public criticism of its handling of legal administration 
was outlined in an article by the Under Secretary of War 
published at the time of the House subcommittee hearings 
on the Army amendments. The civilian official praised the 
quality of appellate procedures under the existing Articles 
of War and described processes in the Office of the Judge 
Advocate General as being "as thorough and efficient as 
the appellate process of the civil courts."12 He asserted 
that "there has been little, if any, criticism of this 
part of the military Justice process." Among the reasons 
cited for the efficiency of the boards of review was that
11H.R. 2575* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 19^7*
Article 50 contained provisions for appellate review. For 
the first time in statutes the titles "Board of Review" 
and "Judicial Council" were capitalized. Nevertheless, 
the Boards attained little new stature with their name.
12Kenneth C. Royall, "Revision of the Military 
Justice Process as Proposed by the War Department," Vir­
ginia Law Review, 33 (May, 19^7), 269-88.
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"officers carefully selected on the basis of legal skill, 
training and judicial experience" performed appellate 
functions. They were described as "entirely independent 
and . . . not subject to superior influences or pressure 
intended to affect their judgment. The Department pro­
posed to "perpetuate and strengthen" the appellate review 
system created in the highly complex Article 50 1/2. The 
1947 amendments were in the tradition of Major General 
Crowder in the comparable debate in 1919-1920.
The key feature of the Army plan was the continua­
tion of the Judge Advocate General's power to rule with 
finality in practically all cases and the corresponding 
advisory role for the Boards of Review. Appellate pro­
cedure was complicated by the insertion of a Judicial 
Council between the existing Boards and the Judge Advo­
cate General. A critical interpretation is that the War 
Department sought to create a new appellate level to pre­
clude establishment by Congress of a civilian appeals 
court as was being urged by many interest groups. Offi­
cial justification for the new panel of officers, who 
were to hold the grade of brigadier general, was centrali­
zation of the confirmation function for the majority of 
general court-martial cases. The new Council held con­
firming power essentially in all circumstances, except
•^Ibid., pp. 280-81. The same members of the 
Army Boards were not so highly complimented by the Judge 
Advocate General in testimony to a House committee. See, 
below, p. 74.
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in courts-martial involving the death penalty or trial of a 
general officer. However, the Judge Advocate General still 
was required to concur in the Council’s opinions. Dis­
agreements were referred to the Secretary of War for final 
disposition.^
The Boards of Review, with members ranging in grade 
from captain through colonel, had no final confirmation 
power. The reasoning for such policy was explained in the 
House subcommittee hearings by the Assistant Judge Advo­
cate General. "It is not intended that the confirming 
power be exercised by these boards of review. It is too 
heavy a responsibility. The confirming power must be 
lodged In a small body which can be made responsible for 
what it does.''̂ -̂  This statement reveals the lack of judi­
cial character of the Boards of Review. The Boards’ task 
was essentially the administrative sorting of cases by 
legal sufficiency for future consideration by the pre­
sumably more mature and qualified lawyers of the Judicial 
Council and by the Judge Advocate General himself. Under 
the Army legislation the only new powers granted to the
■^In criticizing the complicated appellate struc­
ture In the Army plan, Edmund M. Morgan, the principal 
drafter of the Uniform Code, wrote: "It would not be
profitable to go into detail. It is sufficient to state 
the system within the office [of the Judge Advocate General] 
was elaborate and the control by military officers was almost 
complete." "Background of the UCMJ," p. 181.
15Statement of Brigadier General Hubert D. Hoover, 
in Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947)* p. 2070.
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Boards were the right to consider questions of fact, to 
weigh evidence, and to Judge the credibility of witnesses. 
Under the 1920 Articles such powers existed only in the 
examination of cases for forwarding to the President.
Relatively little consideration was given to appel­
late sections of the Army bill during hearings by the 
House subcommittee and full committee.^ War Department 
officials did not explain in detail procedures for the new 
Judicial Council. Spokesmen for two veterans organizations 
criticized the appellate procedures for denying civilian 
review of convictions. One witness urged creation of an
appellate court with civilian judges appointed by the 
17President. ' The other suggested that either of two plans
be enacted: a civilian board of appeals appointed by the
Secretary of War, or authorization for a writ of certiorari
to a Federal court of appeals by the convicted military 
1 ftperson.0 The bill was reported without significant change 
to the House in June, 1947; however, it was not voted on
•^Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947)>  
pp. 565-1307, passim; and, Full Committee Hearings on 
H.R. 774 and H.R. 2575 (1947), PP. 4155-71. passimT
•^Statement of William A. Roberts representing 
AMVETS in Subeommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575 (1947), 
p. 2144.
•^Statement of Justin N. Feldman representing 
the American Veterans Committee, ibid., p. 2089.
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until the following January.1  ̂ After debate on two dates,
the House passed the amendments with few alterations, none
of which affected the substance of the appellate provi- 
20sions. Appellate matters were discussed briefly during 
floor action.
Meanwhile, the Senate Armed Services. Committee 
took no action on either the 'Army or Navy legislation, 
principally because the chairman, Chan Gurney of South 
Dakota, opposed any statute applicable to one service 
only.2*- On May 3* 1948, Senator Gurney wrote to Secre­
tary of Defense James Forrestal urging preparation of a 
uniform code of military justice, with "defense establish­
ment proposals ready for the convening of the Eighty-first 
Congress." Secretary Forrestal announced on May 14, 1948, 
appointment of a committee to draft the first American 
statute of criminal law and procedure applicable to all 
military personnel.22
IQ̂U.S., Congress, House, Amending the Articles of 
War to Improve the Administration of Military Justice, To 
Provide for More Effective Appellate Review. To Insure the 
Equalization of Sentences, and for Other Purposes. H. Kept. 
1034 to Accompany H.R. 2575, 80 th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.
2094 Cong. Rec. 157-217* passim (1948).
21An additional reason for Senate stalling on the 
Army bill was Increasing opposition by the War Department 
to a provision added by the House to create a separate 
Judge Advocate General's Corps. The Corps would have been 
an administrative element for assignment of personnel com­
parable to other professional corps.
2?The letters are printed in 94 Cong. Rec. 7520
(1948).
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Alarmed at the prospect of Senate rejection of the 
House-passed amendments to the Articles of War, Interest 
groups lobbied to bring the bill directly to the Senate 
floor. House Resolution 2575 was introduced by Senator 
James P. Kem of Missouri as a rider to the first peacetime 
Selective Service bill. Floor debate centered on the 
supporters1 contention that no American should be drafted 
without protections of military law reforms. Senator 
Gurney objected to the bill because it pertained to the 
Army only and urged delay until legislation from the 
Forrestal committee was received. Advocates of immediate 
reform prevailed by a five-vote majority. The House con­
curred, and revised Articles of War were enacted to become 
effective February 1, 1949.^ At the time confusion existed 
over applicability of the new act to the Department of the 
Air Force created in 1947- Nevertheless, the Air Force 
complied with the amended Articles. The Navy and Coast 
Guard continued to be governed by nineteenth century laws.
During the slightly more than two years of its 
existence, the appellate system of the Army and Air Force 
was not particularly distinguished. Boards of Review and 
the Judicial Council functioned essentially as administra­
tive elements of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. 
The Air Force did provide a judicial attribute to its tri­
bunals by publishing Council and Board opinions in a
23Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 635.
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reporter series similar to those, for Federal and state 
courts.22* Only a week after the effective date of the 
19^8 amendments, legislation was introduced to repeal all 
existing military law statutes.
Enactment of the Uniform Code
The new criminal code to govern all military per­
sonnel was prepared in a six-month drafting project headed 
by Edmund M. Morgan, a Harvard University law professor and
supporter of military law reforms initiated in 1919-1920 by
26Brigadier General Ansell. Defense Secretary Forrestal 
undoubtedly knew of and, at least, did not oppose Morgan's 
frequently expressed criticism of military law. Appoint­
ment to direct the drafting committee gave Morgan the 
opportunity to advance authoritatively his concept of 
judicialization of the legal system. Similar reform views 
were held by another influential member of the committee, 
Felix E. Larkin, the panel executive secretary who had 
participated in inquiries into the Naval legal system in
24u.S., Department of the Air Force, Court-Martial 
Reports of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force: 
Holdings and Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, Judi­
cial Council, and Boards of'Review, Vols. 1-4.
25h.R. 2^98 and S. 857, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 19^9.
Biographical data on Morgan are contained in 
Arthur E. Sutherland, "Edmund Morris Morgan: Lawyer-
Professor, Citizen-Soldier," Military Law Review, 28 
(April, 1965), 2-6; and, Felix E. Larkin, "Professor 
Edmund M. Morgan and the Drafting of the Code," ibid., 
pp. 7-11.
19^5-19-47- As the principal Department of Defense spokes­
man during Congressional hearings, Larkin influenced the 
legislative history of the new code through his explana­
tions of the provisions. Other members of the drafting 
team included fifteen lawyers— ten military officers and 
five civilians— from the four services.
Sources for the code included recommendations from 
the numerous Departmental and private groups which had 
evaluated military law, particularly after World War II; 
previous legislative proposals; and existing civilian and 
military criminal statutes and Judicial institutions. In 
reality, the code draft contained few original provisions, 
especially In appellate structure and process. Existing 
boards of review were retained and given powers to resolve 
cases with finality as a genuine Intermediate appellate 
court. Previously the boards' decisions were subject to 
confirmation by another authority. A counterpart of Gen­
eral Ansell's civilian appeals court was organized as a 
single tribunal of last resort on questions of law.
As Introduced, and passed with only minor amend­
ment, the appellate system for all services consisted of 
three p h a s e s . First, the field commander who convened 
the court-martial reviewed the trial results on points of
^Articles 64, 66, and 67 of the bill provided 
elements of the appellate process. The drafting committee 
reversed the capitalization style of the 1948 Articles and 
printed the title "board of review" In lower case letters.
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both law and fact. This officer could approve verdicts and 
sentences he determined justified. Second, all but minor 
cases were examined by a board of review in the Office of 
the Judge Advocate General. The board corresponded to that 
previously organized in the Army, with the addition of judi­
cial powers to rule finally on all questions of fact. Third, 
the most significant and controversial cases could be 
reviewed further by the new civilian appellate court for 
errors of law. Practically all cases before the new tri­
bunal would reach it through the court's granting of 
petitions by appellants. The Judge Advocates General 
could certify cases to the highest court after a board of 
review decision, and designated categories of cases would 
be heard automatically.
Hearings on the code legislation produced little 
information on the decision-making process in the Morgan 
committee. It is known that initially the Army and Navy 
each insisted on retaining existing appellate procedures. 
Since the two approaches were opposite In degree of for­
mality, the Morgan panel endeavored to compromise on what 
was described as "useful and practical for all services 
and . . . consonant with the plan of unification." Morgan 
testified that the committee unanimously created boards of 
review within each armed service in preference to a single 
intermediate appellate body to adjudicate cases from all
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9 ftservices. ° However, he did not explain the committee's 
reasoning in reaching the decision. The legislation as 
introduced omitted, probably intentionally, details of the 
civilian appellate court. The tribunal was originally 
called the Judicial Council, as was the panel of three 
general officers established by the 1948 Articles of War.
No provision was made in the draft for tenure for the judges 
or for Senate confirmation of their Presidential appoint­
ment. The House subcommittee changed the name to the 
Court of Military Appeals, added Senate confirmation, and 
provided lifetime tenure.
The Morgan committee’s plan for operation of the 
boards of review was contained in Article 66 of the draft. 
Because the substance of the plan was enacted and continues 
in effect, a detailed analysis thereof is appropriate.
Each Judge Advocate General was directed to con­
stitute in his office one or more boards of review. This 
language coincides with that in the 1920 and 1948 Articles 
of War. As will be examined below, the boards of review 
were created without any relationship to the Federal judi­
ciary. This matter was never considered by the Morgan com­
mittee— a conclusion based on the absence of any reference 
to relationships in House and Senate hearings and in
28u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings, before 
a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 
on S. 857 and H.R. 4o8o, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 
pp. 36 and 42.
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publications by committee participants. The number of 
boards was to be determined by the Judge Advocate General, 
presumably based on case load. Significantly, the boards 
within each service and among the four services were organ­
ized entirely independently of each other. There was no 
statutory method for coordination and development of con­
sistent interpretations of law. Because of this fragmenta­
tion, the boards were created with a significant nonjudi­
cial image. No procedure was Included in the draft to 
enable eri banc hearings by the separate boards of a mili­
tary department.
Membership on each board was specified as not less 
than three officers or civilians. For the first time in 
statute, qualifications were prescribed— each member must 
be admitted to the bar of a Federal court or of the highest 
court of a state. Other appointment criteria were omitted, 
thus adding administrative discretion to the Judge Advocate 
General. No characteristics of a civilian judgeship, such 
as judicial title or designated tenure, were specified.
More importantly, each military board member remained a 
subordinate in the command structure. His performance in 
judicial duties was rated by his military superior, fre­
quently the senior officer on the three-man panel. Periodic 
ratings provided the basis for promotion and desirable 
assignments. Because a junior member was dependent upon 
his immediate superior for favorable ratings, conceivably
the member's judicial options could be restricted. He 
might refrain from active dissent from the opinions of 
the senior member. This potential compromise of the inde­
pendence of board members was not discussed in Congres­
sional hearings. The provision for civilian membership 
was included in the Morgan committee draft at the request 
of the Coast Guard. The Navy urged that authority to
appoint civilian attorneys should be unrestricted by armed
20service. The apparently low regard in which members of 
the early boards of review were held is evident in dis­
dainful remarks by the Army Judge Advocate General. In 
opposing the right of boards to rule with finality on 
questions of fact, Major General Thomas H. Green commented, 
"I believe it unwise to entrust such sweeping powers to 
such relatively young officers or civilian employees (as 
authorized by the code). I must use younger officers on 
these boards, because I can't concentrate all my older and 
wiser heads in Washington."3° Presumably, such a remark 
would not have been made if senior officers considered 
board members as counterparts of civilian appellate judges. 
Further, the military traditionalists probably thought the 
boards to be administrative case-sorting panels in the 1918 
tradition.
Jurisdiction of the boards Included all cases in
^ Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 1189.
3°Subcommittee Hearings on S. 857 (1949), p. 259.
which the sentence, as approved by the officer who convened 
the trial, prescribed confinement of more than one year, a 
bad conduct or dishonorable discharge, or affected a gen­
eral or flag officer. The board had authority to affirm 
guilty verdicts and sentences as it found supported in law 
and fact. For example, a defendant might have been con­
victed of murder and .sentenced to life imprisonment; how­
ever, the board could determine that all the elements of 
proof to sustain a murder conviction were not met. If suf­
ficient evidence were introduced at the trial to warrant a 
manslaughter conviction, then the board could rule that a 
guilty verdict was justified on that lesser charge and 
could assess an appropriate sentence. If evidence pre­
sented at the trial was Insufficient to sustain any charge, 
the board was obligated to dismiss the entire matter. As 
in the 19^8 Articles of War, the board was authorized to 
weigh evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, and deter­
mine controverted questions of fact. All these actions 
were final upon the board's action; concurrence by the 
Judge Advocate General was unnecessary. Reversal of a 
board decision could occur only in those cases success­
fully appealed or certified to the highest court, the 
Court of Military Appeals.31
The Morgan draft authorized the Judge Advocate 
General, within ten days following a board decision, to
^lO U.S.C. sec. 867 (1970).
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refer the case for reconsideration to the same or another 
board. This portion of the appellate plan attracted the 
most opposition from nonmilitary witnesses at Congressional 
hearings. The authority was included in the legislation to 
permit an additional evaluation of a controversial question 
of fact. Since only questions of law could be examined by 
the Court of Military Appeals, the drafters sought to pro­
vide for further examination of facts. Critics insisted 
that the Judge Advocate General could "shop around" until 
he found a board which would give the decision he wanted. 
"[T]his provision destroys the Independence and integrity 
of boards of review and . . . should be stricken," a bar 
association spokesman told the House subcommittee.32 The 
Representatives did delete the subsection.33 Nevertheless, 
the Army and Navy Judge Advocates General tried unsuccess­
fully in both House and Senate committees to have the pro­
vision reinstated in somewhat revised form.34 Unless 
further consideration by the Court of Military Appeals or 
the President were necessary, decisions of the boards of 
review were sent to the field commander for imposition of 
the sentence. If the board ordered a rehearing, the local
32Statement of Richard H. Weis, representing New 
York County Lawyers Association, Subcommittee Hearings on 
H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 642.
33ibid., pp. 1191-1207, passim.
3^lbid., pp. 1303-07, passim; and, Subcommittee 
Hearings on S. 857 (1949), pp. 285-67.
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commander had the opportunity to determine if a new trial 
were feasible. If not, his only act was to dismiss all 
charges.
Administrative subordination of the boards was 
evident in the final paragraph of Article 66. The Judge 
Advocates General were directed to prescribe uniform rules 
of procedure for the boards. This function is performed 
by judges themselves in many civilian jurisdictions.
As noted above, the relationship of the military 
legal system to the Federal judiciary was not considered 
in either House or Senate hearings on the code legislation. 
The assumption throughout testimony was that criminal acts 
by military personnel should be adjudged in a special system 
of courts. Yet, legislators and civilian witnesses often 
expressed concern that the military system provide constitu­
tional protections accorded defendants in the Federal 
civilian jurisdiction. The chief division of opinion among 
witnesses concerned the ever-present problem of balancing 
justice and discipline. Persons with a strong traditionalist 
military orientation urged deletion of proposed restrictions 
on the Individual commander's hitherto broad discretion in 
administering the court-martial process. Spokesmen for 
civilian legal groups typically argued that elimination of 
command control and Influence was the highest priority 
reform. Chairman Morgan of the drafting panel explained 
his belief that the boards of review with their increased
powers "to handle law, fact and sentence , . . eliminated 
a great part of the evils of command control."35 Conversely, 
the Army Judge Advocate General and the chief of the 
National Guard Bureau decried the loss of the commander’s 
disciplinary power. "This makes possible an unwarranted 
invasion of the command prerogative and would authorize 
the board of review to substitute its judgment on military 
policy for that of the commander in the field," complained 
the Army's chief legal officer.36 The National Guard gen­
eral opposed the board's "extremely wide discretionary 
powers which will enable them to overrule, with or without 
legal reasons, the actions of courts and of all the appoint­
ing authorities." Equally objectionable to him were the 
Judge Advocate General's loss of decision-making power and 
the provision for civilian membership on the boards of 
review. ^
A view at the opposite extreme was expressed by 
Arthur J. Keeffe, a Cornell University law professor and 
chairman of a 1945-1946 official study committee on Naval 
legal problems. He recommended abolition of the boards of 
review in favor of a single court of civilian judges to
^ Subcommittee Hearings on S. 857 (1949), P- 45.
•^Statement of Major General Thomas H. Green, 
ibid., p. 258.
37statement of Major General Kenneth F. Cramer, 
Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2498 (1949), p. 772.
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hear all military appeals. His objection to the Morgan 
plan was that judicial independence could not exist in 
tribunals subordinate to the Judge Advocates General. 
Keeffe insisted, further, that every court-martial con­
viction be appealed to a civilian judiciary.38 Under the 
uniform code the vast majority of cases would terminate 
upon the decision of either the unit commander or the pre­
dominately military boards of review.
As in committee, floor debate on the bill in each 
house of Congress produced no normative discussion of 
appellate review. Although the legislators expressed con­
cern over the opportunity for improper command influence 
in the trial court, none criticized comparable potential 
improprieties at the intermediate appellate level. Pre­
sumably, they did not envision any interference in the 
boards' Judicial duties by the Judge Advocate General or 
others in the military hierarchy. There were no calls 
for the boards to be independent of military control and
38lbld., p. 84l. Keeffe's arguments against the 
code were expressed vigorously in a legal periodical article 
published in the Pall of 1949, the period between favorable 
reporting of the bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
and consideration of the legislation by the Senate. In the 
article Keeffe made clear his objective of creating suffi­
cient doubt about the desirability of the new statute to 
cause its defeat on the Senate floor. Keeffe and Morton 
Moskin, "Codified Military Injustice: An Analysis of the
Defects In the New Uniform Code of Military Justice," Cor­
nell Law Quarterly, 35 (Fall, 1949)* 151-70. During the 
final floor debate Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon Included 
the full text of the article in his speech opposing por­
tions of the legislation. 96 Cong. Rec. 1430 (1950).
8o
influence.39
A few Senators attempted to defeat, or amend exten­
sively, the bill once it reached the floor. When intro­
duced in February, 1949, the bill was referred without 
objection to the Committee on Armed Services. On June 19,
19^9* that Committee reported the bill favorably, and it 
was made the order of business on June 21, 1949. However,' 
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon objected, and the bill was 
deferred. Similar parliamentary delays occurred on Sep­
tember 27 and October 17, 1949. Morse's objections were 
based on his contention that the bill as offered contained 
insufficient reforms to eliminate biased command control. 
Morse expressed many of the same objections previously 
argued by Cornell Professor Keeffe. Meanwhile, the chair­
man of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Pat McCarran of 
Nevada, attempted to persuade the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee to agree to assign the bill to Judi­
ciary for additional hearings. Senator Millard Tydings of
39After completion of hearings on H.R. 2498, the 
House subcommittee incorporated all amendments into a new 
text numbered H.R. 4080, under which the legislation was 
enacted. Relevant documents are: U.S., Congress, House,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, H. Rept. 491 To Aceom- 
pany H.R. 4080, 8lst Cong., 1st sess., 1949i Senate, Estab­
lishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, S . Rept. 486 
To Accompany H.R. 4o8o,. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949; and, 
House, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Conference Report, 
H. Rept” 1946 To Accompany H.R. 40fJ0, 8lst Cong., 2d sess., 
1950. The House passed the bill on May 5, 1949, 95 Cong. 
Rec. 5719-44. The Senate, passed the bill on February 3, 
1950, 96 Cong. Rec. 1353-70, 1412-17, and 1430-46. Effec­
tive date of the legislation was May 31, 1951-
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Maryland, the Armed Services head, refused; seven months 
later the full Senate sustained his action. This dispute 
arose principally as a Jurisdictional struggle between the 
two committees. McCarran contended that the uniform code 
was a criminal statute and, therefore, should be heard by 
the .Judiciary Committee, a panel probably less willing to 
ratify Department of Defense proposals as was the Armed 
Services Committee.
Senate action on the legislation was not delayed 
appreciably by the only floor amendments presented to the 
bill. Senator Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire was 
defeated in his efforts to restore military domination of 
the legal system. In appellate matters, the Tobey amend­
ments would have applied the review system of the 1948 
Articles of War to all the armed services and would have 
authorized the Judge Advocates General to certify to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­
bia cases involving varying interpretations of law by 
boards of review and Judicial c o u n c i l s .
The only significant dispute between the two houses 
on appellate provisions was resolved to the detriment of 
the new Court of Military Appeals. The House approved 
life tenure for the three civilian Judges; the Senate sub­
committee reduced the term to eight years. The conference 
committee compromised on fifteen-year terms, thus depriving
1,096 Cong. Rec. 1303 (1950).
82
the highest military court of an essential attribute of a 
true Federal court. Less-than-lifetlme appointment of 
judges has prevented inclusion of the Court of Military 
Appeals in the Article III judiciary.
An assessment
The Uniform Code of Military Justice was indeed 
a compromise. For the civilian reformers, the new text 
provided insufficient restrictions on command influence. 
For the military conservative, the Code destroyed the 
field commander's rightful prerogatives in exercising 
discipline. A typical compromise view was expressed by 
Representative Overton Brooks of Louisiana, chairman of 
the subcommittee which considered the Morgan panel draft. 
"The Code is not perfect; but it does represent a long 
step forward in the slow and painful process of estab­
lishing uniform and well-ordered justice throughout the 
Armed Forces."^1 Presumably the legislation reflected 
the collective judgment of the Morgan panel members on 
the extent of revision of existing statutes which could
Letter from Representative Brooks to Percy N. 
Browne, Shreveport, Louisiana, April 8, 1950, in Brooks 
Collection, Archives, Library of Louisiana State Univer­
sity, Baton Rouge. Other relevant materials are a letter 
from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, October 27, 19^9* 
commending Representative Brooks on his subcommittee's work 
on the Code; a second letter from Secretary Johnson, May 11, 
1950, on the occasion of President Truman's signing the 
Code into law; and a reply from Secretary of Defense 
George C, Marshall, May 10, 1951> to Brooks' inquiry about 
Department preparations to Implement the Code. None of the 
Brooks speeches in the Collection pertains to the Code.
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be expected to gain Congressional approval. The framers 
of the bill apparently believed that any significant depar­
ture from previously accepted methods and institutions 
would be rejected. Certainly the opinion of many indi­
vidual military officials was against extensive reform, 
although their Department's policy might have been stated 
in a milder manner.
Enactment of the Uniform Code did bring important 
attributes of judicial adjudication to the appellate system. 
Thus, the military legal system can be said to have moved 
forward on the continuum of adjudicatory institutions. The 
greatest advancement was caused by the creation of boards 
of review and the Court of Military Appeals to hear appeals 
in serious cases. In contrast with their predecessors, 
the boards of review possessed power to decide cases with 
finality. Despite these advances, the boards did not 
attain the equivalent of legislative court status. This 
next step in judlciallzation occurred with the first major 
amendments to the Uniform Code in 1968, which were prompted 
by continuing public discussion of the desirable balance 
between discipline and justice in the military legal system.
CHAPTER V
JUDICIALIZATION IN THE AMENDED CODE
Events In the 1951-1968 period illustrate diffi­
culties In the enactment of military criminal law and 
procedure. Disagreements among the armed services, 
between the services and the Court of Military Appeals 
judges, and within Congressional committees all prevented 
major modification of the Uniform Code during the first 
seventeen years of Its operation. Eventually, persistence 
of reform-minded legislators brought passage of the Mili­
tary Justice Act of 1968. As with previous twentieth- 
century revisions, these amendments were enacted only 
after extended study, interest group pressure, compromise, 
and parliamentary maneuvers to ensure Congressional 
approval. Despite these handicaps, judieiallzatlon con­
tinued during the period. Although amendments did not 
result immediately, Senate subcommittee hearings in 1962 
and 1966 focused on appellate deficiencies and thereby 
prompted administrative improvements. Boards of review, 
particularly in the Army, began to exhibit an awareness of 
the need for judicialization. The 1968 legislation provided 
the statutory backing essential for the newly renamed
8i»
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Courts of Military Review to begin exercising judicial 
independence.
Framers of the Uniform Code recognized the inevita­
bility of divergent opinions on future reforms and the con­
sequent delays in legislative remedies. As a solution, 
Congress directed the judges of the Court of Military Appeals 
and the four armed services senior legal officers to confer 
periodically on the operation of the legal system and to 
report annually recommendations for amendments to the Code
to the Committees on Armed Services and to the Department 
*1secretaries. However, the publication of a joint report 
has not always produced agreement among the civilian and 
military officials. Throughout most of the first decade, 
disagreement persisted over relative power of the Court of 
Military Appeals and the military departments in legal 
matters. When unity of objectives did exist, concurrence 
on methods was difficult to achieve. Annual reports reveal 
the extent of disagreementj in i960 a joint report was not 
issued because of a very separatist policy advocated by the 
Army-2 These interagency dissentions forestalled any com­
prehensive, beneficial legislation, including measures to 
enhance the judicial attributes of the appellate tribunals.
^lO U.S.C. sec. 867(e) (1970). The Judges, the 
Judge Advocates General, and the General Counsel of the 
Department of Transportation refer to themselves as the 
Code Committee in their joint capacity under sec. 867(g).
2USCMA-JAG Annual Report, i960, p. 1.
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Unsuccessful amendment proposals
In 1953 the Code Committee presented seventeen 
relatively noncontroverslal recommendations for amend­
ment of the Uniform Code. These same proposals were heard 
regularly during the ensuing fifteen years of legislative 
delays. The only significant Item affecting the boards of 
review was elimination of required review of cases In 
which the defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and, 
further, in which he specifically waived appellate exami­
nation of his trial. Military traditionalists frequently 
argued that the Uniform Code procedures caused unnecessary 
delays in the disposition of cases and thereby lessened 
the deterrent effect of punishments.
The 1954 joint report repeated the seventeen amend­
ments; however, disagreements arose as the Navy Judge Advo­
cate General in his separate report urged restoration of a 
greater military dominance of the legal system. For 
example, he recommended that civilian membership on the 
boards of review be restricted to the Coast Guard, thereby 
eliminating civilians whom he had appointed to the Navy 
boards.3 But unexplainably the same officer omitted the 
anti-civilian plan in his 1955 report.** Equally threaten­
ing to the judicial character of the boards was his plan 
to revoke board authority to consider appropriateness of 
sentences.
3lbid., 1954, p. 46. ^Ibid., 1955, P* 26.
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These extremist proposals did not appear in a 1955 
Department of Defense-prepared bill ostensibly Incorporating 
the seventeen agreed-upon recommendations of the Code Com­
mittee. However, additional amendments were Included which 
challenged the autonomy of the Court of Military Appeals. 
Most notable was a restriction on the tribunal’s power to 
accept petitions. These portions of the bill naturally 
Incurred the vigorous opposition of the Court judges. The 
tone of the dispute was expressed in a statement to. the 
House subcommittee by the Navy Judge Advocate General. "It 
[the Uniform Code] does not allow enough authority to the 
officers who are ultimately and entirely responsible for 
the success of military operations.
Civilian reformers again used the forum of the 
House subcommittee, chaired as in the 1949 hearings by 
Representative Brooks of Louisiana, to insist on removal 
of appellate tribunals from the military hierarchy. For 
example, a military law lecturer from New York University 
urged that the boards be organized as a single court 
appointed by the Secretary of Defense. Each three-man 
panel of the new court would include at least one civilian.^ 
As Department of Defense manager for House Resolution 6583, 
the Office of the Judge Advocate. General of the Navy quickly
^Statement of Real* Admiral Ira H. Nunn, Subcom­
mittee Hearings on H.R. 6583 (1956), p. 8448.
^Statement of Bertram Schwartz, ibid., pp. 8509-10-
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submitted to the House subcommittee position statements 
opposing a liberalized role for the intermediate appellate 
tribunals. The Navy insisted that the Department of 
Defense, as an organization, was not created by Congress 
to perform "operational" tasks. That is, the Secretary 
and his staff were to be concerned with policy and long- 
range planning rather than with day-to-day decision­
making in military administration. Further, "the boards 
of review form a very definite part of the discipline- 
just ice arm of each armed service and should remain iden­
tified with each armed service." The Navy countered the 
plan for mandatory civilian membership on the boards with 
the assertion that such criteria would improperly restrict 
the discretion of the Judge Advocate General.^ The same 
proposals and Defense responses were repeated ten years 
later during Senate consideration of methods to enhance 
the independence of the military Judiciary. In a state­
ment reminiscent of that by Cornell Professor Keeffe in 
19^9, a spokesman for the American Legion proposed aboli­
tion of the boards of review and transfer of their task of 
examining questions of fact to the Court of Military Appeals.^
Presumably because of disagreements between the armed
^"Memorandum for Subcommittee No. 1, House Committee 
on Armed Services from the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen­
eral, Department of the Navy, May 2, 1956," in Ibid.,
p. 8649
^Statement of John J. Finn, ibid., p. 8603-
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services and the Court of Military Appeals judges, the 
House subcommittee did not report House Resolution 6583 
to the full committee. Thus, the only effort at substan­
tial reform of the Uniform Code during its first decade 
failed without ever having much prospect for success.
In 1959 the judges of the Court of Military 
Appeals, in a very rare attempt to promote Code amend­
ments, recommended consolidation of the boards of review 
into a single tribunal under the Secretary of Defense.
Their comments occurred amid increasing discord among the 
services and the Court, principally caused by its deci­
sions limiting military command discretion in legal admin­
istration. While the object of the judges' proposal was 
not new, their support definitely added prestige to the 
previously expressed plan of civilian reformers. The 
recommendation was among four changes the Court advanced, 
in addition to several relatively noncontroversial amend­
ments supported in the Joint report, to "increase discipline, 
and enhance the stature of courts-martial as truly Judi­
cial forums." In the judges' recommendation, all boards 
would be merged under the Secretary of Defense, who would 
appoint the members— officers and civilians— for fixed 
terms. Sitting in panels of three judges, each from a 
different service, the new court would perform Intermediate 
appellate review as provided in the existing Article 66 of 
the Code. The judges of the highest court explained, "This
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modification will insure greater independence and accom­
plish more substantial uniformity in the application of 
the Code throughout the Services, as well as in uniformity 
in the sentences finally approved,"9
Omission of the civilian judges' plan from the 
legislative proposals in their joint report with the mili­
tary legal officers must be interpreted as evidence of 
rejection by the military departments of the unified- 
court concept. A form of dissent was recorded even among 
the three judges of the Court. Judge George W. Latimer, 
the member with the most traditionalist military viewpoint, 
indicated "certain reservations" regarding consolidation 
of the intermediate tribunals.10 The substance of his 
dissent was not published in the 1959 report, and even 
his statement of reservation was omitted with the repeat 
of the unification recommendation in the i960 document.11 
The only additional reference to the plan occurred in the 
1962 Senate subcommittee hearings when Judge Homer Ferguson 
supported a single intermediate court. His brief remarks 
were in reply to a question from the subcommittee counsel 
rather than having been volunteered.12
9USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1959, PP* 34-35*
10Ibid., p. 35* 11Ibld., I960, pp. 10-11.
12u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi­
ciary, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, Hear­
ings , before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Eights of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 
260, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 197*
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The low point In relations between the Court of 
Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General occurred 
in I960 as a result of publication of an Army study of the 
administration of the Uniform Code. If implemented* the 
recommended plan would have transferred decision-making 
authority from judicial to administrative agencies. The 
boards of review were not affected drastically in the pro­
posal* perhaps because the boards had never been Indepen­
dent of the Judge Advocate General's control. Two changes 
were advanced: the previously expressed plan to eliminate
examination of cases in which the defendant pleaded guiltyj 
and termination of board authority to consider appropriate­
ness of sentences. This latter function was to be assigned 
to a new "sentence control board" consisting of a minimum 
of five military members. More significantly* the Army 
panel directly attacked the Court of Military Appeals with 
a proposal to add two judgeships with four-year terms 
reserved for retired military lawyers. Presumably* the 
Army's Intent was to halt future* if not actually reverse 
previous* decisions adverse to the military's exercise of 
discretion In administering the legal system. ̂
The Court of Military Appeals judges and the Judge
^USCMA-JAG Annual Report * I960, p. 68. The Report 
of the Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
Good Order and Discipline in the Army is an attachment to 
the Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. 
The i960 Annual Report is the only one ever published with­
out continuous pagination.
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Advocates General reconciled their differences sufficiently 
to issue in 1961 a joint report in which they divided the 
previously sponsored seventeen-point omnibus bill into a 
number of segments. Several of these were enacted in the 
early 1960's; however, none affected appellate procedures. 
The approvals showed that Congress would consider only 
those noncontroversial amendments which the Court and the 
military departments sponsored jointly. The legislators 
were unwilling to force the parties to compromise on the 
necessary but debatable provisions.
The Military Justice Act of 1968
The decade of disagreement over military law 
revision was ended as Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North 
Carolina and his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
assumed the initiative in developing legislation to bring 
about judicialization. Enactment of the Military Justice 
Act of 1968 is attributable to more than six years of action 
and advocacy by Senator Ervin. His chairmanship of two 
subcommittee hearings, preparation and sponsorship of 
legislation, and reconciliation of the feuding parties 
were all essential to passage of the first comprehensive 
amendments to the Uniform Code.1  ̂ As with the 1920 and
^Senator Ervin's account of the legislative his­
tory of the 1968 amendments, is in his "The Military Jus­
tice Act of 1968," Wake Forest Intramural Law Review, 5 
(May, 1969), 223-43-
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1948 amendments to the Articles of War, the 1968 legisla­
tion was passed through abnormal processes. By parlia­
mentary actions in the concluding days of the session, 
Senator Ervin succeeded in adding to House-passed amend­
ments important reforms agreed to in informal conferences 
with the Department of Defense.
Prompted by public and servicemen's complaints of 
injustices occurring in the administration of the Uniform 
Code, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted in 1962 fact­
finding hearings to prepare legislation.1  ̂ Three topics 
in a pre-hearing questionnaire to the military departments 
pertained to the intermediate appellate system and to 
operations of the boards of review. The principal inquiry 
concerned the boards' independence. Expectedly, all three 
services gave assurances of the complete judicial freedom 
of the boards.1^ The Air Force reply was typical: "Each
board operates as a completely independent appellate body, 
and in no instance has any attempt ever been made to inter­
fere with or compromise the integrity or independence of 
their function."17 Secondly, the subcommittee raised the
^Notably, this was the first time that military 
legal matters had been considered by any Congressional 
committee other than that on Armed Services. These hear­
ings were permitted on a one-time basis only.
^ Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of Military 
Personnel (1962), pp. 8*1*1, 907, and 942.
17Ibld., p. 942.
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issue of the personnel rating procedure used in the Army 
and Air Force as a potential Infringement on the freedom 
of junior board members. Unlike the Navy, the other two 
services assigned the senior member the duty of period­
ically rating the other two members. He was, in turn, 
rated by the Assistant Judge Advocate General, who con­
ceivably could have Improperly influenced the entire board. 
This latter possibility was not discussed. Despite denials 
of any compromise of judicial freedom, the Army changed its 
rating system by assigning the Assistant Judge Advocate 
General responsibility for evaluating the performance and 
promotion potential of all board members. The Air Force 
did not alter its procedure until the prohibition on intra- 
board rating was enacted in the 1968 amendments.
The third subject pertained to the previously
proposed consolidation of all boards of review. As noted
above, Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military Appeals
endorsed merger of the boards into a genuine court under
the Secretary of Defense. Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn
of the Court recommended that "to some extent, the boards
of review should be made into intermediate appellate courts
i ftwith substantial tenure.t,J-° A Georgetown University law 
professor with experience as appellate counsel before Army 
boards commented that "these boards serve no useful func­
tion, as they are presently constituted, except to reduce
1®Ibid., p . 186.
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sentences." He, too, urged consolidation of the boards 
into a single court with multi-service panels of military
IQand civilian lawyers.  ̂ Navy and Air Force replies to the 
subcommittee’s follow-up questionnaire dismissed as imprac­
tical any merging of the appellate tribunals. They con­
tended that the uniqueness of problems, regulations, and 
traditions of each service made officers of that service 
the best qualified judge of its court-martial convictions.
As a result of the hearings, Senator Ervin prepared 
eighteen separate bills amending the Uniform Code .^0 The 
theme of the proposals was elimination of legal decision­
making by laymen; qualified attorneys would henceforth 
administer the military legal system. Two proposals were 
designed to enhance the stature and emphasise the judicial 
role of the boards of review: the title would be changed
to "Courts of Military Review" with a civilian chief judge 
and each three-judge panel consisting of at least one
^statement of A. Kenneth Pye, ibid., pp. 551-52.
onU.S., Congress, Senate, S. 2002 through S. 2019, 
88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963- Identical bills were intro­
duced in the House as H.R. 8565 through H.R. 8582. A few 
of the bills pertained to a matter not contained in the 
Uniform Code, administrative discharges under which persons 
were released for various grounds of unsuitability. Com­
plaints were , raised that such discharges were being used in 
a prejudicial and discriminatory manner. For a concise 
summary of the 1962 hearings and resulting bills, see, 
William A. Creech, "Congress Looks to the Serviceman's 
Rights," American Bar Association Journal, 49 (November, 
1963), 1070-74• Creech was the chief counsel of the sub­
committee.
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civilian and military officers serving a specified minimum 
tenure, and, secondly, preparation of performance reports 
on one judge by another was forbidden. As with the 
revisions initiated by the Code Committee beginning in 
1954, Senator Ervin'3 first attempt at reform failed 
because Congress was reluctant to reconcile divergent 
positions. The intensity of opposition to portions of 
the Ervin package was demonstrated by the Army Judge Advo­
cate General in his 1963 annual report. He attacked the 
plan for mandatory civilian appointment as "an unwarranted, 
unsubstantiated, and undocumented attack on the integrity 
and ability of Army boards of review which are and always 
have been composed entirely of officers." He attempted to 
prove that "Army boards of review are vastly and clearly 
superior" to Navy boards which included civilian members. 
The questionable comparison was based on rates of reversal
of the two boards' decisions by the Court of Military
piAppeals.
During the remaining eighteen months of the Eighty- 
eighth Congress, the bills were "subjected to intensive 
study by both military and civilian experts" and "alterna­
tive suggestions and revised language were submitted from 
many sources," but no Congressional action occurred.22 At
PiReport of Major General Charles L. Decker in 
USCMA-JAG Annual R e p o r t 1963> P- 66,
22Ervin, "The Military Justice Act," p. 225.
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the opening of the next Congress, the same bills were intro­
duced in the House and Senate.^3 Senator Ervin explained:
Although there was no disposition to have Committee 
hearings on the bills, upon my urging the Committee 
Chairman agreed to appoint a special subcommittee of 
the Armed Services Committee to join the Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights in joint hearings on the bills, 
under my chairmanship, with the understanding, of 
course, that the bills could be reported to the Senate 
floor only by vote of the Armed Services Committee.24
Given the pro-military predilections of the Senate Armed
Services Committee leadership, presumably the bills would
have died but for Senator Ervin's personal intervention
based on his prestige and membership on both the Armed
Services and Judiciary Committees. In preparation for the
new series of hearings in January, 1966, the Committee
solicited formal position statements from the Defense and
Treasury Departments on each bill and obtained additional
data from a questionnaire to each service.
The two bills on appellate review were opposed by 
both Defense and Treasury.2-* The plan to require the 
appointment of civilian judges drew the principal opposi­
tion, ranging from the prediction that an insufficient
23S . 745 through S. 762, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965.
2^Ervin, "The Military Justice Act,." ibid.
25U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Provide Addi­
tional Constitutional Protection for Members of the Armed 
Forces by Establishing Courts of Military Review, and for 
Other Purposes, S. 74o; and, A Bill to Insure the Fair and 
Independent Review of Court-Martial Cases by Prohibiting 
any Member of a Board of Review from Rating Another Member 
of A Board of Review, and for Other Purposes, S. 755, 89th 
Cong., 1st sess., 19o5.
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number of qualified civilians were available to fill the 
one-per-panel requirement to the detrimental effect on 
military morale because of the civilians' higher salary.2^
The military departments insisted that they retain the pre­
rogative of appointing civilians to the intermediate tri­
bunals, as authorized in the Uniform Code. The only ele­
ment of the principal bill not specifically opposed by 
either Department was the change in name from boards to 
Courts. Similarly, the two Departments objected to the 
bill banning intraboard rating of members as a "legisla­
tive incursion into an essentially administrative function."27 
No significant new proposals or arguments on the 
Ervin-sponsored amendments resulted from the 1966 hearings 
by the joint Judiciary and Armed Services subcommittee. In
PfiLetter from the Secretary of the Air Force to 
the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 17, 
1965; and, Letter from the General Counsel of the Treasury 
Department to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, March 24, 1965, both printed in U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on Armed 
Services, Military Justice. Joint Hearings, before the Sub­
committee on Constitutional Rights of theCommittee on the 
Judiciary and a special subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services, Senate, on S. 745 through S. 762, S. 2906, 
and S. 2907, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, pp. 503-507.
2?Letter from the Office of the Secretary of the 
Navy to the Chairman, Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 
April 7, 1965; and, Letter from the General Counsel of the 
Treasury to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, April 22, 1965, both printed in Military Justice, 
Joint Hearings (1966), pp. 592-93. The Department of 
Defense position on S. 748: and S. 755 was repeated by the 
Department's spokesman at the hearings, Army Brigadier 
General Kenneth J. Hodson, Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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many respects the sessions merely consolidated the range of 
previously expressed opinions into a few major viewpoints 
on the merits of the amendments. In questioning the Navy 
Judge Advocate General the Subcommittee elicited facts con­
tradicting the Defense Department Justification for oppos­
ing civilian membership on the boards of review. The Navy 
legal officer reported that all the dire problems raised 
in the Defense position statement had not in fact developed 
in the Navy's experience with mixed memberships. He cited 
no morale or personnel problems and commented that "the use 
of a civilian member on these boards has been satisfac-
P Ptory." G The hearings produced a restatement of the mili­
tary traditionalists' objections to Judicialization advo­
cated by Senator Ervin and civilian interest groups. Con­
sequently, the bills died in the Eighty-ninth Congress. 
Nevertheless, the proponents did not desist. Senator Ervin 
consolidated all the proposals developed over the previous 
five years into a single bill, a technique used by the Code 
Committee in the 1950's.2^
Defense Department supporters on the Senate Armed 
Services Committee prevented action on the bill. Recog­
nizing the impossibility of dislodging the bill from the
2®Statement of Rear. Admiral Wilfred A. Hearn, 
ibid., p.
2^U.S., Congress, S. 200.9 and H.R. 226, 90th Cong., 
1st sess ., 1967•
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Committee,. reformers took a new approach by introducing in 
the House a bill containing only those amendments acceptable 
to the military departments.^ This bill affected no por­
tion of the Intermediate appellate process; the long­
standing disagreements prevented appellate system amend­
ments from becoming noncontroversial. As written, the 
rather innocuous bill was designed principally to increase 
the participation of military lawyers in courts-martial.
It passed the House June 3, 1968.31
When the legislation arrived in the Senate, Ervin 
Immediately sought to use the House-passed bill as a vehicle 
for adding "the minimum reforms necessary to any meaningful 
military justice legislation."32 Because he wanted to 
ensure complete Defense Department support,for his amend­
ments, Senator Ervin gained concurrence of the Armed Ser­
vices Committee and the Department for informal negotia­
tions to identify acceptable additions from those contro­
versial portions of the omnibus bill omitted from the
3°u.S., Congress, House, H.R. 12705, 90th Cong.,
1st sess., 1967.
■anJ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, To Amend Chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Jus­
tice) of Title 10., United States Code, Hearings, before a 
subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 12705, 90t.h Cong., 1st sess., 1967 
[Committee Paper No. 50]; and, Full Committee Consideration 
of H.R. 578*1, H.R. 15971 . . •» Hearings, before the Com­
mittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on 
H.R. 15971, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968 [Committee Paper 
No. 54]; and, 114 Cong. Rec. 15804-806 (1968).
32Ervin, "The Military Justice Act," p. 226.
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House-passed legislation. Because of the lengthy history 
of opposition to significant reforms by influential Con­
gressmen and by the military leadership, it is surprising 
that the negotiators agreed on several important provi­
sions. In fact, Senator Ervin described the informal 
process as occurring "smoothly.”33 Precise explanations 
for the success of the compromise effort are unavailable; 
Senator Ervin did not elaborate on the process in his pub­
lished description of the passage of the legislation. A 
logical interpretation of the event is that the Department 
of Defense was represented in the negotiations by a legal 
officer with obviously more progressive attitudes than 
those prevailing in the military leadership in previous 
years. Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, the Army Judge 
Advocate General, was a proponent of judicialization and 
enhancement of the stature of the military tribunals. 
Presumably, he recognized the merit of the Ervin proposals 
and was successful in convincing other officials of the 
Department of Defense to accept the legislation.
The Armed Services Committee accepted the amend­
ments written by Senator Ervin after the informal negotia­
tions and reported the revised bill. Both chambers adopted 
the new language without dissent on voice vote. late, in
33Ibid., p. 224.
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October, 1968.3^ Thus, the Military Justice Act of 1968 
became the first substantive amendment to the Uniform Code 
as the culmination of more than fifteen years of debate 
among the persons and agencies responsible for ensuring 
justice to the American serviceman.^5
The informal negotiations between Senator Ervin and 
the military representatives produced essentially the appel­
late process changes sought in the original omnibus bill.
The main deletions were the naming of a civilian chief 
judge and mandatory civilian membership on each panel of 
the new Courts of Military Review. The outcome definitely 
was weighted in favor of the reformers' objectives. Senator 
Ervin characterized the legislation as significantly enhanc­
ing the prestige and independence of the intermediate courts
and promoting uniformity of decision and sound internal
administration.3^ The act was probably the greatest 
degree of judicialization attainable in the circumstances.
In the amended Article 66 of the Uniform Code the
several boards of review in each service were unified as
34U.S., Congress, Senate, Increasing the Parti­
cipation of Law Officers and Counsel bn Courts-Martial,
S. Kept. 1601 To Accompany H.R. 15971* 90th Cong., 2d- sess., 
1968j and, 114 Cong. Rec. 29.392.-402 and 30561-566 (1968).
^Public Law 90-.632, 82 Stat. 1335. Signed Octo­
ber 24, 1968, the amendments: became effective August 1,
1969. For citations of the. legislative history'of each 
major element of the Act,, see the Department of Defense 
sectional analysis printed in 114 Cong. Rec. 30565-66 (1968).
3^Ervin, "The Military Justice Act." p. 241.
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the Court of Military Review. The single Court was defined 
as consisting of one or more panels, with each panel com­
posed of not less than three appellate military judges, 
the latter a new title. The Judge Advocate General was 
authorized to designate a chief judge, who would be respon­
sible for organizing the Court into working panels. A 
member of each panel was to be appointed as senior judge.
In hearing appeals the Court was authorized for the first 
time in statute to sit either as a whole (en banc) or In 
panels. Two new subdivisions were added to the Article. 
Senator Ervin’s objections to intrapanel personnel ratings 
were enacted as a prohibition on one member of the Court 
preparing or In any way participating in the submission of 
an efficiency report on any other member. The other new 
portion prohibited any judge of the Court from reviewing 
a case In which he had participated In any official capac­
ity. 37 The 1968 amendments did not affect existing juris­
diction or powers of the appellate courts.
"The Military Justice Act of 1968 represents 
unquestionably the most significant advance in military 
justice In almost two decades."3^ Since reforms had been 
advocated by various individuals and groups during most of
37i0 U.S.C. sec. 866 (1970).. Note the capitaliza­
tion of the new title "Court of Military Review" which 
provided a form of distinction absent in the former boards 
of review.
3%rvln, "The Military Justice Act," ibid.
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that period, why did the first significant enactment occur 
in 1968? The major explanation is the persistence of 
reform-minded Congressmen, principally Senator Ervin, in 
continuing to sponsor legislation advantageous to Judi- 
cialization. Unlike previous amendments to the military 
legal system statutes, the 1968 act was the result of 
pressure initially from within the armed services. Indi­
vidual complaints led to field investigations by the staff 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. When 
the validity of the accusations was determined, the Sub­
committee conducted hearings in 1962 and 1966 and attempted 
to advance legislation. In the early stages of the reform 
movement, external factors In American society affected the 
efforts only Indirectly. Previous laws pertaining to the 
military legal systems were enacted as the aftermath of 
war. In contrast, most of the decision-making relating to 
the 1968 act preceded the decline in public support for the 
American military involvement in Southeast Asia. Passage 
occurred In 1968 because of the fortuitous circumstance of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of 
Defense reaching agreement on a workable compromise at the 
personal Initiative of an influential legislator and a 
progressive military legal officer.
An assessment
The history of appellate, review in American mili­
tary law illustrates the overriding fact that genuine
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judicial Institutions to consider appeals of court-martial 
convictions are alien to the military legal systems. Courts 
of appeals totally independent of the military hierarchy and 
its influence have never existed. Included in this assess­
ment is the present United States Court of Military Appeals 
because of its omission from the Federal judiciary. The 
Court is vulnerable to military coercion because it lacks 
many of the essential attributes of a constitutional court, 
principally the complete severance of all relationships 
with the executive branch. Since 19&9 the Courts of Mili­
tary Review have advanced measurably toward the greatest 
degree of independence possible in their statutory setting. 
Judicialization has occurred at the expense of the military 
unit commander's discretion in administering justice and 
discipline to his subordinates. This uneven shifting of 
authority from a potentially subjective individual to a 
probably objective appellate court is indeed a major break 
with military tradition based on the laws of Caesar's Roman 
armies.
Reformers in the 1970's seeking to accelerate the 
trend toward judicialization must recognize the extreme 
difficulty, under which military law has been revised. The 
first three amendments in the twentieth century were 
prompted by public criticism heightened during wartime.
Even In the 1968 enactment, Congressional supporters cited 
circumstances arising from the Southeast Asian conflict to
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encourage passage. As In the approval of practically any 
kind of legislation, public and interest group backing must 
be consistently strong. Particularly important is unquali­
fied support by the military leadership itself. Legisla­
tive hurdles frequently can be surmounted only■through the 
personal efforts of influential committee members. In each 
of the four enactments since World War X, an individual 
member of Congress provided the initiative and the parlia­
mentary skills necessary for enactment. Noteworthy in 
these tasks were Senator Chamberlain, Representative Elston, 
Representative Brooks, and Senator Ervin. Even with their 
efforts, the four bills passed as a result of "accidents." 
The 1920 Articles of War, never heard formally in committee, 
were added as floor amendments to unrelated legislation.
The 1948 Articles survived in the same manner. The 1950 
Uniform Code, the only legislation enacted in the standard 
procedural sequence, was saved from extensive change and 
delay by a five-vote margin. The 1968 amendments were 
prepared, after fifteen years of debate and numerous hear­
ings, in informal compromise sessions between a legislator 
and the military.
In terms of the judicial-executive adjudication 
continuum, the Military Justice Act of 1968 brought the 
intermediate appellate tribunals to a mid-point in the 
progression toward unquestioned judicial status. The new 
amendments, plus an accompanying expanded sense of judicial
character in the military tribunals, have moved the Courts 
of Military Review to the threshold of legislative court 
status. Because of the realistic impossibility of future 
judicialization through legislation exclusively, attain­
ment of desired attributes probably will have to occur- 
through activism by the judiciary— the Federal courts and 
the five military courts. Their decisions may bring the 
military intermediate appellate tribunals to a point of 
judicial equivalence faster than will Congressional enact­
ments. Recent opinions by these tribunals provide evi­
dence of this trend.
CHAPTER VI
JUDICIALIZATION THROUGH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
In enacting the Uniform Code Congress did not 
definitively establish the relationship of the military 
tribunals to the Federal judiciary. As evident from the 
history of military legal statutes, the ambiguity reflected 
the long-standing separation of military and civilian crim­
inal litigation systems. The imprecision was a predictable 
outcome of the compromise between conflicting objectives of 
the traditionalist military leaders and the Increasingly 
Influential civilian reformers. Congress ignored the ques­
tion of whether the Court of Military Appeals was truly a 
court or merely an administrative element of the Department 
of Defense. The boards of review were placed by Implication 
in the latter category because of their historical adminis­
trative role. Although lacking Congressionally conferred 
judicial character, the Court of Military Appeals and two 
of the four Courts of Military Review have acted Indepen­
dently to assert their eligibility for Inclusion in the 
judicial fraternity. This judicial activism, beginning in 
1966 and 1969, respectively,- is the only significant self- 
appraisal by these military tribunals. Thus, these opinions
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reveal much about the nature of the contemporary military 
legal system.
This analysis will proceed by examining whether, 
and to what extent, the military courts in question are 
indeed judicial in character or whether they remain pri­
marily administrative adjudicatory agencies. "Judicial" 
and "administrative" correspond to definitions of terms 
used in the continuum developed by Roscoe Pound based on 
judicial and executive adjudication. Judicialization of 
the five military tribunals has created variations in 
placement on the continuum at any given time . ^
Administrative adjudication is performed by many 
elements of the executive branch and by most of the inde­
pendent regulatory commissions. Examples are the quasi­
judicial activities of the Department of Agriculture and 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Despite similarities
•̂ A variant approach classifies the military legal 
system as unique— not subject to placement on the continuum 
of the judiciary and administrative agencies. According to 
United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, 
"Military proceedings are different. As we said in 
0TCallihan v. Parker . . ., ’A court-martial is not 
yet an Independent instrument of justice but remains 
to a significant degree a specialized part of the 
overall mechanism by which military discipline is 
maintained.'" Parlsi v. Davidson, ^05 U.S. 3^* 51 
(1972), (concurring opinion).
This same interpretation is held by the military tradition­
alists who seek to develop exclusive military command con­
trol over the legal system. Nevertheless, it is the posi­
tion of this writer that .the. military legal tribunals can 
be related to the classification pattern of judicial and 
administrative institutions.
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between the adjudicatory features of these agencies and the 
military legal system, the latter has never been considered 
in the study of administrative law.2
Since military tribunals are assumed to be sus­
ceptible to analysis in the judicial-administrative adjudi­
cation continuum, the issue is then to determine the rela­
tionship of the military institutions to the Federal judi­
ciary. United States courts are divided into two classes—  
constitutional and legislative.3 in the former are those 
courts recognised in Article III of the Constitution, 
namely, the Supreme Court and the inferior courts— the 
Courts of Appeals and:the District Courts. Specialized 
courts created by Congress have been the subject of contro­
versy regarding their status as constitutional courts. 
However, their position as orthodox Article III courts has 
been assured by statutes declaring them to have been estab­
lished under Article III. These tribunals are the Court of
2The distinction between the judiciary and admin­istrative agencies is examined in American Jurisprudence,
2d ed., vol. 20. p. 387 (1965)*
^For the constitutional history of the two kinds 
of courts, see Charles Alan Wright, Handbook of the Law of 
Federal Courts (2d ed.; St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Company, 1970 and 1972 pocket, part), pp. 26-34. Concern 
over the classification .of Federal courts has been depre­
cated by. two political scientists who advocate a behavioral 
methodology. "[T]he distinction between a constitutional 
and a legislative court is. one of the type that would have 
delighted those meticulous medieval scholastics who argued 
about how many angels would fit on the head of a pin." 
Goldman and Jahnlge, The Federal Courts as a Political 
System, p. 24.
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Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court, and the 
Court of Claims. Congress can transfer a court into the 
constitutional classification by giving it all the attri­
butes of an Article III court, including lifetime Judicial 
appointments. **
Congress can create adjudicatory institutions to 
participate in the accomplishment of functions enumerated 
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Thus, Con­
gress established legislative courts, such as the United 
States Tax Court under the power "to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and the United States 
Court of Military Appeals under the power "to make rules 
for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces." However, Congress delayed until 1968 to declare 
by statute that the Court of Military Appeals was in fact 
a legislative court.5 in 1969 the Supreme Court acknowl­
edged the Article I status.^ The question remains whether 
the four Courts of Military Review are legislative courts. 
The Supreme Court has answered indirectly in two cases in
^Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
^Public Law 90-340». 82 Stat. 178 (1968) amending 
10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a). See,, below, p. 114.
6Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). See,, below,
p. 116. Many of the problems caused by the uncertainties 
of the Court of Military. Appeals as a legislative, court 
were foreseen quite early -in its existence. For example, 
see observations by a former, commissioner of the court. 
Daniel Walker, "An Evaluation of the United States Court 
of Military Appeals," Northwestern University Law Review,
48 (January-February, 1954), 714-33.
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the affirmative.^ Congress has not legislated on the sub-
Oject nor has the issue been raised in hearings. The Court 
of Military Appeals has stated positively that it "expresses 
no opinion" on the matter.9 The Army and Air Force Courts 
of Military Review have declared themselves to be legisla­
tive courts.10 However, the Coast Guard Court of Military 
Review has interpreted the same data used by the Army and 
Air Force Courts to reach the opposite conclusion. x The 
Navy Court of Military Review has, like Congress, remained 
silent.12
Judicialization of the Court 
of Military Appeals
A determination of probable causes for such diver­
gent opinions by three of the intermediate appellate courts 
must begin with actions by the Court of Military Appeals. 
Principally at the initiative of Chief Judge Quinn, the
N̂oyd v. Bond, ibid., and Paris! v. Davidson, 405 
U.S. 34 (1972).
^Public Law 9°-632, 82 Stat. 1341 (1968) and docu­
ments associated with the Military Justice Act of 1968.
lenders on v. Wondolowski, 21 USCMA 63, 44 CMR 117
(1971).
10United States v. Draughon, 42 CMR 447 (ACMR 1970), 
and, Gagnon v. United States., H2 CMR 1035 (AFCMR 1970).
11Combest v. Bender, .43 CMR 899 (CGCMR 197-1).
12No decision concerning powers of the Navy Court 
has been' published in Vols. 42 through 45 of Court-Martial 
Reports. Further, no disposition of miscellaneous docket 
cases has been reported in the Annual Reports of the Navy 
Judge Advocate General.
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Court endeavored from the date of Its creation to enhance 
its image as a genuine judicial tribunal. Actions affect­
ing its name and location are illustrative. As passed in 
1950 the Uniform Code did not include the words "United 
States" in the title of the Court. Nevertheless, the 
judges added the prestige-carrying words to the title and 
official s e a l . -̂3 The Uniform Code provided that the Court 
would be "located for administrative purposes in the Depart­
ment of Defense." However, Chief Judge Quinn vigorously 
opposed relationships with the Department which might com­
promise the Court's independence, either in fact or in 
appearance. The judges rejected permanent accommodations 
in the Pentagon in favor of a court room and chambers in a 
Federal court building in downtown Washington.̂  Support 
for the judges' efforts to increase Court prestige have 
come from advocates of military law reform. Among the 
changes recommended was the granting of lifetime appoint­
ments to the judges. Chief Judge Quinn has written exten­
sively in legal periodicals describing the qualities of 
the military adjudicatory system.-*-5 Finally in 1968
13,,Rules of Practice and Procedure," July 11, 1951, 
Rules 1 and 2, 1 USCMA xxiii (1951).
•^Frederick R. Hanlon, "Ten-Year Chronolpgy of the 
United States Court of Military Appeals," in USCMA-JAG 
Annual Report, 1961, pp. 47-61.
■^Examples of Chief. Judge Quinn's remarks are the 
following: "Despite all the changes that have taken place
in the military justice system during the past two decades, 
some remain unconvinced that courts-martial are, or truly
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Congress enacted a noncontroversial statute designed to 
clarify the Court’s Article .1 position. Significantly, 
the issue of Article III status was not raised. The new 
legislation included the simple declaration, "There is a 
United States Court of Military Appeals established under 
article I of the Constitution and located for administra­
tive purposes only in the Department of Defense."^ The 
Senate Armed Services Committee report on the bill rein­
forced the affirmation of legislative court status.
The congressional intent was that the Court of 
Military Appeals be a court in every significant 
respect. Despite this clear intent, there have been 
contentions that the court is not a court at all but 
an Instrumentality of the executive branch or an 
administrative agency of the Department of Defense. -̂7
The 1968 act brought the Court of Military Appeals no
nearer to incorporation Into the Federal judiciary. The
Court Is in the anomalous position of being a full component
can be, a part of the federal judiciary." "Courts-Martial 
Practice: A View from the Top," Hastings Law Journal, 22
(January, 1971)> 201-12. "Under the Uniform Code, the 
courts-martial system can truly be regarded as an integral 
part of the federal judiciary." "Some.Comparisons between 
Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice," UCLA Law Review, 15 
(June, 1968), 1240-59* Additionally, see Chief Judge 
Quinn's dissent in United States v. Borya, 18 USCMA 259,
40 CMR 259 (1969).
l6Public Law 90-340.(196.8); 10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a)
(1970).
^U.S., Congress, Seriate, Establishing the Court 
of Military Appeals as the: U.S. Court of Military Appeals, 
S. Rept.. 806 To Accompany S.. 26.34, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 
1967, p. 2. See, also, House, U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals, H. Rept. 1480 To Accompany S. 2634, 90th Cong.,
2d sess . , 1968.
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of neither the judicial nor executive branches.
Simultaneous with Congressional consideration of 
the clarifying statute, the Court of Military Appeals began 
asserting powers characteristic of courts in the Federal 
judiciary. These actions have, in turn, prompted the Courts 
of Military Review to evaluate their own status. The 
statute under which this self-appraisal has occurred is 
the All Writs Act which provides, "The Supreme Court and 
all courts established by act of Congress may issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles 
of law."*^ Generally termed "extraordinary relief," the 
writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, and coram nobis, 
all of which are actions outside normal appellate review.
The substance of the writs is immaterial here; instead, 
the present concern is whether or not writs can be issued 
by the military appellate courts. That is, are the Court 
of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review 
capable of exercising powers invoked by Article III and 
Article I courts under the All Writs Act? This precise
18The anomaly Is a characteristic of legislative 
courts. For example, the Court of Military Appeals and 
the Tax Court are theoretically Independent of the execu­
tive branch; yet, their annual budgets are enacted In 
executive appropriations and their statutory authoriza­
tion is found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
in the Internal Revenue Code rather than In the Judiciary 
title of the United States Code.
*̂ *̂ 28 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a) (1970). Emphasis added.
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point was not considered by Congress In Its enactment of 
any military law statutes nor In the passage of the various 
versions of the All Writs Act.
In 1966 the Court of Military Appeals declared 
unequivocally that "this Court is a court established by 
act of Congress within the meaning of the All Writs A ct."20 
In at least three previous cases the Court Intimated that 
It possessed writs power; however, it did not reach the
merits of the question in disposing of the cases under con-
21sideration. In 1969 the military court’s activism was 
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court. "[W]e do not 
believe that there can be any doubt as to the power of the 
Court of Military Appeals to issue an emergency writ of 
habeas corpus in cases . . . which may ultimately be reviewed 
by that court."22 Although its position as a legislative 
or Article I court Is now confirmed, the Court of Military 
Appeals still exhibits a sense of Inferiority because of
90United States v. Frischholz, 16 USCMA 150, 152-53 
and 36 CMR 306, 308-309 (19-557I
21United States v. Buck, 9 USCMA 290, 26 CMR 70
(1958); United States v. Tavares, 10 USCMA 282, 23 CMR 356
(1959); and, In re Taylor, 12' USCMA 427, 31 CMR 13 (1961).
22Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969). See 
p. 119, below, for facts from which the Supreme Court made 
the declaration of legislative court status. Interestingly, 
Justice Harlan's opinion essentially favorable to the mili­
tary tribunals followed by less than two weeks Justice 
Douglas' opinion In O'Callihan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 
(1969), which contained highly critical indictments of the 
capability of the military legal system to produce justice.
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its exclusion from the Federal judiciary.23 jt is not a 
“court of the United States" within the meaning of the 
definitional statute.21* It is not a participant in the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.25 it is "not a 
part of the judiciary at all," according to an Influential
writer.26
Judicialization in the Courts 
of Military Review
While the Court of Military Appeals is now a legis­
lative court, the Courts of Military Review continue in an 
uncertain status. Expectedly, the Intermediate appellate 
courts did not attempt to exert extraordinary relief or 
writ power until the superior military court had approached 
the subject. Interpretations of their authority by the 
Courts of Military Review occurred in the context of the 
Military Justice Act of 1968. Effective August 1, 1969,
23This status was reaffirmed In the Supreme Court’s 
most recent direct opinion on the subject: "Military
courts are legislative courts5 their jurisdiction is inde­
pendent of Art. Ill judicial power." Paris! v. Davidson, 
405 U.S. 34, 41, n. 7-
2^28 U.S.C. sec. 451 (1970). "The term 'courts of 
the United States' includes . . . any court created by Act 
of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office 
during good behavior."
2^28 U.S.C. sec. 331 (1970). Participation is by 
courts designated as constitutional courts.
2^Wright, Federal Courts., p. 34. The source Is a 
principal text for law school courses on the judiciary; 
thus, such an impression of the military court of last 
resort is communicated to many prospective attorneys.
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each service’s boards .of review were renamed as Courts of 
Military Review with the same jurisdiction. None of the 
proposals leading to the 1968 act brought any reported 
discussion of the status of the intermediate tribunals as 
either legislative courts or administrative panels. Pre­
sumably, the subject was omitted because the courts were 
thought to be .unaffected by the traditional classifica­
tions of adjudicatory institutions.
Less than two months after the Army Court of Mili­
tary Review gained that title, a unanimous three-judge 
panel asserted that the Court was "a court established by 
Congress" and was therefore eligible to grant the writ 
sought by the petitioner in the pending case.2? Counsel 
for the United States argued that the Court was an admin­
istrative body established by the Judge Advocate General, 
not a legislative court established by Congress. The Army 
panel’s principal substantiation for the decision was a 
clause in the Supreme Court's Noyd v. Bond opinion issued 
three months earlier. There Justice John Marshall Harlan 
by obiter dicta had described the Air Force board of review 
as "the appellate military tribunal Congress has estab­
lished to oversee the administration of criminal justice
2?United States v.. Dolby. (ACMR 1969). Unpublished 
in Court-Martial Reports. b.ut‘ summarized in The Criminal Law 
Reporter, 6 (October 22,. 196.9), 20.63-64. As a prisoner, 
Dolby, sought a writ of habeas corpus. Facts of the case 
are unavailable because the hase was not published in full.
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In the petitioner's branch of the Armed Services."28 The 
Army judges read this definition as confirmation from the 
nation's highest court that the boards of review were estab­
lished by Congress. Designation of the boards as "courts" 
was Interpreted as implying Congressional intent to enhance 
the judicial stature of the intermediate appellate tri­
bunals. Further, the Army judges evaluated the act of the 
Judge Advocate General in "establishing" the Court of Mili­
tary Review as a ministerial task, performed without inde­
pendent discretion, in compliance with Congressional man­
date ,
It Is possible to speculate regarding the motiva­
tion of the Army court in engaging In judicial activism, a 
role alien to the intermediate tribunals, the performance 
of which was previously confined to the narrowly defined 
tasks of appellate review under the Uniform Code. Perhaps 
the Supreme Court in Noyd invited the Intermediate courts 
to exercise extraordinary relief powers. A brief review 
of Noyd is necessary to establish the context of Justice 
Harlan's remark quoted above. Convicted by court-martial, 
Air Force Captain Noyd was ordered confined pending appel­
late review. He immediately secured habeas corpus relief 
from a Federal district :court,. but the Court of Appeals 
reversed the lower court by. holding that Noyd ha.d not 
exhausted all his opportunities for relief available In
28395 U.S. 683, 686 (1969).
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the military legal system.29 The Supreme Court agreed, 
citing principally the power of the Court of Military 
Appeals to grant a writ of habeas corpus. More importantly 
for the issue of power of the intermediate appellate tri­
bunals, Justice Harlan, writing for the 8-1 majority, con­
tinued in a footnote:
The Government suggests that petitioner should also 
be required to exhaust a second remedy allegedly 
afforded him within the military system. It is said 
that Captain Noyd should have requested the Air Force 
Board of Review to release him pending the exhaustion 
of his rights of appeal. The Government, however, 
cites no decision of a Board of Review which asserts 
the power to grant emergency interlocutory relief prior 
to the Board's consideration of a case on its merits; 
nor are we referred to any statute which unequivocally 
grants this authority. In the absence of any attempt 
by the Boards of Review to assert such a power, we do 
not believe that petitioner may properly be required 
to exhaust a remedy which may not exist.30
The Court seemed to recommend that the boards of review 
(and their successors, the Courts of Military Review) exer­
cise writs powers. At a minimum, the possibility for such 
judicial action was left open by not being specifically 
precluded. The ambivalent position of the United States 
is noteworthy. Before the Supreme Court, the government 
endorsed writs power for the intermediate appellate courts. 
A few months later before the Army Court panel considering 
just such an action, the government counsel advocated the 
opposite. Nevertheless, the arguments were consistent in
2^Noyd v. Bond, 285 P. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968) and 
Noyd v. Bond, *102 F. 2d l»4l (10th Cir. 1968).
3O395 U.S. 683, 698, n. 11 (1969).
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that each was designed to block the claim of the Individual 
military member in the pending litigation.
Thus, for the first time in history a military 
intermediate appellate court declared that it possessed 
powers beyond those conferred in its charter. The effect 
of the Army panel's assertion in United States v, Dolby 
remained to be determined through future actions of the 
Court of Military Review. Because of the significance of 
the question, the next petition for extraordinary relief 
was docketed for hearing by the full bench of the Court.
In contrast to the unanimity of the three-judge panel in 
Dolby, the eleven judges in Draughon prepared six opinions.
On the crucial issue of writs power, they divided seven to 
four in the affirmative. Of the four, three opposed the 
Court’s considering its extraordinary relief powers in the 
pending case because they held the claim to be unjustified.
 ̂United States v. Draughon, 42 CMR 447 (ACMR 1970). 
Convicted in 1968 on charges of desertion and forgery, 
Draughon petitioned the Army Court of Military Review late 
in 1969 for appropriate relief in the nature of coram nobis. 
He argued that the forgery conviction should be overturned 
because factually it was not service connected, in terms of 
the United States Supreme Court decision in 0'Callihan v. 
Parker in June, 1969. He sought to have his case reopened 
to obtain dismissal of that charge and to have the sentence 
reassessed based only on the. legally permissible conviction 
for desertion. The Army Court agreed that the conviction 
on the forgery charge was inappropriate under the O'Calli­
han decision. The' Court, then inquired into its. authority 
to provide relief; that is,: did it have power to issue the 
appropriate writ? Finding in the affirmative, the Court 
then decided that in the pending case a writ was unwarranted 
because the O'Callihan rule was not applicable to cases 
closed prior to the date of the Supreme Court decision.
Thus, Draughon won the lega] point but lost his desired 
relief.
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Consequently, in a future case these same three Judges 
might have accepted the activist position. The other 
Judge filed a full dissent in which he argued that the 
Court was an administrative element of the Office of the 
Judge Advocate General. Because these opinions reveal 
much about conflicting interpretations of the question 
of legislative court status for the Courts of Military 
Review, detailed analysis is appropriate.
In Draughon as in Dolby, the United States position 
was that the Court of Military Review was not a court estab­
lished under either Article I or Article III of the Consti­
tution. The majority rejected these arguments by deter­
mining that the Court was established by Congress through 
the conferring of jurisdiction to perform appellate review 
under Article 66 of the Uniform Code. Three extracts from 
the majority opinion reflect the reasoning leading to the 
affirmation of extraordinary relief power.
Congress has ordained the scope of appellate power to 
be performed by the Court, clothed it with judicial 
functions and judicial power as well as expressly con­
ferring on this Court appellate fact-finding power.
The constitutional premise of this Court's statutory 
existence is founded on Article I of the Constitution. 
This Court exists by the same authority as civil courts 
of the United States.
[T]he Court of Military Review Is a court established 
by Act of Congress and as such Is possessed of the 
authority declared in the All Writs Act. . . .32
32Ibid., p. 452.
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The author of the Dolby opinion repeated in a concurrence 
reasoning he had advanced in the previous landmark case. 
Again he relied on the Supreme Court's comment in Noyd and 
on the interpretation of Article 66 as evidence of Congres­
sional establishment of the Court of Military Review. His 
purpose was to counter the concurring opinion of two judges 
who considered extraordinary relief power confined to cases 
already on the Court's docket.
The dissenting opinion in Draughon, ineffective in 
persuading the Army Court, provided a precedent for the 
unanimous decision by the three-judge Coast Guard Court of 
Military Review to reject writs power.33 The two opinions 
in combination enumerated approximately twenty reasons 
against Article I status for the appellate courts. In 
essence, the arguments represented a traditionalist atti­
tude to subordinate the military legal system under the 
Judge Advocate General and the command hierarchy. The 
Draughon dissenter denied that in Article 66 Congress had 
created a court, in terms of the All Writs Act. Counter­
ing the majority view that the Judge Advocate General's
33Combest v. Bender, 43 CMR 899 (CGCMR 1971).
Combest sought a writ of habeas corpus to gain release 
from what he contended was illegal punishment and confine­
ment . The Court determined that it had no authority to con­
sider his plea. Interestingly, the Coast Guard tribunal 
assumed that it did have s.uch power in disposing of its 
first petition for extraordinary relief. Without reaching 
the substance of the writs, argument, the Court found that 
the petition was without merit and dismissed it. In re 
Teske, 42 CMR 945 (CGCMR 1970).
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action In "establishing" the Court was ministerial, the 
dissenting judge insisted that "unless and until he takes 
such action, there is no Court of Military R e v i e w . "34 
this interpretation, the Court was a creature of executive 
action and consequently powerless to Issue writs. Addi­
tionally, the Court had no power to issue rules of pro­
cedure and practice, to issue subpoenas, to enforce its 
judgments, or to determine the qualifications of attorneys 
practicing before it.
The Coast Guard Court added to the Army dissenter's 
itemization of reasons leading to rejection of extraordinary 
relief power. The Combest opinion compared the judicial 
attributes of the Court of Military Appeals and the Courts 
of Military Review. Distinctions were seen in the wording 
used by Congress in enacting authorization statutes.
,r[W]hile Congress had Indicated in 1950 that it, was estab­
lishing the Court of Military Appeals, in 1968 it refrained 
from saying it, was establishing the courts of military 
r e v i e w . "35 in the view of the Coast Guard judges, absence 
of any Congressional consideration of a legislative declara­
tion of the Courts of Military Review to be Article I courts 
was sufficient to preclude any other interpretation. The 
Army judges reasoned that intent was shown in Article 66
3^United States! v.' Draughon, 42 CMR 447, 458. 
35combest v. Bender, 43 CMR 899, 902.
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which gave appellate Jurisdiction to the Courts. Among 
the other negative reasons cited by the Army dissenter 
and the Coast Guard panel was the nature of Judicial 
appointments. Judges were assigned to the Courts by the 
Judge Advocate General of each military department. No 
tenure is prescribed by statute5 only the administrative 
policy of each service provides for an average assignment 
of four years duration at the headquarters. A Judge can 
be removed at any time without cause. Salaries are not 
immune from reduction.
As noted above, the Air Force Court of Military 
Review concurred with the Army Court in declaring its 
status to be that of a legislative court. Instead of 
deliberating at length on the major arguments, the Air 
Force Court adopted the reasoning of the majority in 
Draughon. n[T]he creation by Congress of a military appel­
late court system with power to oversee appropriate aspects 
of the administration of military justice gave to these 
appellate courts whatever powers are necessary or appro­
priate in aid of their jurisdiction."36 Despite their 
willingness to accept petitions for extraordinary relief, 
both the Air Force and Army Courts have granted very few 
of the desired writs.37
^ Gagnon v. United States, 42 CMR 1035 (AFCMR 1970). 
Petitioner’s plea for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.
■^As noted, the desired writs were denied in Dolby, 
Draughon, and Gagnon. Similar dispositions occurred in
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The Navy Court of Military Review has not as yet 
published an opinion on its authority to issue writs for 
extraordinary relief. No substantive evidence exists to 
explain this fact. Presumably, the issue has not been 
raised in an appropriate case in such a manner as to demand 
a forthright decision by the Navy tribunal. Even this 
explanation is somewhat implausible when considering that 
appropriate cases have been brought to the other three 
intermediate appellate courts. In interviews two judges 
of the Navy Court gave opposite opinions on the authority 
of the Courts of Military Review to issue writs. In the 
view of Judge J. Fielding Jones, the Navy jurist with the 
longest period of service, "the Navy boards of review and 
the Court have always assumed that the All Writs Act was
applicable and usable in the protection of their juris­
diction." Further, the military courts were created by 
act of Congress; therefore, they are legislative courts.38 
Judge Louis L. Milano expressed the converse in commenting 
on a hypothetical c a s e . 39 jt is impossible, of course, to 
predict the action of the Navy Court when and if it is
the following Army cases: United States v. Gwaltney»
CMR 536 (ACMR 1970). and United States v. Dickison.
43 CMR 599 (ACMR 1970)..
3®Letter, Arlington, Virginia, March 28, 197.3*
Judge Jones, a civilian, served on Navy intermediate appel­
late tribunals from 1951 until. July, 1972.
^interview, Washington, D. C., December 12, 1972.
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presented an unavoidable, controversy requiring a definitive 
statement on the nature of Its creation. The tradition of 
Naval law is essentially conservative; accordingly, the 
Court might take a position of self-restraint similar to 
that by the Coast Guard Court.
External support for the position asserted by the 
Army and Air Force Courts is essentially nonexistent.
Since the landmark decisions, Congress has enacted no 
legislation affecting the Courts' status. The Court of 
Military Appeals has declined the opportunity to give its 
opinion on the issue. Despite these reactions, the most 
potentially significant development is a footnote comment 
by the United States Supreme Court in a 1972 opinion.
The Court of Military Appeals has not displayed 
activism in behalf of the intermediate courts which it 
exerted for itself in 1966. The author of the principal 
concurring opinion in Draughon urged "recognition by the 
United States Court of Military Appeals and by the Federal 
courts of extraordinary powers which the Courts of Military 
Review possess." However, explicit approval has not been 
forthcoming. The Court of Military Appeals commented in a 
197.1 opinion footnote, "We. express no opinion respecting 
the application of 28 U.S.C'.' sec. 1651(a) [the All Writs 
Act] to Courts of Military. Review"."*^ Despite their.
^°Heriderson v. Wondolowski, 21 USCMA 63, 64, n. 1 
and 44 CMR 117 (1971).
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reluctance to decide the' merits of the question of para­
mount Importance to the intermediate courts, the three 
civilian judges have written approvingly of the Courts of 
Military Review.
In the military Justice system courts of military 
review occupy a position that is comparable in many 
ways to the status of the United States Courts of 
Appeals in the Federal court structure.
Our decision emphatically is without any intention 
to depreciate the status of members of the Courts of 
Military Review. We have many reasons for desiring 
that they maintain the prestige that should accompany 
their important appellate function,^1
These generally laudatory comments contrast with an evalua­
tion of the performance of the boards of review included 
in an opinion eight years earlier. A Navy board was sharply 
criticized for deciding a constitutional question, namely, 
the adequacy of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. u[T]he 
board of review would have been well advised had it declined 
to make that decision, leaving it for higher competent 
review authority."**2
Not only have the judges of the Court of Military 
Appeals declined to support legislative court status for 
the intermediate courts through their judicial opinions, 
but they have also been similarly hesitant .In their roles
^ United States v.. Chl'lcote, 20 USCMA 283, 287 and 
43 CMR 123j 127 (197D- These- remarks occurred in an 
opinion invalidating a procedure of the Courts of Military 
Review whereby a decision of a three-judge panel could be 
reconsidered en banc.
lip .United States v. Culp, 14 USCMA 199, 201 and
33 CMR 411, 413 (1963).
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as members of the Code Committee.. In their 1971 Annual 
Report issued with the Judge Advocates General, they urged 
Congress to consider legislation specifying the extraordi­
nary relief powers of the Court of Military Appeals, the 
Courts of Military Review, and the military judges who 
preside over courts-martial. ^  However, the Code Committee 
declined to provide specific recommendations for the scope 
of legislation on writs powers. This failure perhaps indi­
cates an inability of the legal system officials to agree 
on a draft text on the controversial- topic. Provisions 
relating to extraordinary relief powers were Included in 
military statute amendments Introduced In the Ninety-second 
and Ninety-third Congresses.^  Prospects for early enact­
ment are dim; not even preliminary preparations by committee 
staffs have been begun on these bills.
Despite the hesitancy of Congress and of the Court 
of Military Appeals to extend writs powers to the inter­
mediate courts, dicta in a footnote of a 1972 opinion by 
the Supreme Court may be sufficiently broad and open-ended 
to support future judicializatlon. Justice Potter Stewart
**3u s c mA-JAG Annual Report, 1971* p. 1.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. 2172,. 92,d Cong., 1st 
sess., 1971; House and Senate.,, H.R. 291 and S. 987, 93d 
Cong., 1st sess., 1973*
^Letter from Frank M. Slatinshek,. chief counsel, 
Committee, bn Armed Services.,-. House of Representatives.,
June 15, 1973; and, letter, from T. Edward Braswell,- Jr., 
chief counsel, Committee on Armed Services, Senate.,
August 15, 1973.
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wrote for the Court, "Military courts are legislative 
courts. . . ."**6 This brief sentence was cited above as 
evidence that the Court of Military Appeals Is now unques­
tionably a legislative court. **7 The remaining query 13 how 
this sentence applies to the Courts of Military Review. 
Logically, the intermediate appellate courts are included 
in Justice Stewart's definition of "military courts." 
Therefore, the Courts of Military Review must be "courts 
established by act of Congress" and thereby eligible to 
exercise all the inherent powers of such courts. This 
interpretation is supported by a statement of Justice 
Harry Blackmun in the most recent Supreme Court decision 
affecting military law. ° In dealing with the issue of 
retroactive application of 0'Callihan v. Parker, the Court 
said, "[T]he decision there . . . certainly was not based 
on any conviction that the court-martial lacks fundamental 
integrity in its truth-determining process." Further,
"Nothing said in O'Callihan indicates that the major pur­
pose of that decision was to remedy a defect in the truth- 
determining process in the military trial."**9 These 1973 
compliments to the military legal system conform with the
^ Parlsi v. Davids on,- ,405. U.S. 34, 41, n. 7 (1972).
47p. 117, n. 23., .above..




view that the Supreme Court is encouraging the Judicializa- 
tlon of the military tribunals. Because of the recency of 
Parisi and Gosa, the Courts of Military Review have not 
published decisions interpreting the effect of the dicta.
As Supreme Court opinion seems to support enhance­
ment of the judicial character of the military appellate 
courts, so too does the unofficial comment of observers.
One of the means suggested for increasing the effective­
ness and prestige of the Courts of Military Review is 
through active exercise of extraordinary relief power.
For example, commentators with opposite fundamental views 
on military law reach the same conclusion concerning writs 
power. A frequent critic of the quality of military law 
and of command influence stated that the Courts of Mili­
tary Review will achieve greater independence from com­
mand control by granting "equitable and extraordinary 
relief in any situation involving a serviceman."5° An 
active-duty Army attorney, in analyzing the intermediate 
courts' powers under the All Writs Act, suggested that the 
Courts of Military Review conceivably have broader powers 
than those possessed by the Court of Military Appeals.51 
The latter Court has defined its authority as being limited
5°Sherman, "Civilianization of Military Law," p. 103.
^Thomas M. Rankin, "The All Writs Act and the Mili­
tary Justice System," Military Law Review, 53 (Summer,
1971) j 103—355 •
to cases properly before it or which may eventually reach 
it.^ That is, the Court will apply its extraordinary 
relief power only to its defined jurisdiction under 
Article 67 of the Uniform Code. Based on the same stand­
ard, the Courts of Military Review have a potentially 
greater opportunity to exercise All Writs Act power 
because their jurisdiction is more extensive than is that 
of the Court of Military Appeals. The additional source 
of cases for the intermediate courts is Article 69 which 
authorizes the Judge Advocate General to refer for formal 
review any general court-martial case not automatically 
qualifying for Article 66 review. These cases involve 
sentences of less than one year and, thus, are not subjects 
for routine docketing with the Courts of Military Review. 
Most importantly, these cases are not reviewable by the 
Court of Military Appeals. Thus, the Courts of Military 
review have exclusive jurisdiction. The Army commentator 
emphasised the potential impact of writs power exercised 
by the intermediate courts. "Assumption by military appel­
late courts of authority conferred by the All Writs Act 
radically alters the nature and scope of legal redress 
available within the military, judicial system, "53 Pre­
sumably, all the opportunities for relief within military
-^United States v.': Bevilacqua, 18 USCMA 10,. 39 CMR 
10 (1968); and, United States, v. Snyder, 18 USCMA 480, 40 
CMR 192 (1969)-
53Rankin, "All Writs Act and the Military," p. 133.
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courts must be exhausted before a petitioner enters the 
Federal judiciary. This is the broad meaning of the 
Supreme Court's Noyd ruling.
Persons associated with the military legal system 
typically assert the judicial character of the Courts of 
Military Review and of their predecessor boards of review. 
Comments made during the past decade, particularly, have 
emphasized the independence of the tribunals and have cited 
the protections afforded the military defendant through 
automatic review of his conviction. At least in public 
forums, both civilian and military observers have agreed 
that the boards and Courts perform judicial tasks. Despite 
their possible subjective opinions, these participants iri 
and observers of the appellate process have insisted that 
the tribunals are judicial rather than administrative 
institutions. Among the published appraisals are the 
following two comments. A former member of an Air Force 
board of review noted that "[bjoards of review are judi­
cial bodies, analogous to appellate courts in the Federal 
system."^ a civilian attorney with military legal expe­
rience described the tribunals as "in fact courts, although 
not 'courts' in the sense of being established under 
article III of the United States Constitution."55 The
•^Biddle, "Air Force'. Boards," p. 12.
■^Delmar Karlen, "Civilian and Military Justice at 
the Appellate Level," Wisconsin Law Review, 1968 (No. 3)j 
786. For similar evaluations, see, Charles M. Schiesser
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current chief judges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Courts 
in interviews all affirmed the judicial character of their 
respective institutions and emphasized their personal 
desire to enhance the prestige of the military judiciary.56 
Thus, the persons associated with the military appellate 
process believe that they are performing a genuine judi­
cial function. Perhaps their attitudes regarding the 
nature of the system are more important in assuring jus­
tice on a daily basis than would be a definitive Congres­
sional classification of these tribunals as legislative 
courts.
An assessment
From this analysis of official and unofficial 
positions on the major question of authority of the Courts 
of Military Review, what conclusions can be developed? 
Arguments on each side are convincing. By strict con­
struction of Article 66, the Courts most probably are 
not legislative courts simply because Congress has not 
so stated. However, the activist position is supportable 
because the Courts, normatively, should be legislative
and Daniel H. Benson, "Modern Military Justice," Catholic 
University Law Review, 19 (Summer, 1970), 489-519; and,
Roger M. Currier and Irvin: M. Kent, "The Boards of Review 
of the Armed Services," Vanderbilt Law Review, 6 (February, 
1953), 241-50.
-^Interviews with. Chief Judges Kenneth J. Hodson, 
Falls Church, Virginia, December 11, 1972; Gale E. Krouse, 
and Robert S. Amery, both in Washington, D.C., December 12, 
1972.
courts with all attendant powers. The basis for this view 
is the need Cor the intermediate appellate courts in the 
largest criminal jurisdiction under the national govern­
ment to have all powers necessary to ensure the fair and 
complete administration of justice to the military defend­
ant. Further, the weight of United States Supreme Court 
dicta is on the side of judicialization. Assumption of ' 
extraordinary relief power is another step in the progres­
sion by the military appellate courts toward the equivalent 
of full judicial status. The issue could be settled by a 
brief Congressional declaration, similar to that passed in 
1968 clarifying the position of the United States Court of 
Military Appeals. Because such an enactment is improbable 
in the near term, supporters of judicialization will have 
to be content with a somewhat ambiguous "judge-made" law.
This inquiry into the nature of the Courts of Mili­
tary Review can be placed in perspective by again consider­
ing adjudicatory institutions arrayed along a continuum, 
ranging from the most informal administrative hearing pro­
cedure to constitutional courts. Since their advent as 
a statutory organization in 1920 the military appellate 
tribunals have moved in increments along the continuum 
from the outer limits of administrative agencies toward a 
middle position of legislative courts. The Uniform Code 
of 1950 removed the boards from the purely advisory admin­
istrative classification. Until 1969 the boards functioned
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In a zone of uncertainty— neither truly judicial, nor truly 
administrative. With their new name as Courts of Military 
Review and with a spirit of judicial activism, at least In 
the Army and Air Force Courts, the tribunals have advanced 
to the classification of legislative courts. Perhaps In 
1972 the United States Supreme Court confirmed the status 
which two of the four Courts sought.
On the assumption that the Courts of Military 
Review are the equivalent of appellate courts in the recog­
nized judiciaries, the next task Is to compare their judi­
cial characteristics and the actions of their judges with 
those features of their more established counterparts.
CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Analysis of historical materials and of legislative 
and judicial determinations suggests that the Courts of 
Military Review are, at least cte facto, judicial institu­
tions. The same conclusion is derived from comparison of 
quantitative data on the decision-making processes and 
intracourt judicial behavior from the military and civil­
ian intermediate appellate courts. Examination of processes 
and relationships within courts has become the principal 
research technique of political scientists studying the 
American national and state judiciaries. However, as 
analyzed in Chapter II, the prevailing behavioral method­
ology is not completely applicable to this inquiry. The 
chief limitations are insufficiency of data on the military 
judges and the small number of en banc decisions from which 
to gain impressions of behavior of the complete court. 
Nevertheless, certain comparisons can be made of the Courts 
of Military Review and their counterparts.
Comparison of dispositions ■-
The quality of Justice provided by military appellate
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courts can be estimated, from comparison of rates of affir­
mation and reversals among the two national criminal court 
systems. The most valid comparison can be made from data 
on the frequency of affirmed cases. Composite rates for 
the eleven Courts of Appeals and for the four Courts of 
Military Review are remarkably similar— 82.0 per cent in 
the civilian courts and 85-8 per cent in the military 
courts. These data for the period 1962-1971 reveal that 
convictions in either national trial system are upheld in 
about the same percentages in the initial appellate review.
An even closer percentage results from comparison of rates 
of reversal of convictions in the two systems. For the 
same decade, 1^.3 per cent of the military appellants 
received 3ome modification in the verdict or sentence 
adjudged in their trial; 15-^ per cent of the appellants 
in the Courts of Appeals obtained reversals of their con­
victions. Because of variations in the methods of report­
ing reversals, the second comparison is probably less pre­
cise than is the first.
These conclusions are based on data arranged in the 
following manner. Disposition of criminal cases by the 
eleven civilian and four military courts is reported yearly.1
1 Annual Report of P.'S. Courts, Table B-l, U.S.
Courts of Appeals, Cases. .Commenced and Terminated; and 
USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 196.2-1971* Data for each, of the 
four military courts were not published consistently before 
1962. Since 1962 the composite figures omit data for four 
years in which dispositions by the Coast Guard Court were 
not reported.
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For the Courts of Appeals the actual numbers are published 
in each category: disposed of, affirmed, and reversed.2
In the Courts of Appeals a reversal of a conviction is 
essentially the only method for granting relief to an appel­
lant. In the military courts relief is provided through 
reversal of the conviction and reduction of the sentence.
Accordingly, data for action by three of the four military*
courts are based on the number of cases in which the ver­
dict or sentence or both were modified. Completely con­
sistent data are unavailable because the Navy Court of 
Military Review dispositions are based on modification of 
verdicts only; the number of reduced sentences is not 
reported. For purposes of over-all comparison, the number 
of cases affirmed by each of the military courts was deter­
mined to be the difference in the total number of cases 
heard minus the number modified.
Despite reporting differences, the comparison 
revealed by the consolidation of all civilian and all mili­
tary data remains meaningful. A conclusion can be validly 
drawn that the rate of modification of trial court judg­
ments Is not appreciably different in the two jurisdic­
tions. Further, the observation can be made that the mili­
tary courts are acting much, the same as the Courts of 
Appeals in applying standards of justice. Conversely, the
2In addition to affirming or reversing a conviction, 
Courts of Appeals dispose of cases through dismissal and 
"other methods." Those categories Involve very few cases.
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military courts are not acting as agencies of the executive 
hierarchy imposing unwavering decisions favorable to the 
government.
The trend In the number of cases ulTJ.rincd In the 
military courts during the 1962-1.971 decade corresponds 
with that computed for a much shorter period by a 1972 
Defense Department study group investigating the admin­
istration of the Uniform Code. The percentages are 85.8 
for the decade and 83.4 based on 529 cases— one month's 
output by the Army and Navy Courts and six months' by the 
Air Force Court.^ This data source compares with 55,027 
cases for the ten-year period used in the computation 
prepared for this study.
Comparison of composite rates of cases affirmed by 
the civilian courts with corresponding data of the separate 
military courts reveals patterns suggestive of judicial 
independence. Among the eleven Courts of Appeals the per­
centage of cases affirmed generally increased during the 
decade— from a low of 76.6 per cent in 1962 to a high of 
85.2 per cent in 1967• The upper range was dominant in 
succeeding years with the figure for 1969 and 1961 being 
1 per cent or less below the high point. The rate of
^U.S., Department :of Defense, Report of the Task 
Force on the Adminlstrati'ori of Military Justice in the 
Armed Forces, 1972, vol. 3, p. 2bk. This report doesnot 
include data from the Coast Guard Courtj however, the dif­
ference is insignificant because of the very small number 
of cases considered on appellate review in that service.
affirmation oJ’ convictions by both thu Air Force and Army 
Courts of MUltary Review followed a curve with the low 
point midway of the decade. In 1968 each of the two mili­
tary tribunals affirmed a lower percentage of cases than 
in any other year in the period of examination— 78.3 per 
cent by the Air Force Court and 49-5 Per cent by the Army 
Court. Only the Navy Court exhibited a steady rate of 
affirming convictions, a range of less than 4 per cent 
between the extremes during the decade. The total number 
of cases decided by the Coast Guard Court was approximately 
6 per cent of the number processed by the Air Force Court, 
the least active of the other three military appellate tri­
bunals. Therefore, comparison of the Coast Guard statis­
tics with those of the other courts is essentially mean­
ingless because of the great variation in the size of the 
data source.
Comparisons among the composite rates for the mili­
tary courts are significant only to a limited extent. For 
example, the ten-year average rate of affirmation by con­
viction by the Army Court is 64.4 per cent and by the Air 
Force Court is 91-9 per cent. The explanation for the dis­
parity is the policy in the Air Force criminal justice 
system to limit sentence reductions by the appellate courts. 
The objective is to permit an administrative determination 
of clemency based on the convicted individual's prospects 
for rehabilitation and restoration to active military duty.
J >\2
Only in the latter portion of the decade under study here 
did the Army establish extensive rehabilitation programs 
for its prisoners. Consequently, sentences were reduced 
by the appellate court as a kind of clemency action. **
As has been shown, in disposing of cases the mili­
tary appellate courts as a composite entity perform quite 
similarly to the Courts of Appeals. This comparable 
behavior is evident also in dissents within the courts of 
the two jurisdictions. Both sets of data point to the con­
clusion that the military appellate tribunals function as 
judicial institutions. Additional analysis of more com­
plete data perhaps would substantiate the projection.
Comparison of dissents
Analysis of dissents on collegial courts became in 
the 196O's a common approach to study of the judiciary. 
However, methods of analysis for the United States Supreme 
Court are not directly applicable to lower appellate courts 
because of J.uua stable membership and a smaller percentage 
of controversial cases in the lower courts. These same 
limitations prevent application of sophisticated quantita­
tive techniques to the military intermediate appellate tri­
bunals .
Study of dissent on the Supreme Court and on the
^Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military 
Personnel, 1962, p. 960. Presumably, the same procedure 
was in effect throughout the 1962-197’i period.
Courts of Appeals has been conducted with a higher degree 
of reliability than comparable research Into the Courts of 
Military Review because of the completeness of data. All 
formal opinions of the two civilian courts are published; 
in contrast, since the establishment in 1951 of the mili­
tary tribunals, only about 2.9 per cent of their dispo­
sitions have been published. Nevertheless, this relatively 
small number of published decisions contains practically 
all the dissents from the four courts. Thus, the dissent 
behavior trends can be established with sufficient accuracy 
although all dissenting opinions are not readily available 
for review and tabulation. The dearth of published 
opinions is the result of the military courts' procedure 
in disposing of cases. Because all convictions in which 
the sentence is one year or more confinement must be 
reviewed by the intermediate courts, a significant per­
centage of cases involve no disputed points of fact or 
errors in law. These cases are affirmed without comment 
in a unanimous per curiam opinion. The number of such 
dispositions varies among the four courts and over the 
period of their operation. The Air Force Court, the only 
tribunal on which data are available, prepared an almost 
equal number of full opinion and per curiam dispositions 
during fiscal years 1967 through 1971-^ The relationship
^Unpublished annual statistical summary provided 
to the writer by the Commissioner, Air Force Court of Mili­
tary Review, 1972.
mu
between the number of written opinions and standard format 
affirmations is heavily weighted toward the latter in the 
Army and Navy Courts because of their significantly larger 
case loads. For example, one estimate is that an opinion 
is written in only 12 per cent of the cases reviewed by 
the Army Court.̂
Procedures vary among the four services in the 
selection of full opinions to be published in Court-Mart1al 
Reports. Criteria for publication are the significance of 
the point of law interpreted and the precedent potential.
The decision to publish is made by nonjudicial personnel. 
Interestingly, under the original procedures governing the 
Navy boards of review the three members of each board, if 
they were in full agreement, could direct that an opinion 
be published.^ In later years their power, as that of 
judges of other tribunals, became advisory. Thus, the data 
base of opinions available consists of less than 3 per cent 
of the total dispositions but the great majority of all 
nonunanimous opinions. The percentages by service of 
opinions published are: Air Force, 5-35 Army, 4.1; Navy,
0.8; and Coast Guard, a disproportionately high 43*7 per 
cent of its comparatively few. dispositions.
^Karlen, "Civilian and Military Justice," p. 802.
^Draft instructions from Office of the Judge Advo­
cate General; copy provided' to the writer by Judge J. Field­
ing Jones of the Navy Court of Military Review, 1973-
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Based on data as described, dissent occurred In 
4.9 per cent of the published decisions of the four mili­
tary Intermediate appellate tribunals from their founding 
in 1951 through early 1972. Rates for the individual 
Courts are: Navy, 7*3 per cent; Army, 5.4; Air Force,
3.4; and Coast Guard, 1.4. An explanation of these per­
centages is necessary to ensure accurate interpretation.
The dissent rate in Navy cases is the highest of the four 
Courts because the number of reported Navy opinions is 
low. Only about 24 per cent as many Navy as Army cases 
have been published during the twenty-one years of opera­
tion of the tribunals. Consequently, the number of unani­
mous Army cases dilutes the impact of the highest actual 
number of dissents among the four Courts. The raw numbers 
of cases with dissents are: Army, 162; Air Force, 65;
Navy, 53; and Coast Guard, 4.
These figures can be compared with data for other 
national and state appellate courts. The results provide 
evidence of relatively parallel intracourt behavior on the 
military and civilian tribunals. The conclusion to be 
reached from this analysis is that the military courts 
have functioned in a manner, quite similar to that of the 
recognized judicial institutions.
Goldman reported data on rates of dissent in the 
eleven Courts of Appeals during the period of fiscal years
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1962 through 1964.® Further computation from his tabula­
tion reveals a composite rate of dissent of 8.0 per cent. 
The range of percentages of nonunanimous opinions from 
among the eleven Courts extends from a high of 15-5 per 
cent to a low of 2.8 per cent. Inclusion of all appellate 
cases regardless of subject matter in this tabulation 
probably increased the rate of dissent over that for a 
sample containing criminal litigation only. Thus, an even 
closer comparison would be expected If data were available 
to evaluate the criminal dispositions of the military and 
civilian appellate courts. Based on present Information, 
the dissent rates are: military, 4.9 per cent; civilian,
8.0 per cent.
Dissent rates based on criminal cases only have 
been computed for state supreme courts by Canon and Jaros.9 
In order to control for the number of judges on the courts 
of various size in their data base, the two political scien­
tists calculated an Index of D i s s e n t . T h i s  was necessary
®Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict and Consensus in the 
United States Courts of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review,
1968 (No. 2), 464.
9a complete data presentation is in Bradley C.
Canon and Dean Jaros, "State. Supreme Courts: Some Com­
parative Data," State Government, 42 (Autumn, 1969)3
260-64.
%
^ As developed by Canon and Jaros, the Index of 
Dissent is expressed: ID = Da/De where ID is the Index of
Dissent, Da is the actual proportion of cases in which 
dissent occurs, and De is the statistically expected pro­
portion of cases In which dissent occurs, based on the
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because the statistical probability of dissent Increases 
with the number of judges on each court. An Index value 
was computed for each of the four military appellate courts
and for the composite of the four using the Canon and Jaros
method.
Canon and Jaros found that a principal factor in 
the rate of dissent on state supreme courts was the pres­
ence of an intermediate appellate court which filtered 
cases to the highest court. Supreme courts in states with 
an intermediate appellate tribunal recorded dissent at 
about twice the rate of those courts which hear appeals 
directly from trial courts. The Courts of Military Review 
are similar to the supreme courts of the approximately 
thirty states which do not have intermediate tribunals.
The Criminal Index of Dissent for these state courts was
7.I.11 This compares very closely with the Index of 6.5
mean actual number of judges hearing cases. De = l-2/2n, 
where n equals the mean number of judges hearing cases 
rounded to the nearest whole number. This explanation is 
provided In each of the articles by Canon and Jaros. For 
example, see "Dissent on State Supreme Courts: The Dif­
ferential Significance of Characteristics of Judges,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (May, 1971), 330-31 
and n. 30. Their studies were based on 7,880 cases scien­
tifically selected from decisions of the fifty-six high 
courts of the states. The additional six courts are the 
Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas and in Oklahoma, deci­
sions of which are not reviewable by the state, supreme 
court in each state; and two! divisions each In the supreme 
courts, of Missouri and Washington by which most cases are 
adjudged.
•^Canon and Jaros, "External Variables, Institu­
tional Structure and Dissent on State Supreme Courts," 
Polity, 3 (Winter, 1970), 192-93-
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for the four Courts of Military Review. The Index of a 
number of Individual state supreme courts falls in the 
same range. For example, the Index for the supreme court 
of Utah coincides with the composite military figure, 7.1. 
Other courts are: Kentucky, 6.8; Alabama, 6.4; and Arkan-
1 Psas, 7-2. Separate calculations of an Index of Dissent 
for each of the Courts of Military Review yield the fol­
lowing: Navy, 9-6; Army, 7.2; Air Force, 4.6; and Coast
Guard, 1.9.
Confirmation by the Canon and Jaros generalization 
regarding the effect of intermediate appellate courts on 
dissent behavior of the highest court In a Jurisdiction is 
provided In the military appellate system. The Index of 
Dissent for the Court of Military Appeals for the 1971-1972 
term is 14.0, which Is more than twice the Index value of 
the composite data of the four Courts of Military Review.
A complete record of dissents on the Court of Military 
Appeals has not been published and was not computed as 
part of the present study. ^
Additional data on state supreme court dissent 
behavior have been reported by Glick and V i n e s . T h e i r
12Canon and Jaros, "State Supreme Courts," p. 364.
■^Stephen L. Buesche'r and Donald N. Zillman, "The 
Court of Military Appeals: A Survey of Recent Decisions,"
Military Law Review, 59 (Winter, 1973), 175-
•^Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, State 
Court :-Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973)» P- 79-
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source is the complete output of state supreme courts in 
1966. In that year the courts of nineteen states had dis­
sent rates of 7.4 per cent or less, the same range as the 
twenty-one-year average for each of the four military 
courts. The Glick and Vines data are not as refined as 
those prepared by Canon and Jaros in that criminal cases 
are not isolated and no distinction is made for the pres­
ence of intermediate court filtering.
The paucity of dissent in Courts of Military 
Review corresponds with the findings of Richardson and 
Vines in a study of the Courts of Appeals in three cir­
cuits on specific litigation subjects.1  ̂ "[D]lssent is 
simply not a frequent decision making pattern in the courts 
of appeals."1^ Their observations regarding the correla­
tion of eri banc hearings with dissent are corroborated in 
•data on the Courts of Military Review. Not only is dis­
sent more likely to occur statistically on a court panel 
of five or more judges, but also the procedure for con­
vening a court en banc in both jurisdictions brings the 
most controversial issues to hearings before expanded 
benches. Although the Army boards of review occasionally 
met jointly to decide a case,, the procedure was not 
authorized in the Uniform Co.de until 1969- None of the 
other service tribunals heard cases before combined boards.
^ The Politics of Federal Courts, pp. 123 and 134-41.
l6Ibid., p. 136.
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Under the authorization, for en banc procedures enacted in 
1968, the Judge Advocates General promulgated rules which 
permitted full-bench reconsideration of panel decisions 
upon the motion of either party in the case. Further, the 
Courts followed an Internal operating policy of circulat­
ing draft opinions of a three-judge panel among the entire 
Court membership. Upon the request of any judge, an 
en banc hearing would be conducted to supersede the panel 
decision. As a result of these arrangements, the number 
of en banc decisions increased markedly in 1969-1971. 
Predictably, approximately one quarter of all nonunanimous 
decisions in the history of the Army appellate tribunal 
were reported in 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 1 - The other Courts did not 
experience such a significant increase in number of dis­
sents .
The Court of Military Appeals invalidated in 1970 
both procedures under which a panel decision could be 
reconsidered.1® The effect of the action by the highest 
military court was to reduce the number of en banc hear­
ings by the intermediate courts. Simultaneously, the 
number of dissents declined. The reduction is evident in
1^This comparison is. based on the number of cases 
with dissents reported in Court -Mart i al Reports., Vol. 42 
(197.0). and Vol. 43 (197.0-197.1)'*
l8United States v. Ch'ilcote, 20 USCMA 283, 43 CMR 
123 (1.970) and United States, v. Wheeler, 20 USCMA 595, 44 
CMR 25 (197D.
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dispositions by the Army Court in 1971-1972 when only nine 
nonunanimous cases were reported in contrast to the forty- 
four such cases during the previous eighteen months. 
additional effect of the Chilcote decision was the conver­
sion by the Air Force Court in mid-1971 to a permanent 
en banc arrangement. The associated factor in the change 
was a simultaneous reduction in the number of authorized 
judgeships on the Air Force Court. Although the reduced 
number still provided for two panels, one judgeship was 
vacant throughout most of 1971-1972. Therefore, the Court 
operated with five Judges participating in every decision.
The occurrence of dissent on the three largest of 
the military tribunals has been distributed somewhat unevenly 
throughout the history of the courts. The greatest con­
sistency existed in the Army tribunals, with the exception 
of the previously described series of en banc decisions in 
1970-1971. During the first six years of operation by the 
Air Force boards of review, dissenting opinions were 
written in approximately 5 per cent of the cases. How­
ever, during 1957 through 1967 only five nonunanimous 
cases were published. No explanation is available for 
this rather abrupt change in' judicial behavior.
Perhaps the most unexplainable contradiction exists 
regarding dissent on the Navy, boards of review during the
■^Eight nonunanimous cases were reported in Court- 
Martial Reports, Vol. 44 (1971-1972) and one such case In 
Vol. 45 (1971-1972).
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1951-1956 period. The twenty, volumes of Court-Martial
Reports covering those years contain 399 Navy decisions,
only five of which include dissents. This contrast with
the relatively vigorous dissenting behavior on the Army
and Air Force boards of review led to an official query
to the Navy Judge Advocate General by a subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee in 1956. The Navy's
senior legal officer denied a rumor that he had directed
the boards of review to refrain from writing dissents.
Dissents appear in approximately 25 percent [sic] of 
the cases on which opinions are written and this is 
entirely to be expected and meets with my endorsement 
because if there were no dissents out of the boards of 
review I would incline to the view that the individual 
members were not giving the cases their undivided judi­
cial attention. There are bound to be dissents. This is a healthy situation.20
Based on dissents in slightly more than 1 per cent of the
cases published during the period, the quoted dissent rate
of 25 per cent seems implausible.
Analysis of the substance of dissents in military 
decisions reveals a majority in each of the tribunals 
favoring the individual rather than the government. Thus, 
the dissenters1 viewpoint was more liberal than was that 
adopted by the majority in each nonunanimous opinion. The 
difference between the views ranged from complete disagree­
ment on questions of guilt to recommendations for lesser
20Memorandum from Rear Admiral Ira H. Nunn, .April 30,. 
1956, printed in Hearings on H.R. 6583 (1956), p.' 8656.
153
sentences than those imposed by the majority. The extent 
of the libertarian view among the dissenters ranged from 
67*2 per cent on the Navy Court to 5^.3 per cent on the Air 
Force Court. No direct comparison can be made between the 
policy direction present in military and civilian courts.
No researcher has reported the trend in criminal cases 
heard by the Courts of Appeals. However, a logical 
assumption is that dissents there would also favor the 
convicted defendant because of the approximately 82 per 
cent of the dispositions which affirm trial court judgments.
Characteristics of judges
The quantitative comparisons of decision-making 
trends and of dissent behavior contribute to confirmation 
of the hypothesis that military appellate courts are in 
fact judicial institutions. However, other kinds of com­
parisons are impossible because of lack of data on mili­
tary judges. For example, one political scientist has 
sought to correlate dissent behavior of United States 
Supreme Court justices with four background characteristics 
of individual members.21. Similar inquiries have been con­
ducted into personal traits and attributes of the judges
21S. Sidney Ulmer, "Dissent Behavior and the Social 
Background of Supreme Court Justices," Journal of Politics. 
32 (August, 1970), 580-98. See, also, Joel B. Grossman, 
"Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making," Harvard 
Law Review, 79 (June. 1966), 1551-6lf.
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of the Courts of Appeals.22 The previously cited work by 
Canon and Jaros contains a study of the effect of personal 
background on state supreme court justices' voting behav­
ior.2  ̂ Comparable study of the military judiciary cannot 
be accomplished because for practical purposes the Judges 
are anonymous. The introductory pages of practically 
any volume of judicial opinions include identification of 
the judges serving on the courts issuing the published 
decisions. Courts-Martial Reports, the series containing 
opinions from the four intermediate appellate courts, is 
an exception; the names of the military appellate judges 
are not published in the,volumes. Thus, the researcher 
can compile only a potentially incomplete list of last 
names as signed on opinions. Conceivably, none of the 
decisions in which a given judge participated may have 
been published.
Although data on the background and professional 
experience of individual judges are unavailable, a com­
posite profile of these men can be assembled from general
ppFor example, Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior 
on the United States Courts, of Appeals, 1961-1964," Ameri­
can Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 374-83.
The same author has written "Judicial Appointments to the 
United States Court of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review. 1967 
(Winter, 1967), 186-214, and "Characteristics of Eisenhower 
and Kennedy Appointeea'-to the" Lower Federal Courts," Western 
Political Quarterly. 18 (December, 1965), 755-62,.
23"Dissent 0n State Supreme Courts: The Differen­
tial Significance of Characteristics of Judges," pp. 322-46.
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descriptions. Members of the boards and Courts in the 
Air Force and Army participated In military legal affairs 
almost exclusively before appointment to the appellate 
tribunals. During the first decade of operation of the 
Navy and Coast Guard boards, some members alternated 
between legal and operational military duties. Typical 
positions in which appellate judges served Included most 
of the activities of the military departments’ legal 
agency. Probably a majority of these duties were unrelated 
to criminal law; the other fields involved contracts, pro­
curement, and International law. Common duties within the 
criminal justice system were service as a trial judge and 
as prosecution or defense counsel. Many officers were the 
staff attorney for a major commander, and In that capacity 
they prepared the convening authority review of court- 
martial convictions. Only a few military appellate judges 
had any experience in a judgeship in a civilian jurisdic­
tion. These individuals served on the boards of review In 
the early 1950's.
Judges of the four Courts of Military Review who 
were serving In mid-1973 attained their positions through 
a variety of professional assignments. Most spent the 
majority of their previous duty in appointments related
2^Data for this profile were developed from the 
Hodson, Krouse, and Amery interviews, the Jones letter, 
and random testimony to Congressional committees.
to the criminal justice system. A common stepping stone 
to the appellate bench was an appellate counsel position 
in which lawyers appear before the Courts of Military 
Review and the Court of Military Appeals. Regardless of 
the actual positions held by the judges, all have been 
socialized in the military judicial environment. However, 
this background includes an earlier socialization in the 
norms and ethics of the legal profession developed in their 
law school education. (Some of the more senior officers 
attended law school while on active military duty. It is 
open to speculation whether their socialization is different 
from that of the judges who followed the more common 
sequence of education and then military duty.) Of the 
fifteen current members of the Army Court all hold the 
grade of colonel, with the exception of one lieutenant 
colonel and the chief judge who is a retired major general 
recalled to active duty. All five members of the Air Force 
Court hold the grades of either colonel or lieutenant 
colonel. The predominant grades of members of the Navy 
and Coast Guard Courts is captain. However, these two 
Courts have judges with a greater variety of status. Of 
the ten Navy judges, two are. retired officers. Similarly, 
one of the five Coast Guard Judges is retired from that 
service. Although these three men are currently serving 
in a civilian capacity, their, backgrounds are comparable 
to those pf the active-duty: military members. The only
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civilian without extensive military experience currently 
serving on any of the four tribunals is the Coast Guard 
chief judge who has been a member of that bench since its 
organization in 1951.
A civilian attorney was appointed to each of the 
seven original Navy boards of review in 1951. However, 
each was succeeded upon his voluntary retirement or resig­
nation by a military lawyer. Availability of Navy attorneys 
with criminal justice experience was the reason for both 
the initial appointment and subsequent phasing-out of 
civilian judges. Under the Articles for the Government 
of the Navy very few lawyers were needed to administer the 
judicial and disciplinary systemj practically all functions 
were performed by the unit commander. With implementation 
of the Uniform Code, the Navy had insufficient experienced 
criminal lawyers to serve in all positions requiring such 
individuals under the new statute. Accordingly, civilian 
lawyers specializing in criminal practice were appointed 
to the new appellate review tribunals. During the ensuing 
years as more Navy lawyers gained experience in criminal 
justice affairs the civilian judges were replaced with 
military offleers.^5
One advantage of civilian membership on the appel­
late courts is the continuity of service. Civilian judges 
on the Navy Court served, in effect, under an indefinite
^jones letter.
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tenure appointment. In contrast, military judges on each 
of the tribunals have averaged between three and four years 
duty.
From available evidence, a characteristic of the 
judges throughout the history of the military intermediate 
appellate courts has been their personal adoption of judi­
cial attitudes. As a member of the boards or Courts, each 
individual apparently recognized his responsibility to act 
as an impartial judge of the facts affecting the liberty 
and reputation of the convicted individual. Most regarded 
a judgeship as a position of prestige within the military 
and considered themselves to be the equivalent of Federal 
appellate judges, although they certainly recognized the 
lack of many of the positive attributes of that status. 
Additionally, the Independence of the judges individually 
and of the Courts collectively has been emphasized by com­
mentators. Official policy on the subject Is typified by 
a statement from the Navy Judge Advocate General at the 
time of organization of the boards of review.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice contemplates 
that in the review of cases within their cognizance 
the Boards of Review shall be free of all coercion.
^Interviews with Earl A. Morgan, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, March 13, 1973; Claiborne Dameron, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, March 15 > 1973; and Myron L. Birnbaum, Washing­
ton, D.C., December 12, 197.2, all of whom were members of 
Air Force boards of review, during the 1950's. Interview 
with Abraham Nemrow, a judge of the Army Court of Military 
Review in the late 1960*s, Falls Church, Virginia, Decem­
ber 11, 1972, and March 28, 1973. Hodson, Krouse, and 
Amery interviews. Jones letter.
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This applies, of course, not only to outside influences 
upon the Boards but to all relationships between indi­
vidual members of a particular Board.27
Although complete voting data on individual judges 
are unavailable, sufficient information exists to suggest 
that background influences work in similar fashion on both 
military and civilian Judges. For example, tabulation of 
dissenting votes cast by each military judge reveals a 
rather fixed pattern of behavior. Most of the dissenters 
consistently supported either the appellant or the govern­
ment. The Navy judge with the greatest number of dissents 
deviated only once from supporting the individual. Similar 
consistency exists in the votes of the frequent dissenters 
on the.'Army and Air Force tribunals. With more complete 
voting statistics and information on the social and pro­
fessional backgrounds of the judges, perhaps explanations 
could be suggested for the seeming predilection of a given 
jurist to support the claim of the appellant rather than 
of the government in controversial litigation.
An assessment
This examination of judicial process and intra­
court behavior has developed support for the hypothesis 
that the military intermediate appellate courts are judi­
cial institutions. Quantitative comparisons of the features
^Memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, United 
States Navy [Rear Admiral G., L. Russellj, subject: Boards
of Review, February 21, 1951. Copy provided to the writer 
by Judge Jones.
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of the military courts and their counterparts in the state 
and Federal judiciaries haive revealed substantial simi­
larities. Members of military appellate tribunals have 
performed and expressed attitudes suggestive of the con­
clusion that the personnel are cte facto Judges and the 
institutions are de facto courts. This evidence comple­
ments legislative and judicial actions which have enabled 
the military courts to progress along the continuum toward 
legislative court status.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION— PROSPECTS 
FOR FURTHER JUDICIALIZATION
Judiclalization of the military legal system, and 
particularly of the intermediate appellate courts, is an 
ongoing process. As change to date occurred through an 
erratic and tortuous evolution, predictably future achieve­
ments will be the product of slow and irregular movement. 
The only reliable supposition is that a separate military 
law jurisdiction will continue to exist in the United 
States. Since enactment in 1968 of amendments to the Uni­
form Code, numerous recommendations for further revision 
have been advanced by Congressmen, official and unofficial 
study groups, and influential individuals. Although pas­
sage of any of their plans is unlikely in the near future, 
these proposals are significant indicators of continuing 
trends in the transition of military legal institutions 
and procedures.
Supreme Court review of 
military decisions
Despite reductions in the jurisdiction of military 
courts since 1955> the existence of separate tribunals and
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criminal statutes for the armed forces Is so embedded In 
American law as to be permanent.1 It is improbable that 
Congress by positive legislation or the Supreme Court by 
Interpretation of the Constitution would require the 
prosecution of all military-related crimes by servicemen 
in Federal courts of general jurisdiction. Moreover, in 
several opinions the Court has emphasized the validity of 
the separation, as in a 1972 decision citing the "basic 
principles of comity that must prevail between the civil­
ian and the military judicial systems."2 The dual struc­
tures preclude review of military judicial decisions by a 
civilian court until all military remedies have been com­
pleted. ̂  The precedent for Supreme Court recognition of 
separate military law was developed more than a century 
ago. In 1857 the Court ruled that courts-martial were 
not established under Article III of the Constitution.2*
Six years later the Court stated that It lacked jurisdic­
tion to review by certiorari the decisions of military
^-Three decisions of the Supreme Court have limited 
military jurisdiction: United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)•> prohibited prosecution of dis­charged servicemen for crimes! committed while subject to 
the Uniform Code; Reid v.. Covert,. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), pro­
hibited prosecution of civilians in peacetime; and 0 1Calli- 
han v. Parker, 395 U.S. 25.8 (1969) » prohibited prosecution 
of servicemen commiting crimes not service-connected occur­
ring off government property.
2Parisi v, Davidson, .405 U.S. 34, 46 (1972).
3Noyd v. Bond, 395. U.S. 683 (1969).
^Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857)-
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courts.^ The relationship was summarized by the Court: 
"Military law, like state law, is a Jurisprudence which 
exists separate and apart from the law which governs in 
our federal Judicial establishment. This Court has played 
no role in its development. . . . "^ In a 1962 speech Chief 
Justice Earl Warren remarked, "[X]t could hardly be expected 
that the regular federal Judiciary would play a large role 
in regulating the military's treatment of its own person­
nel. The considerations militating against such inter­
vention remain strong.
Contrasting with the precedents for continued 
separation of military and civilian adjudicatory systems 
are two recently published proposals to abolish, in effect, 
the military legal system as it has historically existed.
The functions would be transferred to civilian control under 
the Jurisdiction of the general Federal courts. The less 
detailed of the two plans is that of a civilian law profes­
sor who has frequently criticized existing military legal 
procedures.® He urged that civilian prosecution and judg­
ment of military crimes be implemented through modification
5e x  parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 2^3 (U.S. 1863).
6Burns v. Wilson, 3̂ 6. U.S. 137, 1^0 (1953).
7"The Bill of Rights, and the Military," Mew York 
University Law Review, 37 (April, 1962), 188.
®Edward F. Sherman, "Military Justice Without Mili­
tary Control," Yale Law Journal, 82 (June, 1973), 1398-1425.
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of methods used In Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden,
A retired Army lawyer insisted that command Influence; and 
associated abuses can be eliminated only by "completely 
removing [the legal system] from the operational control 
of the military departments" and placing it in "the hands 
of civilian administrators, preferably under the control 
of the Attorney General of the United States."9 Civilian 
trial lawyers, judges, and legal administrators would 
replace military officers in every position throughout the 
trial and appellate structure. The military commander's 
only duty would be to initiate criminal charges against 
his subordinates. Trial juries would continue to be com­
posed of military personnel. Such drastic dismantling of 
the traditional system is improbable without massive expo­
sure of gross injustice and misconduct within existing 
Institutions.
Although dual systems predictably will continue, 
a commonly supported reform is a method to bring military 
court decisions under United States Supreme Court review.
The procedure is to provide a writ of certiorari from the 
Court of Military Appeals to the Supreme Court. Such legis­
lation would give the highest court jurisdiction which it 
ruled in 1863 it did not possess. Certiorari would enable 
the Supreme Court to accept for examination military cases 
on the same basis as any Federal or state litigation. At
^West, "A History of Command Influence," pp. 153-54.
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present, a military member must be denied desired relief 
by the two military appellate courts before he can petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus from the lowest Federal court. 
If the district and appellate courts reject his plea, then 
he can petition the Supreme Court for review. Under the 
proposed amendment, the Individual could approach the 
Supreme Court immediately after denial of relief by the 
Court of Military Appeals.
Certiorari to the Supreme Court can be authorized 
by the addition of a one-sentence section to the United 
States Code.10 This is the form of legislation introduced 
in each of the past three Congresses.11 Support will 
probably be forthcoming from the Code Committee— the judges 
of the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates 
General. At the Committee’s direction a joint-service
Chapter 81 of title 28 of the United States Code 
would be amended by adding at the end thereof a new section 
to be numbered 1259: "Cases in the United States Court of
Military Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by 
writ of certiorari." H.R. 291, A Bill to Protect the Con­stitutional Rights of Those Subject to the Military Justice 
System, To Revise the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 
for Other Purposes, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, sec. 3*
Similar language is contained in essentially identical bills 
in the same session, H.R. 316 and S. 987- Earlier legisla­
tion which died without hearings included S. 4191, 91st Cong., 
2d sess., 1970; H.R. 579, ,9-2d Cong., 1st sess., 1971; and 
S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971*
11For an explanation of the legislation, see remarks 
by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, 117 Cong. Rec. 5310 (1971) 
and 119 Cong. Rec. S 3142 (daily edition, February 22, 1973). 
See, also, Bayh, "The Military Justice Act of 1971: The
Need for Legislative Reform," American Criminal Law Review,
10 (July, 1971), 9-24.
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panel has studied the plan for two years. Although the 
effect of the revision is seemingly unambiguous, the over­
cautious leaders of the military legal system have refrained 
from recommending enactment of the certiorari p r o v i s i o n .
Late in 1972 the Army declared its concurrence in 
the provision for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The 
other services were silent on the subject in their replies 
to the same questionnaire from the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights.
An influential endorsement of certiorari has come 
from Chief Judge Kenneth J. Hodson of the Army Court of 
Military Review. In his present position and as a former 
Army Judge Advocate General, Major General Hodson among 
military legal officials is perhaps the most progressive
3-2USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1970, p. 2 and 1971, 
p. 2. Perhaps the Code Committee reached agreement on the 
proposal during 1972; the report for 1972 had not been pub­
lished and distributed as of the date of this writing. One 
problem which the Committee was possibly considering con­
cerns the opportunity for petitioning the Supreme Court by 
the 90 per cent of convicted defendants whose cases are 
presently beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Military 
Appeals. In United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 USCMA 10, 39 
CMR 10 (1968), the Court of Military Appeals defined its 
extraordinary relief authority, as restricted to cases within 
its jurisdiction under 10 ;U.S.C. sec. 867(b). Of course, 
the vast majority of those cases outside the Courtrs juris­
diction are unlikely to contain points of unsettled law on 
which the Supreme Court would likely grant certiorari.
•^Question l-D-10. A copy of the Subcommittee 
questionnaire and Departmental responses was provided to 
the writer by Colonel Victor A. De Fiori, U. S. Army, 
Director, Legislation and Selected Policies., Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of. Defense— Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
December 27, 1972. The Coast Guard was not asked to reply 
to this survey.
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and conscious of the need for judlclalizatlon. In three 
recent articles he urged adoption of the certiorari legis­
lation to "bring military justice under the umbrella of 
the Supreme Court . . . [because] that should remove mili­
tary courts from the stigma of being an executive, or what
14is worse, a political court." Similar reasoning was used 
In endorsements by a noted civilian attorney and by a mili­
tary lawyer. ̂-5
No specific opposition to the certiorari plan has 
appeared in legal periodicals. However, one Air Force 
attorney counseled a moratorium on revision of military 
legal institutions and procedures. In citing the advance­
ments under the Military Justice Act of 1968, he concluded, 
"[I]t seems prudent to allow the system to mature fully 
without the enactment of further changes at this time."16 
Notably, authorization for direct review by the Supreme 
Court of military appellate court decisions apparently
^"Courts-Martial and the Commander," San Diego Law 
Review, 10 (December, 1972), 70. See, also, "The Manual 
for Courts-Martlal: 1984," Military Law Review, 57 (Sum­
mer, 1972), 11; and, "Military Justice: Time for Radical
Change?" Yale Law Journal, forthcoming (copy of draft pro­
vided by Chief Judge Hodson to this writer).
l^Louis B. Nichols, "The Justice of Military Jus­
tice,". W3JJ:iam_jmdLjyiar̂  12 (Spring, 1971), 508;
and, Frank E. Barker, "Military -Law: A Separate System of
Jurisprudence," University of Cincinnati Law Review, 36 
(Spring, 1967), 22&1
^George D. Schrader, "Military Justice: A System
for the Seventies," Air University Review, 23 (May-June, 
1972), 49.
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was not considered in previous revisions of the military 
criminal law statutes.. However, the lack of such Initia­
tive Is explainable in that autonomy of the military- 
controlled system would be undermined by enactment of a 
certiorari authorization. Military traditionalists pre­
sumably halted examination of the subject in public forums. 
When viewed in terms of the enhancement of justice, the 
benefits to be derived from the right to petition the 
nation’s highest court seem uncontestable. As pointed 
out by Chief Judge Hodson, the provision for certiorari 
should give the military tribunals a greater judicial 
status.-1-? Addition of the military jurisdiction as a 
source of certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court prob­
ably would not significantly increase its workload. Thus, 
no serious opposition should develop from this concern.
Since prospects for hearings on a comprehensive 
military justice bill are minimal in the Ninety-third Con­
gress (1973-19710 3 advocates of the certiorari plan might 
well note the history of enactments in the late 1950's and 
early I960's. The Code Committee originally suggested a 
composite seventeen-section bill. After years of legisla­
tive inaction, the sponsors introduced the principal amend­
ments as separate bills, a number of which were passed. A 
similar process may be necessary to obtain enactment of the 
one sentence pertaining to certiorari. This method would
•^See, above, pp. 166-67 and n. 14.
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probably be successful if the military leadership, the 
judges of the Court of Military Appeals, and the influen­
tial interest groups united in supporting passage.
Congressional proposals 
for judicializatlon
Most of the substantive military law reforms pro­
posed since 1968 were included in comprehensive bills intro­
duced in the Ninety-second and Ninety-third Congresses by 
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana and Representative Charles 
Bennett of Florida.3-® The other major approach to military 
law reform was sponsored by Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon 
in the Ninety-first and Ninety-second Congresses. His pro­
posals were divided into thirteen separate bills, in con­
trast to the omnibus bill of Senator Bayh and Representa­
tive Bennett.^9 These bills will be the sources for the 
following analysis of recommended revisions of the laws 
governing appellate review.
l8S. 1127 and H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971 
and S. 987 and H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973- Repre­sentative Jonathan Bingham of New York introduced essen­
tially the same bill as H.R. 316 in the Ninety-third Con­
gress. Article 66 pertaining to appellate matters is 
identical in all the bills cited.
^S. 2171 through S. 2183, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 
1971- S. 2172 pertains to appellate courts. As of July, 
1973, Senator Hatfield had not introduced his bills in the 
Ninety-third Congress.
^°For a summary of legislative proposals intro­
duced through early-1971, see, Edward F. Sherman, "Congres­
sional Proposals for Reform pf Military Law," American 
Criminal Law Review, 10 (July, 1971), 25-^9.
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The objective of the Bayh-Bennett legislation is 
elimination of command influence from military adjudica­
tion, the same goal of reformers beginning with General 
Ansell in 1918. The commander of the convicted person has 
historically performed the first review of court-martial 
proceedings. The task of ascertaining legal sufficiency 
of the conviction and the appropriateness of the sentence 
is accomplished on the advice of the commander's staff 
lawyer. According to Senator Bayh, "This procedure has 
become for the most part, either a time-consuming formality 
or an invitation [to the court-martial jury] to Impose the 
maximum sentences so that the commander can reduce them."21 
The proposed amendment abolishes the commander's review 
and causes the record of every trial to be sent directly 
to the Court of Military Review or to the Office of the 
Judge Advocate General, depending upon sentence severity. 
Jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts is not 
increased by the plan; however, the Courts will probably 
modify more sentences than at present since they will 
assume the task of the commander. A modification of the 
Bayh-Bennett plan is advocated by Chief Judge Hodson who 
recommended authorizing the. ̂ commander a clemency power 
because that local officer is the best evaluator of the 
convicted person's rehabilitation potential.22 A slightly
21117 Cong. Rec. 5305 (1971).
O p "Courts-Martial and the Commander," p. 67.
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different approach was suggested by the Code Committee in 
its 1971 legislative program. Under its plan, the com­
mander would retain power to mitigate a sentence but would 
lose his current authority, to review a verdict.23
The Bayh-Bennett bill provides improvements in the 
Courts of Military Review. Nevertheless, a serious defi­
ciency is the absence of a positive declaration of the 
status of the tribunals as legislative courts. Although 
the wording providing for the establishment of the Courts 
of Military Review is changed from that in the present 
statute, the new language leaves open the possibility of 
challenge to the Courts' status. The Uniform Code now 
reads, "Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a 
Court of Military Review. . . ."24 The proposed language 
reads, "There is established in each service a Court of 
Military Review. . . . "25 This language contrasts with 
the clause providing for establishment of the Court of 
Military Appeals, which reads, "There is a United States 
Court of Military Appeals established under article X of 
the Constitution. . . ."26 The distinction is evident 
also in the language providing for the United States
23uscMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, P* 2.
2it10 U.S.C. sec. 866(a) (1970).
25h.R. 291, sec. 866(a).
2610 U.S.C. sec. 867(a) (1970). See, above, p. 114.
172
Tax Court, the tribunal most recently given legislative 
court status. "There is hereby established, under article 1 
of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record 
to be known as the United States Tax Court."2? Conse­
quently, it is evident that the Courts of Military Review 
would not attain unquestioned status as legislative courts 
under the Bayh-Bennett bill. A different kind of ambiguity 
results from the establishment clause of the Hatfield bill, 
which reads, "The President shall establish within each of 
the armed services a Court of Military Review. . . ."28 
Although establishment by the President is more prestigious 
than establishment by the Judge Advocate General, the judi­
cial character of the Courts of Military Review is not 
improved by this language. The implication remains that 
the Courts are creatures of the executive branch.
The precise wording of the establishment clause is 
important in terms of the authority of the Courts under 
the All Writs Act. As analyzed in Chapter VI, above, 
extraordinary relief writs can be Issued by "courts estab­
lished by act of Congress."29 The Bayh-Bennett language 
would probably meet that requirement; whereas, the Hatfield 
language likely would not. The writs question is further
2?26 U.S.C. sec. 7441 (1970)..
28S. 2172, sec. 866(a).
2928 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a) (1970).
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complicated by a very persistent printing error. In his 
floor speeches introducing the omnibus bill in 1971 and 
1973, Senator Bayh specifically stated that the Courts of 
Military Review would have power to issue all writs and 
cited such authority as derived from "article 66(i)" of 
his bill.30 However, subsection (i) has never been printed 
in the text of any of the bills introduced by Bayh, Bennett, 
or Bingham. Even the text of the bill printed in the 
Congressional Record immediately following Bayh's 1971 
speech concludes Section 866 with subsection (h).31 Thus, 
the intent presumably is to confer all writs power on the 
Courts of Military Review by a direct statement, rather 
than to have that power assumed under the definition of 
"courts established by act of Congress." However, the 
printing error must be corrected to ensure -the authoriza­
tion.
Another ambiguity exists in the Bayh-Bennett bill 
because of a drafting error.32 Military judges who preside 
over trials are granted writs authority by the bill in Sec­
tion 826(b). Section 866(h) provides that "judges of the 
Court of Military Review shall be. deemed military judges
3°117 Cong. Rec. 5310 .(1971) and 119 Cong, Rec.
S 3143 (February 22, 1973* daily edition).
31ll7 Cong. Rec. 5319 (1971).
3^This same error exists in all versions of the 
Bayh-Bennett legislation. For illustration purposes, see 
H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973 In the sections cited 
herein.
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for the purpose of section 836(a)(2)." The error In the 
middle digit.of the subsection number is an explainable 
typographical substitution; however, the reference to sub­
section (a)(2) is questionable since that clause authorizes 
military judges to "rule finally on all motions." There is 
little reason for appellate military judges to possess that 
authority only. As with the dropping of Section 866(i), 
this error exists in all printed texts of the bills from 
1970 through 1973. The Bayh-Bennett bill does not refer 
to writs authority for the Court of Military Appeals, pre­
sumably because such power has been confirmed by the 
Supreme Court. In contrast, the Hatfield bill grants such 
authority to the highest military appellate court but makes 
no provision for writs power for the intermediate courts.
As described above, support for enactment of writs 
authority is rather general. The Army has officially 
endorsed the plan.33 The Code Committee, instead of recom­
mending specifically that writs power be granted to the 
Courts of Military Review, has deferred judgment on the 
policy by merely suggesting that Congress "specify the 
extent" to which each of the: military courts may entertain 
petitions for extraordinary relief.3^ The granting of All 
Writs. Act power to the Courts, of Military Review, would, in
^Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee ques­
tionnaire, 1972, question I-D-10.
^ USCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, P- 1*
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effect, establish them as legislative courts.
Judicial attributes for the Courts of Military 
Review are increased to a greater extent under the Bayh- 
Bennett bill than under the Hatfield plan. Both retain 
the Judicialization actions of the Military Justice Act of 
1968. The Bayh-Bennett bill emphasizes the need for Judi­
cial independence of the Courts. Each Court is to be 
located in the Office of the Judge Advocate General for 
administrative support, but it is to "be otherwise inde­
pendent of all other military command and control [in] the 
performance of its Judicial function." The two plans differ 
on an important subject of Judicial prestige. The Bayh- 
Bennett bill grants authority to the Courts to prescribe 
rules of procedure for practice before them and to estab­
lish qualifications for attorneys admitted to their bar, 
while the Hatfield bill directs the President to establish 
rules of procedure and omits any provision for the Courts' 
bar. These two functions are typically performed by 
courts themselves in most Jurisdictions. Under present 
law the Judge Advocates General handle all such adminis­
trative matters.
The right of the' military courts to prescribe their 
own operating methods and the', essential supplementary rules 
to implement the Uniform Code is an important element of 
Judicialization. Judicial authority of the military appel­
late courts could be increased by a grant to them of power
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to develop and promulgate appropriate directives. The 
Bayh-Bennett bill continues the present provision of the 
Uniform Code which authorizes the President to prescribe 
such rules.35 The document containing supplements to and 
authoritative interpretations of the Code is the Manual 
for Courts-Martial.36 Among the important subjects in the 
document are rules of evidence, elements of proof of each 
crime punishable under the statute., and the maximum penalty 
for each crime.
A desirable alternative to the present method of 
issuance of the necessary rules is to replace executive 
action with judicial development and publication of such 
regulations. A logical agency to perform the task is a 
military judicial conference, according to Army Chief Judge 
H o d s o n . 3 ?  To be chaired by the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Military Appeals, the statutorily created conference of 
representatives of all the military judiciaries would have 
power to prescribe rules for the entire legal system.
Their principal product would be equivalent to the present 
Manual for Courts-Martial. The actual text of rules pre­
pared under the new system probably would not differ in
3510 u.S.C. sec. 836 (1970).
3^The current edition of the document is the 
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (revised 
edition), issued as Executive. Order 11746, June 19, 1969.
3?Hodson interview and "Military Justice: Time
for Radical Change?" draft p. 2 6 .
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significant degree from that at present because under both 
methods the drafting would be performed by a Joint-scrvlce 
team of lawyers. However, the important point for pres­
tige of the military courts is the authority for publi­
cation. As long as the Manual for Courts-Martial and the 
rules for court procedure are published by executive branch 
officials, the military courts will be deprived of a 
characteristic possessed by constitutional and legislative 
courts.
The subject of personnel for the Courts of Mili­
tary Review is one on which all reformers have opinions. 
Among the options proposed, those in the Bayh-Bennett bill 
are perhaps least innovative. The existing statute implies 
that the Judge Advocate General will assign judges to the 
Court of Military Review. However, the personal partici­
pation of the senior legal officer in each service is not 
specifically required. As noted in Chapter VII, assign­
ments to the Courts are made through standard personnel 
actions, with the chief judges having opportunity for rec­
ommendation of specific individuals. The Judge Advocate 
General may exercise the right of final approval of a per­
son selected by the personnel, staff. Under the Bayh- 
Bennett bill, the Judge Advocate General is directly 
responsible for appointment of each judge. It is realis­
tic to expect that the actual mechanisms for selecting 
prospective judges .will not change drastically under the
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revised language. Notably, the Bayh-Bennett bill does not 
provide a means of increasing the prestige of the Courts by 
having the judges appointed by an official superior to the 
Judge Advocates General. Further, the bill does not specify 
a tenure for the military appellate Judges, thereby per­
mitting their service to be at the discretion of the mili­
tary hierarchy as at present.
Presidential appointment Is recommended by several 
authorities. The Hatfield bill provides for such appoint­
ment for a term of three years and sets eligibility as 
experience in military judicial affairs for both military 
and civilian judges. The existing requirement of member­
ship in the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court 
of a state is retained. For the military members, a minimum 
grade of lieutenant colonel or commander Is specified; the 
grade corresponds to a total of approximately eighteen 
years active duty under present promotion policies. Other 
supporters of Presidential appointment are Edward F. Sher­
man, a civilian attorney, and Chief Judge Hodson. The 
former recommended a three-year term.38 Army jurist
favored a four-year Presidential appointment for all mili­
tary judges, both trial and appellate, as a means of 
ensuring independence from command influence originating
■3Qat any level of the hierarchy. J
38"civilIanization of Military Law," p. 103•
^Hodson interview and "Military Justice," p. 26.
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An additional method for accomplishing the goal of 
prestige and independence is the establishment of judge­
ships on the same basis as permanent professorships at the 
United States Military Academy and the United States Air 
Force Academy. Officers appointed as academic department 
heads are promoted to the grade of colonel and given tenure 
until their voluntary retirement or resignation. The offi­
cer serving as dean of the faculty is promoted to the grade 
of brigadier general and given similar indefinite tenure.1*0 
Using this precedent, the chief judge of each Court could 
be appointed by the President to the position which would 
carry the grade of brigadier general and other judges 
would receive permanent promotion to the grade of colonel. 
Civilian judges would receive comparable salaries but 
would relinquish civil service status. This arrangement 
for grade and tenure would remove incumbent judges from 
the military promotion system and thereby eliminate the 
need for periodic personnel ratings. The patterning of 
judicial appointments after the model of academy profes­
sorships has not appeared in published proposals for mili­
tary law reform.
Existing and suggested, legislation on Court of 
Military Review judgeships must be evaluated in terms of 
Supreme Court interpretations on the broader question of
1*°10 U.S.C. sec. 4335 and sec. 4336 (for the Army) 
and sec. 9335 and sec. 9336 (for the Air Force).
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executive control of appointees performing Judicial func­
tions. As noted, neither the present statute nor the Bayh- 
Bennett bill provides for tenure for appellate judges or 
for procedures for their removal. The Hatfield bill omits 
a removal method. In contrast, the existing statute and 
the Bayh-Bennett bill do provide for tenure and a removal 
procedure for judges of the Court of Military Appeals.
They serve for fifteen years and "may be removed by the 
President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty 
or malfeasance in office, or for mental or physical dls-
hiability, but for no other cause." 1 This difference in 
status of judgeships on the two military appellate courts 
illustrates a need for positive reforms if the intermediate 
appellate courts are to obtain de jure recognition as legis­
lative courts.
At present the judges of the Courts of Military 
Review must be considered simply administrative appointees 
serving at the pleasure of the Judge Advocates General.
If an appellate military judge were summarily dismissed 
unquestionably without cause and then brought suit for
reinstatement, what would be. the Federal courts' judg- 
I I  omerit Based on Supreme .Court interpretations of Presi­
dential power to remove appointees, the courts would have
^10 U.S.C. sec. 867(a)(2) (1970).
ii pIn this hypothetical case it must be recognised 
that such a dismissal would not simultaneously terminate 
the judge's military commission or civil service appointment.
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to determine initially the nature of the functions performed 
by the appellate military J u d g e .  **3 jf the courts found that 
his task was indeed Judicial in nature, then the ruling 
logically would be that such an unsubstantiated dismissal 
was illegal, based on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Wiener v. United States. I f  the courts determined the 
function to be executive in nature, then the dismissed 
appointee would have no recourse under the doctrine of 
Myers v. United States. **5
Although differences exist between circumstances of 
the specific appointment held by the appellant in Wiener 
and the appellate military Judgeships, the two can be 
classified as comparable for this analysis. Thus, the 
opinion must be that the Courts of Military Review perform 
a Judicial function. The Supreme Court's Wiener decision 
emphasized that Judges must be immune from external coer­
cion affecting their Judicial decisions. Appellate mili­
tary Judges, too, must be legally immune from improper 
influence from their superiors in the executive branch.
This examination of the status of military Judgeships sug­
gests that the Courts of Military Review inherently possess
^3it is assumed here 'that the constitutional doc­
trine applies not only to the. President but .to other exe­
cutive officials. Thus, by. extension the assumption is 
that the Judge Advocate General is constrained as is the 
President.
Ii ii357 U.S. 349 (195.8).
45272 U.S. 52 (1926).-
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an important judicial attribute.— independence— which, in 
turn, enhances the quality of justice prevailing in the 
legal system. Independence could be further ensured 
through specific provisions in the Uniform Code for judi­
cial appointment, tenure, and removal procedures. These 
elements probably will be essential to a Congressional 
declaration of legislative court status for the tribunals.
Other portions of the proposed bills provide addi­
tional efforts at judicialization. Both the Bayh-Bennett 
and Hatfield bills alter the jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Military Review. Additionally, the recommendations of a 
civilian reformer and of a 1972 Department of Defense study 
group are for elimination of automatic appeals. The Courts 
of Military Review now receive cases in which the sentence 
"affects a general or flag officer or extends to death, 
dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, 
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for 
one year or more."^ The least change would occur under 
the Bayh-Bennett bill which deletes the portion of the 
existing statute pertaining to automatic review of cases 
involving general or flag o f f l e e r s . T h e  number of such 
cases is infinitesimal.
^610 U.S.C. sec. 866(b) (1970).
^Another inconsistency In the Bayh-Bennett bill is 
the drafters' failure to revise the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Military Appeals to reflect the deletion of auto­
matic review of general officer cases. H.R. 291, sec. 
867(b)(1).
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The case load of the Courts of Military Review 
would increase markedly under the Hatfield bill revision 
of appellate jurisdiction. Instead of reviewing all cases 
involving sentences of one year or more, the Courts would 
consider all cases with sentences of four months or more.^ 
The magnitude of the increase can be estimated from data 
for Fiscal 1971- A total of 77,31^ courts-martial were 
conducted by the four armed services; however, in the same 
year the four appellate courts considered less than 10 per
ii Ocent of that number of cases. * The bulk of the increase 
would be in the review of special courts-martial in which 
a bad-conduct discharge is not adjudged. In the Army, for 
example, in Fiscal 1971 approximately 96 per cent of the 
special courts-martial did not result in sentences with 
a punitive discharge. The maximum confinement which can 
be Imposed by a special court-martial is six m o n t h s . 50 j f  
it is assumed that one-third of the special courts-martial 
resulted In sentences of between four and six months, then 
8,500 cases would have been added to the docket of the Army 
Court of Military Review under the Hatfield criterion. This 
estimated increase is more than two-and-one-half times the 
actual number of cases reviewed. Probably the great mass
S. 2171, sec. 866(b)..
^ usCMA-JAG Annual Report, 1971, P. 5- 
5010 U.S.C. sec. 819 (1970).
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of added cases would Involve no major questions, for adver­
sary argument in an appeals court.
The Bayh-Bennett and Hatfield legislative proposals 
provide a continuation of the role of the President in the 
military legal system. In a strict interpretation, even 
the present limited participation by the chief executive 
violates the concept of judicial independence for the mili­
tary tribunals. However, the reality of the President's 
actually very limited authorized tasks and the tradition of 
even this minimal Involvement probably precludes any effort 
to eliminate the President from all responsibility in the 
system. Under Article. 71 of the Uniform Code the Presi­
dent must approve all court-martial sentences extending 
to death or Involving a general or flag officer. He must 
approve the sentence, or parts thereof, before the punish­
ment may be imposed. Significantly, the President cannot 
overturn a verdict approved by the Court of Military Appeals. 
The occasions in which Presidential action must occur are 
extremely infrequent. Presumably the death penalty cannot 
now be Imposed by a military court-martial. Thus, the only 
cases coming to the President would be those in which a gen­
eral or flag officer was prosecuted— a very rare occurrence. 
Under Article 71(b) the Secretary of the military, department 
must approve a sentence Involving dismissal of a commis­
sioned (other than general or flag) officer before such 
punishment can be imposed. Conceivably, the President
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could exercise selective review of the actions of the 
departmental official, a Presidential appointee, and direct 
a specific disposition. Presidential Intervention in any 
other military case would have to be justified through 
some inherent power in the chief executive as commander- 
in-chief of the armed forces. Presidential actions affect­
ing the sentence imposed by the military legal system would 
not impinge upon the independence of the judicial institu­
tions. As presently established in statute, authorized 
actions would not affect the courts' role in determining 
a verdict through weighing of law and facts. Reduction of 
a sentence occurs frequently in civilian jurisdictions in 
which the chief executive is authorized to grant clemency, 
pardon, or parole, or to commute a sentence.
Unofficial proposals for 
j udiciallzation
Although different in significant details, the 
Bayh-Bennett and Hatfield bills both represent a rather 
limited departure from the traditional concept of mili­
tary law and institutions. A much greater range of view 
is present in the many unofficial proposals for reform of 
the Uniform Code. A survey of these generally fragmentary 
plans indicates the kinds of alternatives which Congress 
will probably have to consider during any forthcoming amend­
ing process.
Change in the jurisdiction of the Courts ‘of Military
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Review is a subject for potential disagreement between 
reformers and the military departments. Policy views 
against expansion of the Courts’ jurisdiction were expressed 
by each of the three services responding to the 1972 ques­
tionnaire by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights. Their reactions were to a plan to grant, the Courts 
discretion to accept petitions from appellants whose cases 
did not qualify for automatic review.51
The Subcommittee inquiry pertained to a very minor 
expansion of the jurisdiction through elective appeals.
In contrast, a civilian attorney proposed implementation 
of a complete system of defendant-initiated appeals. The 
plan is based on two automatic administrative reviews of 
trial records followed by a formal appeal if desired by 
the defendant. Cases qualifying for such elective appeals 
include those with sentences of at least four months, as 
in the Hatfield bill; however, the important difference 
between the two plans is the elective rather than auto- 
matic appeals provision.
Expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Mili­
tary Appeals has been proposed by an Army attorney. At 
present, the highest appellate court can accept petitions
^Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 
questionnaire, 1972, question I-D-8.
52Sherman, "Civilianization of Military Law," 
pp. 102-103.
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from only those defendants whose cases have been ruled 
upon by the Courts of Military Review. The more liberal 
plan permits the Court to grant petitions from any court- 
martial regardless of the sentence imposed.
Defendant-initiated appeals would be required under 
recommendations of the Task Force on the Administration of 
Military Justice in the Armed Forces, a fourteen-member 
panel appointed in 1972 by the Secretary of Defense. ^  
According to the Task Force, the present system of auto­
matic review "uses precious time and resources and is 
believed, at least by some, to result too frequently in 
perfunctory action."^5 Under its plan, appeals from gen­
eral courts-martial and special courts-martial in which 
a punitive discharge was adjudged would be heard by the 
Court of Military Review only if the defense counsel pre­
sented an assignment of errors to the Court. Automatic 
review would occur only in the very rare case involving a 
general or flag officer or a death penalty. The principal 
justification for this recommendation by the task force 
was the effect of judicialization on the military legal 
system.
^Daniel h . Benson, ."The United States Court of 
Military Appeals," Texas Tech. Law Review, 3 (Fall, 1971), 
20-21.
cL
J Report of the Task Force on Military Justice,
Vol. 2, pp. 7*1-78 and Vol. 1, pp. 92-95-
55Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 93-
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Historically, military codes were written to be 
administered by laymen rather than by lawyers; today 
courts-martial are almost totally managed by lawyers.
Clearly, some of the safeguards that were considered 
necessary to prevent illegal influence of the court- 
martial by the commander would not be required in a 
system administered largely by lawyers. . . .56
The impact of the study on future Department of 
Defense legislative programs is difficult to predict.
The military criminal justice system is frequently praised 
for providing automatic review— either administrative or 
judicial— of every court-martial conviction.57 Such 
guarantees do not exist in any other Federal or state 
jurisdiction. But, as was described above, only 10 per 
cent of the court-martial cases are now reviewed judi­
cially by the intermediate appellate courts. Therefore, 
implementation of defendant-initiated reviews would not 
reduce significantly the percentage of cases now heard 
automatically. In a comment made shortly after publication 
of the Task Force report, the Chief Judge of the Air Force 
Court of Military Review expressed concern that prejudicial 
errors might not be detected in a system of defendant- 
initiated reviews.58
Elective rather than automatic appeals are supported 
by an American Bar Association committee developing criminal
56Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 92.
57por example, see, Homer E. Moyer, Jr., "Proce­
dural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over the
Civilian Defendant," Maine Law Review, 22 (1970), 10 4-40.
^Amery interview.
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appeals standards. In many civilian jurisdictions the 
number of elective appeals has increased dramatically 
since i960. Despite this trend, "substantial sentiment" 
existed among a minority of the committee to establish 
automatic appeals as a minimum standard for criminal pro­
cedure statutes In state and Federal jurisdictions.59 jn 
many states, automatic appeal is provided for only the 
most serious crimes Involving lengthy sentences of con­
finement. Automatic appeals are the exception to the norm.
Numerous other plans have been advanced for changing 
the Institutions and procedures of the military judicial 
system. Essentially all the proposals cause the military 
procedures to correspond more directly with those of civil­
ian jurisdictions. Most of the suggested changes in the 
appellate courts contribute to the objective of judlcial- 
ization.
The most extensive change in the structure of the 
intermediate appellate courts which has been discussed Is 
the creation of a single court to adjudicate all cases 
regardless of service origin. Located for administrative 
purposes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
tribunal would be composed of judges from each of the four 
services. The joint court Issue was first raised officially
^American Bar Association, Project on Minimum 
Standards for Criminal Justice.: Standards Relating to
Criminal Appeals, approved draft (New York: American Bar
Association, 1970), pp. 17-20.
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by the judges of the Court of Military Appeals. The con­
cept was discussed again during the 1962 hearings by the 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. At that 
time the military departments opposed such a court. The 
Air Force's written response to the Subcommittee's 1962 
questionnaire continues to be a typical objection.
Although such a system might be theoretically 
feasible, it would'not be practicable. The diversity 
of service problems and the respective areas unique 
to each of the services render lawyers of each service 
best qualified to review case3 pertaining to his ser­
vice. 6°
Support for the joint-court plan has come from two civil­
ian appellate judges. Judge Ferguson of the Court of Mili­
tary Appeals expressed his support to the Subcommittee in 
1 9 6 2 . Judge Jones, who retired in 1972 after serving 
on Navy tribunals since their creation in 1951, would staff 
the all-service single court with civilian judges, who 
could be retired military lawyers. One statutory problem 
in the creation of a joint court is the subordination of 
the Coast Guard judiciary to a court organized under the 
Department of Defense, which presently has no jurisdiction 
over that service. Obviously, some form of transfer would
^ Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military 
Personnel (1962)7 P* 595* Similar opinions were expressed 
in 1972 interviews by Navy. Chief Judge Krouse and Myron L. 
Birnbaum, a former member .of an Air Force board of review.
^ Ibid., p. 197. See, above, p. 90*.
/? pJones letter.
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have to be arranged to place the Coast Guard legal system 
under the Department of Defense rather than under the 
Department of Transportation. Despite the advantages for 
judicialization In a Department of Defense Court of Mili­
tary Review, it is doubtful that the individual military 
services will consent to relinquish their present control 
of criminal adjudication.
Further advancement by the Courts of Military 
Review toward greater judicialization depends upon enhance­
ment of the Court of Military Appeals. Civilian reformers 
have recommended that the highest military court be granted 
Article III status and incorporated into the Federal judi­
ciary. If this ever occurs, then the intermediate appel­
late courts logically could be given more attributes of 
genuine legislative courts.
Two legal periodical writers advocated conferring 
Article III classification on the Court of Military Appeals. 
The precedent for conversion of an appellate court from 
legislative to constitutional status exists in Congress1 
transferring of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.^3 
At present, the Court of Military Appeals meets the criteria 
for Article III status defined by the Supreme Court. The 
classification depends on whether the court's "business 
. . . there specified [in the statute creating the court]
^ 2 8  u.S.C. sec. 211 (1970). The transfer of status 
occurred as a result of a 1958 statute.
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and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence 
there [in Article III] expressly or impliedly made requi­
site."^ However, the Court .of Military Appeals is defi­
cient in one major prerequisite— appointment of its judges 
for life tenure during good behavior. On three occasions 
the House of Representatives has approved life tenure, 
only to see the Senate refuse to concur. Each rejection 
resulted from matters unrelated to the merits of the issue 
of life tenure. In addition to prestige, the benefits to 
be derived from constitutional status are unquestioned 
ability of the Court to declare unconstitutional sections 
of the Uniform Code or of executive orders and, secondly, 
a standard method for Supreme Court review of military 
judicial decisions. ^5 Further, the judges of the Court of 
Military Appeals would become equal members of the Federal 
bench and, thereby, less susceptible to political pressure 
through unfavorable Congressional tampering with their
ftauthority, tenure, and salary as can now occur. If the 
Court of Military Appeals were granted Article III status 
and if Congress approved methods to link the military and
6iJGlidden v. Zdanok,. ,370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962).
^These points are developed further, in John T. 
Willis, "The Constitution, the United States Court of Mili­
tary Appeals and the Future.,."- Military Law Review, 57 (Sum­
mer, 1972), 27-97-
^Daniel Patrick 0 'Hanlon, "The Military Judicial 
System: Should It Be Brought Under Article III?" Law and
Social Order, 1972 (No. 2), 329-43.
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civilian legal systems, then the remaining appellate and 
trial courts in the military could bo expected to receive 
comparable enhancement.
Prospects for enactments
Frequently in the preceding chapters the prediction 
has been made that enactment of comprehensive revision of 
the Uniform Code is improbable in the near future. What 
substantiation exists for this conclusion? The legisla­
tive history of military statutes demonstrates the need 
for substantial agreement on the desirability of reform 
among the military departments, the interest groups, and 
the general public. It Is unlikely that such a conjunction 
of pressure will develop In the next few years. Cessation 
of American military involvement in Indochina removes from 
public attention the prosecution of servicemen for contro­
versial crimes. Termination of conscription eliminates 
many of the circumstances of reluctant servicemen tried 
for disobedience of orders, particularly those related to 
combat.
One means available to. legislators to build public 
and pressure group support, for military criminal justice 
reforms is the introduction of bills. The Bayh-Bennett 
and Hatfield bills analyzed herein are only the most com­
prehensive of the numerous pieces of legislation formally 
filed in recent Congresses. Sponsorship of amendments
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enables a legislator to develop a vehicle for expression 
of his views on the need for Congressional action. Speeches 
before interested citizen groups and periodical articles 
are methods for motivating public support.^7
However, a corresponding danger exists in that the 
introduction of so many bills may overwhelm the capacity of 
the executive and legislative branches to prepare for and 
conduct hearings on the major proposals. For example, in 
the Ninety-second Congress seventy-six bills on military 
legal matters were Introduced and referred to the House 
Armed Services Committee. Many were submitted to the 
Department of Defense for feasibility study and policy 
comment. Because of the complexity of most bills, the 
Department did not respond to any of the proposals. An 
additional reason for this particular delay was the diver­
sion of staff to the eight-month study by the Department's 
Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice. The 
Department awaited the results of its own study before 
acting upon legislation referred by the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees.
Many of the same bills were introduced in the 
current Ninety-third Congress.6® Most were submitted
67jnterview with Peter Coogan, staff of Senator 
Birch Bayh, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1972.
^Braswell letter. As of August 15, 1973, no 
schedule had been established for any hearings.
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to the Department of Defense for analysis. According to
the sponsor of one of the principal bills, Representative
Bennett, "[H]opefully, replies will be received [from the
Department of Defense] for possible subcommittee considera-
69tion during the 93rd Congress." * The next problem is the 
scheduling of hearings in both the House and the Senate. 
Senator Bayh evaluated the prospects as not very encour­
aging for hearings in 1973. Joint hearings by a sub­
committee of the Armed Services Committee and the Subcom­
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee, 
as were held in 1966, are a probable arrangement for future 
Senate study of military law legislation. However, the 
chairman of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, Senator 
Ervin, has given scheduling priority to hearings on bills 
revising administrative discharge procedures.71 Even these 
hearings are improbable in 1973? and possibly even in 1974.
Thus, immediate action of a comprehensive nature on 
military legal reform is unlikely, if for no other reasons 
than the mechanics of preparation of Department of Defense 
policy positions and the scheduling of Congressional
^Letter from Representative Charles E. Bennett, 
Washington, D.C., January 12, 1973.
7°Letter from Senator Birch Bayh, Washington, D.C., 
January 11, 1973.
710f course, Senator Ervin was occupied during 
1973 with his chairmanship of the Senate Select Committee 
on Presidential Campaign Activities. S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 
1st sess., 1973*
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hearings. Further delay will probably diminish public 
interest in the legislation. The model for future enact­
ments will probably be that of the Military Justice Act of 
1968 which emerged after fifteen years of rather persistent 
effort by various interests.
Judicialization through administrative actions
With no statutory revisions forthcoming, the Courts 
of Military Review will be affected chiefly by judicializa­
tion initiatives of the judicial and executive branches. 
Perhaps the Navy and Coast Guard Courts will join their 
Army and Air Force counterparts in declaring their power to 
issue writs for extraordinary relief. With a unified posi­
tion on this important issue, the Courts will be more likely 
to receive from the Court of Military Appeals the desired 
endorsement of their status as legislative courts. A 
number of administrative changes were implemented in 1969 
as a result of the Military Justice Act of 1968. These 
actions provide illustrations of judicialization through 
administrative initiative.. The Courts of Military Review 
are now accorded a respect not present during the years of 
the boards of review. Appellate, military judges wear Judi­
cial robes and conduct sessions with counsel in courtrooms 
befitting the status of an appellate court. New rules of 
practice and procedure issued by the Judge Advocates Gen­
eral included sample forms for the submission of official
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documents to the Courts, pf Military Review. Even the papers 
prepared by the Judge Advocates General are addressed "To 
the Honorable, the Judges of the United States [Navy] Court 
of Military Review.11?2
Progress in Judicialization through administrative 
change has been slow. For example, many of the deficiencies 
cited in the United States v. Draughon and Combest v. Bender 
opinions as evidence of the nonjudicial character of the 
tribunals could be corrected through actions within the 
authority of the military departments. Membership on the 
Courts could be stabilized through implementation of a 
specified tenure for Judges, who would be ineligible for 
reassignment except for cause related to their Judicial 
performance. Judges should be removed from all relation­
ships with the military command hierarchy during their Judi­
cial assignment.
A second major area for improvement is in the pub­
lication of Judicial opinions. Court-Martial Reports con­
tains all opinions of the Court of Military Appeals and 
selected opinions of the four intermediate appellate courts. 
Criteria for publication of a Court of Military Review 
opinion include the importance and precedent potential. 
However, the final decision on publication in each, military 
department rests with personnel in the Office of the Judge 
Advocate General rather than with the Judges themselves.
72/jo CMR xl-xlv (196.9).
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The best evidence that not all important decisions are 
published is the omission of United States v. Dolby from 
Court-Martial Reports. The declaration that the Army 
Court possessed extraordinary relief power undoubtedly 
met the importance criterion. Certainly not all Court of 
Military Review opinions are worthy of publication. If 
the reason for highly selective publication is lack of ' 
space in the reporter series, then a solution is removal 
of Court of Military Appeals opinions from Court-Martial 
Reports. Opinions of that tribunal are duplicated in two 
reporters, both published by the same commercial firm. 
Additionally, Courts of Military Review are not identified 
on the cover of the volumes of Court-Martial Reports, the 
contents of which are listed as the opinions of "The Judge 
Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the United States 
Court of Military Appeals." Opinions of the Judge Advo­
cates General have never been published in Court-Martial 
Reports. The wording perhaps originated with the assumption 
that the original boards of review in 1951 were still advi­
sory agencies for the Judge Advocates General. As noted 
above, the names of the judges, of the Courts of Military 
Review are not printed in the' '.introductory pages of Court- 
Martial Reports. Printed Instead are the names of the 
Judge Advocates General of each military service since 
the founding of that office.'. Such vestiges of administra­
tive subservience to the military command hierarchy detract
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from the Judicial status and authority of the Courts of 
Military Review.
An assessment
The numerous proposals for revision of the Uniform 
Code advanced since 1969 all contain as a principal objec­
tive the increased Judicialization of the military criminal 
Justice system. Expectedly, the extent of reform varies 
in the diverse legislation. As did the proposals before 
1968, these legislative efforts will form the foundation 
for future enactments, although new amendments are, real­
istically, several years distant. Viewed in terms of 
history, enactment of major elements of these proposals 
will maintain the evolution of military adjudicatory 
institutions and procedures. This evolution continues to 
move the intermediate appellate courts farther along the 
continuum from executive to Judicial adjudication. The 
proposals demonstrate a recognition of the deficiencies 
of executive adjudication pointed out by Roscoe Pound.
The goal of the reformers is to. continue the process of 
providing "checks upon arbitrary, biased, or extra-legal 
if not unlawful . . . action. . . ."73
73p0und, Justice According to Law, p. 79.. See, 
above, p . 9 •
CHAPTER IX
AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL EVOLUTION
The hypothesis of this work is that the Courts of 
Military Review are evolving toward a status of genuine 
Judicial institutions recognized in fact and law as legis­
lative courts. The foregoing analysis of the history of 
military appellate methods, of legislative and Judicial 
declarations, of Judicial behavior, and of contemporary 
attitudes on Judicialization substantiates the hypothesis. 
The research framework has been a descriptive analysis of 
the advancement of military appellate institutions along 
a continuum ranging from executive to Judicial adjudication.
The same format is applicable to study of any 
adjudicatory institution in actual or potential transition 
from executive to Judicial status. In addition to the 
military tribunals analyzed herein, two other specialized 
courts of the national government have evolved over time 
to fully recognized Judicial positions. The predecessor 
of the United States Customs Court was the Board of General 
Appraisers in the Treasury Department. The Customs Court . 
is now a constitutional court and a full member of the 
Federal Judiciary. The predecessor of the United States
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Tax Court was the United States Board of Tax Appeals, a 
component of the Treasury Department. The Tax Court is 
now a legislative court established under Article I of the 
Constitution. Conceivably continued transition could bring 
it into the status of a constitutional court. Although 
each of these tribunals originated as an element of the 
executive branch, each has terminated that subordination. 
Other adjudicatory institutions of the executive depart­
ments may undergo similar transformations severing former 
direct administrative relationships. The other model of 
judicialization is that of the military intermediate appel­
late courts. In all probability these tribunals will remain 
in some form of relationship with the military departments. 
Nevertheless, these tribunals are attaining attributes of 
genuine judicial Institutions while continuing as executive 
entities. The conclusion from these observations is that 
the doctrine of separation of powers Is not a rigid prohi­
bition on the existence within the executive branch of judi­
cial Institutions. All activities subordinate to an execu­
tive department are not necessarily executive in character. 
Conceivably other adjudicatory elements in the executive 
branch will undergo judicialization similar to that occur­
ring In the military courts. The process by. which these 
transformations progress involves Interactions among the 
principal centers of authority In American government. 4 
A final means of assessing the status of the Courts
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of Military Review is an evaluation against the standard 
for appellate courts, developed by the American Bar Associa­
tion.
The structure of appellate courts should be con­
sonant with the purposes of appellate review, to wit:
(i) To protect defendants against prejudicial 
legal error in the proceedings leading to convictions 
and, within limits, against verdicts unsupported by 
sufficient evidence;
(ii) Authoritatively to develop and refine the 
substance and procedural doctrines and principles of 
criminal law; and
(Hi) To foster and maintain uniform, consistent 
standards and practices in criminal processes.1
As presently constituted, the Courts of Military Review
accomplish satisfactorily the first purpose of appellate
review. With the effects of judicialization, these Courts
are now able to identify and correct prejudicial errors
which in earlier years would have been ignored as legal
niceties by the command-dominated adjudicatory processes.
Because the intermediate appellate courts are empowered to
weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
determine controverted questions of fact, these tribunals
have greater opportunity than do most civilian courts to
reject verdicts unsupported by evidence. The Courts of
Military Review have even been permitted by the Court of
Military Appeals to consider certain matters outside the
standard trial record. For example, post-trial psychiatric
examinations have been used to determine that an accused
-1ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals, p. 22.
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was incompetent to stand trial.2
However, the military intermediate appellate courts 
are deficient in meeting the other two standards. The 
Court of Military Appeals has exercised most of the ini­
tiative in developing and refining the substance and pro­
cedural doctrines of criminal law under the Uniform Code.
In their new status as the equivalent of legislative courts, 
perhaps each Court of Military Review will become more 
effective in the task of doctrinal development. Similarly, 
the intermediate courts have not been particularly competent 
in fostering and maintaining uniform, consistent standards 
in military law. Before 1969 the boards of review within 
each service functioned independently with little, if any, 
coordination of Interpretation. Through the years as the 
body of precedent from the Court of Military Appeals developed 
substantively, the boards moved toward the objective of 
greater consistency. One positive result of the estab­
lishment of the single Court of Military Review in each 
service is the coordination of decisions, accomplished 
through supervision by the chief judge and eii banc deci­
sions in the most controversial cases. Further progress 
could be. made through the creation of a military judicial 
conference as an administrat±ve aid to synchronization of 
opinions of the four Courts.
2For example, see Uriite'.d States v. Gordon, *J2 CMR 
799 (ACMR 1970).
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Military adjudicatory Institutions and procedures 
are creations of a political system which produces outputs 
through compromise. Each statute affecting military crim­
inal justice matters was the best obtainable in the situa­
tion prevailing at the time of enactment. Consequently, 
the ideal system probably will never be developed through 
acts of Congress, even if all the nonlegislative parties 
agree on the elements of that ideal system. The hope for 
the future is that necessary improvements can be made by 
the Judicial and administrative components of the military 
departments. An encouraging sign is that influential of fi- 
cials are amenable to judicialization. The traditionalist 
military attitudes are waning; few leaders now consider the 
strengthening of judicial institutions and procedures to be 
an unwarranted infringement on the rights of commanders.
The opinion of General William C. Westmoreland, a former 
Army Chief of Staff, is noteworthy: "A military trial
should not have a dual function as an instrument of dis­
cipline and as an instrument of justice. It should be an 
instrument of justice and in fulfilling this function, it 
will promote discipline..
The public, the judiciary, the Congress, and, most 
importantly, the military leadership have demonstrated a 
newly acquired recognition that the fifty-year evolution
3"Military Justi.ce-.-A Commander's Viewpoint," 
American Criminal Law Review, 10 (July, 1971)» 8.
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toward judicialization .of the military criminal justice 
system will continue. That evolution will take the mili­
tary intermediate appellate courts farther toward the 
ultimate point on the adjudicatory continuum— unquestioned 
status as legislative courts of the United States.
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